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ABSTRACT. 
John Creaby 
"Anatomy of a merger: A study of the merger process in British Trade Unions, with 
particular reference to the case of the G.MB/Apex merger of 1989" 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy from 
the University of Durham. 
March 1995 
The historic contexi, characteristics, effects of social and industrial determinants and the 
tendentious factors of trade union mergers are explored. The literature on trade unionism, its 
history and merger trends and styles, is reviewed with special reference to the relationship of 
staff and manual workers. The hypotheses developed concern the reasons for mergers, the 
capital I labour nexus, merger styles, and the effects of both internal factors (trade union 
movement and individual trade union culture) and external (industry and societal) factors. 
This is then related to the particular merger of APEX/GMB: the significance of a staff union 
amalgamating with a general, ostensibly manual, union. The hypotheses are reviewed against 
the historic development, characteristics, structural changes and, more particularly, the culture 
of the unions. Reviewing the developed themes of culture changes, the actual merger details 
are analysed, drawing upon interviews of a relevant selected group of senior lay and full-time 
officials and internal documents. This case study also considers the earlier merger of the 
Boilermakers' Society and the General & Municipal Workers Union: itself significant in 
bringing together a craft and general union. Among other conclusions, it is asserted that the 
future development is the amalgamation - fiiendly style, managing change as part of the trade 
union critical application to merge, and the "Super Union", which is "conglomerate" in 
character. There is no monocausal determinant, however there are interdependent factors. 
This gives direction to probable development for the 1990s. Although concerned with the 
developing British trend it also points to the factors' relevance to a broader arena of the trade 
union centre, the TUC and Europe. 
(None ofthis work has previously been submitted for any other degree.) 
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Introduction 
This thesis represents an investigation of trade union mergers in contemporary Britain. Mergers 
of trade unions in the 1980-1990s reduced the number of rue affiliates from 112 ( 1979) to 68 
( 1993 ) creating new speculation as to the direction of change in British trade unionism. The 
scenario of new human resource management, "Japanisation", the "flexible firm", the shift in the 
profile of occupational structure of industry and the creation of a single European market all 
pose problems of a changed environment for trade unions. They add to the political circumstances 
of Britain with a Conservative government since 1979 continuing into the 1990s , which has 
had a programme of state intervention into the role and practices of the trade unions. In the main 
it has removed the long established social partnership benveen government, employers and trade 
unions. The issue of state intervention and approach is not new it merely differs in character . 
The TUC has always examined the changing profile oftrade unions as a result of mergers and has, 
emanating from the General Council statement adopted at the 1987 Congress, undertaken to make 
a "detailed examination" of structures. This interest and attempt to reform trade union structures 
has surfaced previously at times of change and increased merger activity in 1926-1927, 1944-
1946, and 1962-1965. However the TUC has always maintained the stance that the trade unions 
have the "right ultimately to determine their structures and practice in the light of their own needs 
and experiences" (TUC 1966 ). So , with no central direction , change is driven by what appear 
to be complex elements. 
Undy et al. in their notable study had a conceptual model involving the interaction of change 
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agents, the decision making structure and leadership as definitive determinants of the "needs and 
experiences" of the trade unions. This model aligned to the question of amalgamation, but had a 
broader concentration ; to comprehend internal and ex1emal changes of trade unions. (Undy 1981) 
Their model leads to other considerations of intra - trade union factors that favour or inhibit 
amalgamations and the extra- trade union factors which impact on the equation. These main 
potential causation of any trade union merger , therefore , include a wide range of components. 
In the following Chapters key issues will be delineated, the changed environment identified and 
consideration given to the historical background to trade union characteristics. Rather than 
attempting a comprehensive coverage of amalgamations, the focus will be on a particular merger, 
the GMB and APEX. This was a most important merger cutting across the boundaries of the 
present and previously perceived future structural characteristics. 
From the aforegoing , the work will relate to knowledge about tensions, action and reaction that 
mergers bring about. To support this, cross reference will be made with other amalgamations 
past and present. Detailed comparative data is drav·m particularly from the AEU (later to 
become through amalgan1ation with the EEPTU, the AEEU), MSF (an amalgamation of TASS 
and ASTMS), TG\VU and the public sector wuons, NALGO, NUPE and COHSE (recently 
amalgamated to form ill\1JSON) . 
In introducing the debate on the GMB/ APEX merger at the GMB 1988 Congress John 
Edmonds, Gl\ffi general secretary stated that he believed there would in the future "be only four 
major unions in Britain and each of them will have well over a million members ... " and \Vent on to 
add ... "We need new members and we need good amalgamations, the sort that strengthens the 
union by opening up opportunities for further recruitment . " ( Edmonds 1988) 
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The following Chapters will identify the factors shaping the attitudes of trade union members to 
forge "good amalgamations" and the perceived and expected results . In this work, mergers of 
trade unions refer to all amalgamations and transfers of engagements. However it must be 
recognised that "amalgamation means each union loses its identity and becomes merged into a 
new union ... ", "transfer of engagement is a transfer of the obligations of one union (transferor) 
to another (transferee) and an assumption ofthose obligations by the latter. Members of all unions 
involved in a proposed amalgamation should be given the opportunity to vote, but in the case, 
however, of a proposed transfer of engagement the voting is confined to the transferor union." 
(Jones & Manis 1982). In most cases reference will be to mergers, however where there is 
specific need to establish detail, reference may be made to the merger being an amalgamation or a 
transfer of engagements. 
Chapter one will examine the changes in characteristics determined by what is termed the 
socialisation effects of the capital I labour nex"Us. It v.~ll also consider the effects of density and 
trade union growth by analysing the statistics of change whilst considering the changed industrial 
and commercial environment. Chapter two will assess the practical and tendentious factors 
affecting individual union mergers. The case study research methods are described in Chapter 
three. The results of which are contained in Chapters four and five. The situation that prevails 
post- merger is considered in Chapter 6. 
Chapter four illustrates the historic character, background and parallel development of the two 
unions, whilst Chapter five records in detail the process and motivations of the merger itself 
Chapter six considers the post - merger situation as it applied to the leadership, activists and 
internal structures . Finally Chapter seven relates the concluding analysis which will include two 
Introduction 
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conceptual maps of the model deYeloped from the research and the portends for the future of 
amalgamations . 
Introduction 
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In this Chapter we will examine macro-factors relating to the mergers. It is evident that 
structural characteristics , as effected by socialisation , have a direct influence on the trade 
union merger process. This qualitative examination is compounded by the quantitative analysis 
of size, growth and density. As these determinants affect actual and potential membership of 
the trade unions, they are important points of departure in the study of trade union mergers . 
Trade Union Structural Characteristics 
Present structural characteristics of trade unions are a direct result of historic determinism. 
Whilst commentators often talk of the British Trade Union Movement, it cannot be perceived 
as an organic whole; each union has evolved independently often embod)~ng different 
priorities and sets of practices. Nevertheless most documents on trade union organisation 
distinguish four basic types of union : craft, industrial , general , and non -manual or staff . 
However, as the initial map of change outlines in Table 1 , there are intra and extra factor 
which show changing characteristics. These traditional trade union structure classifications 
have often created constraints on change and particularly on mergers. Nevertheless , with 
pressure from the socio-historic determinants, they are important points of departure in the 
study of trade union amalgamations. 
Intra- and Extra - Factors which Affect Trade Unions Table 1 
INTRA- FACTORS EXTRA- FACTORS 
CHARACTERISTICS CHARACTERISTICS 
TRADE UNION STRUCTURES POTENTIAL UNION ME1-1BERS 
Traditional to Conglomerate Social Stratification 
Manual > Craft Actual > Asswncd 
Industrial > Sectoral Industrial > Sectoral 
General Demographic Changes 
Non-manual > Staff Imagery > Perception 
Conglomerate New job territory 
Open or Closed 
Cbaracterisitics affected by Soci1>-historic determinism 
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Craft unions : skilled workers' social closure. 
From the craftsmen and Guilds of the 18th Century, using their bargaining powers, with scant 
regard to those outside their craft or skills and no reference outside their district, these workers 
combined to form unions. With the advance of the Industrial Revolution and the growing 
strength of these craft based unions, the state intervened with laws ( Combination Acts 1799 
& 1800) to forbid the combination ofworkers, ifthey were established to improve.wages and 
conditions. 
These Craft unions , as they became known , reflected the societal changes taking place and 
various attempts were made to form a universal trade association with a federal basis of 
sectors based on trade or locality in the years that followed the repeal of the Combination 
Acts, 1824 . (Engels 1844 : Thompson 1968) 
Industrial Unions : Craft Unions Extend. 
What was achieved , however , was moves to establish a number of national Craft I Industrial 
Unions. The important features of these unions was size and geography, a national/centralised 
administration and identity which reflected in the process of their activity, giving the ability to 
hold out against employers and the state obstructions. They also reflected industrialisation . 
By merger of small engineering craft unions , the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, 
established in 1851, typified the fom1 of polity that crafts believed they required to protect 
their interests . The membership was drawn from a social stratum detennined by themselves 
i.e. workers from a sector of particular acceptable skills. (Jeffrey 1971) 
This is what Allen termed the socialisation influence : the fact that trade unions do not 
operate independent of society, but respond and contribute to its change. As he outlined 
"It is not possible for unions which arose in opposition to the dominant 
Characterisitics affected by Socio-historic determinism 
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e_ffects of capitalism to operate within the system as permanent bodies 
without taking on some of the characteristics of the system itse(f" (Allenl966) 
General Unions: Open to All Workers. 
The craft I industrial workers' standard of living and job security was not enjoyed by the 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers in the new sweated industries. By the end of the 19th 
century, trade union membership extended outside the restrictions applied by those elitist 
unions. Trade unions now encompassed a mass membership of gas workers, dockers, tram 
'vorkers and shop assistants. These employees had previously been seen as transient in terms 
of their relationship v.ith their employer, therefore permanent trade union membership was 
regarded as impracticable. 
This "New Unionism" 'vas General in character and ethos, differing from the craft I industrial 
unions in a number of ways. Not only was it a quantitative difference, with a larger potential 
membership area of recruitment across occupational spheres, geographic areas , industrial 
sectors and women , there was also a qualitative difference which changed the perspective of 
the union. It recognised that industrial society \vas not dhided by sectional interest of 
occupation, but the overriding factors were between Capital and Labour. (Kapp 1989 : Thorne 
1925: Clegg 1954 & 1964: Radice 1974) 
These general unions were to have a major impact on trade unionism. These more open -
general trade unions had a constant tendency to merge, thus came into being the two giant 
unions, the Gas & General Workers and the Dockers and Transport Workers, forerunners of 
the GMB and TGWU. Moreover the success of the general unions provided an incentive to 
the craft I industrial unions to form stronger national identities and amalgamate to include many 
types of craftsmen and skills in adjacent trades. For example, the ASE became the base for the 
amalgamation of ten unions to forn1 the AEU in 1920 and the acceptance of some unskilled 
Characterisitics affected by Socio-bi~1oric determinism 
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and the semi-skilled (however not women) into membership. These unions now took on some 
of the characteristics of the general unions whilst still maintaining the industrial I craft base. 
(Clegg 1954: Pelling 1967: Jeffrey 1971: Kapp 1989) 
Non-Manual or Staff Trade Unions : Into the Offices. 
In industries, sef\~ces or the trades circumscribed v.~thin the state or public bodies, a different 
form of trade union developed which was neither "general" or "craft I industri;il" ; there 
evolved the Occupational, Sectoral and Staff unions. They evolved out of the increasing 
complexities that the gro\v1h of production brought, the expansion of banking and finance, the 
new ethos of sales I purchasing in companies and the emergence of a public service sector. 
These trade unions whilst having "declared themselves to be bona fide trade unions with the 
express purpose of bettering the economic position of their members", were "unwilling to 
submerge themselves in larger unions with predominantly manual-worker membership." 
(Lockwood 1966) 
An example of this trend was the National Union of Clerks (NUC) established in 1890, 
forerunner of APEX . Although the ~l.JC was basically a general occupational union catering 
for office staff, the general element related only to its cover of many sectors of employment. 
However , most occupational unions took the form of sectoral or industrial basis. Lock-wood's 
classic study of clerical v,;ork organisation and unionisation gives a good appreciation of these 
developments. Later consideration will be given to his argument that although bureaucratised 
these work situations have not proletarianised the workers. (Lockwood 1966 : Marsh 1978) 
The aforegoing gives a brief appreciation of the historic and internal factors \vhich established 
the traditional classification of trade unions. Whilst these classifications are imperfect , they do 
give a base from where to start. It must be noted that most, if not all , literature relating to the 
Characterisitics affected by Socio-historic determinism 
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trade union movement covers these classifications in various levels of detail. 
Turner in 1964, referring to trade union structures, noted the "inadequacy ofthe classifications 
commonly used to describe the diverse external forms it may assume," and using his analysis 
from the empirical study of the textile unions suggested a different typology, that of open or 
closed unions. The open unions imposed no restriction on entry, they organised and recruited 
all workers and were generally expansionist. The closed unions restricted entry thr_ough the 
nature of occupational skills and qualifications and often the apprenticeship system. Although 
stating that "the frontier between open and closed unionism is not rigid or permanent", he 
contended nevertheless that it "pretty adequately explains not merely the cotton unions' 
ex1ernal structure, but the general pattern of British trade union organisation". (Turner 1964) 
Turner's model has in recent years been criticised by other writer , including Undy. Undy et al. 
showed that there were "more and more exceptions in the contemporary situation "to this 
notion and that unions were never "quite closed or open". In fact Undy cited the NUR and 
r"\TUM as "unions that confine themselves to a single industrial sector (that) will change their 
job territory in line with changes in that industry". Compounding this analysis, the present 
merger wave in the 1990s has the NUM discussing terms with the TGWU and the NUR 
amalgamated with the seamen's l\TUS to form the National Union of Rail, Maritime and 
Transport Workers (RJv1T). Undy understood that this could happen for even these industrial 
unions if their "strategic position is threatened or they become so small as to be unviable 
administratively" would break out of their industrial sector. (Undy et a! 1981) Indeed given 
the complexity of trade union characteristics , no classification model is finite . However, we 
\viii see the importance of classification in later Chapters as it effects the tendentious factors of 
merger style and individual unions' culture. 
Characterisitics affected by Socio-historic determinism 
Socialisation: the change to characteristics 
SOCIALISATION EFFECTS CAPITAL\LABOUR 
THE CHARACTERISTICS of TRADE UNIONS Table 2 
Capital 
INDUSTRIALISATION 
Capital changes led by 
Technological change 
Family firm 
socialisation 
Capital confined to local boundaries 
INDUSTRY 
Factory System 
Industry based capital 
Capital confined to national 
boundaries 
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 
Developing Teclmology led change 
Taylorism ... Fordism. 
Professional management controls 
differs ownership 
!\.1erger of companies mainly in 
the same or near sectors 
Internationally mobile 
CONGLOMERATES 
Structural Changes 
Merger of Companies non sectoral 
into different industries & services 
Capital internationally concentrated 
New industrial cultures 
Labour 
CRAFT 
Trade unions contained 
by craft 
Exclusive social strata of 
potential union membership. 
"closed union". 
Labourconfinedtolocal 
boundaries 
CRAFT--INDUSTRIAL 
Industrial unions extended in 
industry 
Amalgamation within skill spheres 
Exclusive strata of potential union 
membership : " closed unions 
New General /sectoral/ occupational 
trade unions: "open unions " . 
cater for new potential membership 
GENERAL TREND 
All trade unions have general 
approach. 
Social strata of potential trade union 
members extended 
Merger oftrade unions taking 
account the tendency to general trends 
Closed unions becoming more open 
CONGLOMERATES 
Structural Changes 
Merger ofunions from all groups 
including manual & non - manual 
Social strata of potential union 
members ex1ended to all employees. 
10 
As already shown earlier , socialisation affects the characteristics of trade unions and puts 
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pressure upon them to accept change. An Illustration of the Capital I Labour nex-us through 
socialisation is outlined in Table 2 . This shows a direct effect on the characteristics of trade 
unions by the changing phases of industrial capitalism. 
During the period of industrialisation and the development of an industrial society, by the mid 
19th century , the system and hierarchies impressed its image on society. The craft unions and 
their leadership reflecting these changes, discovered 
"that capitalism was not a temporary catastrophe , but a permanent 
system which allowed some improvement , had altered the objectives 
of their struggle. 771ere were no socialists to dream of a new society. 
There were trade unions, seeJ.:ing to exploit the laws of political 
economy in order to create a scarcity of their kind of labour and thus 
increase their members' wage" 
( Hobsbawm 1969} 
Littler clearly exposes , in his historical analysis of the labour process, craft/ industrial worker 
having a "co- domination" role with the employer and their concern was often " to limit the 
collective power of the unskilled and semi -skilled" as contractors of this labour. (Littler1986) 
Industry developed a corporation capitalism, which was to replace the individualistic family 
factory system in this new phase of capitalist development. 
"It does not matter what we call it ( 'c01poration capitalism ' 
'organised capitalism ' , etc. ) so long as it is agreed - and it must be 
-that combinations advanced at the expense of market competition, 
business c01porations at the expense of private .firms, big business and lmge 
ente1prise at the expense of smaller; and that this 
concentration implied a tendency towards oligopoly. This was e1'ident 
even in so powerful a fortress of old- fashioned small- scale and 
medium competitive ente1prise as Britain ". ( Hobsbawm 1987) 
The major shift in proprietorial control was in the period 1919 - 1939 to the extent that " by 
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1939 , Britain had as high a concentration of capital as any other Western society". (Littler 
1986) So the increased mergers of companies cut across industry, services and even 
established new sectors. Machine technology assumed more and more importance with a rapid 
grov.>th in engineering and new products such as cycles , cars and the rubber , chemical and 
energy sectors. The trade unions needed a more competent structure, a bureaucracy to meet 
this challenge. At the same time, this new era required more and more workers in the 
unskilled or semiskilled occupations . 
To meet the challenge , as indicated in Table 1 , characteristics of the unions changed : craft 
unions amalgamate.d within their skill spheres, general and occupational unions amalgamated 
and developed to cater for the potential members ignored by the "labour aristocrat" industrial 
craft unions. 
This early period of the 20th century brought further transitional economic developments, the 
shift to consumerism and the new methods of production introduced by the American car 
manufacturer, Henry Ford . This included the growth of" scientific management" techniques 
to control labour power. developed by another American, Frederick Winslow Taylor. He 
believed that for management to be effective, it had to have absolute control of the labour 
process in every detail. The classic Chaplin film (1936), "Modern Times", in the opening 
sequence, satirises in its central theme, the effects of automation on the workers' lives. Here 
was ridiculed the big corporation , the regimentation and control of the workers, work speed-
up and eventually Chaplin inside the machine, a human cog. Indeed, industry was now 
structuring into large corporations able to benefit from the "cost saving" and more particularly, 
the control propounded by the human resource "behavioural analysis" schools of thought. 
(Taylor 1967 : Littler 1986) The analysis and research into these systems in Britain , during 
the inter war years, do not specifically relate to the restructuring and mergers of trade unions , 
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however they pro\~de a foundation for recognising the industrial changes which clearly effected 
British trade unions. 
Trade unions in Britain amalgamated to meet the challenge of the new order. Particularly the 
amalgamation "aggressive" TGWU , formed in 1922 by mergers, was, during the following 25 
years , to have 33 unions amalgamate with it. Industrial I craft unions again consolidated 
within skills, as did, to a lesser degree, occupational I sectoral unions. The bureau~ratic form 
of industry that prevailed at the time had an hierarchical infra structure which was rigid. 
However this transitional period created the emergence and growth, not only of the managerial 
professional, but also administrative employment. (Bain 1967 : Lumley 1973) 
For the trade unions , this was a significant potential union membership shift to the white 
collar, black coated worker or salariat in the 1960s through to the 1980s. This led to 
sections being established in some manual unions for staff employees apart from the 
occupational I sectoral unions. The TGWU had formed its clerical section, ACTSS, as long ago 
as 1924 but had only stimulated activity in the late 1960s. The Gl\1B formed its section, 
MATSA , much later in 1972. Industrial /craft unions attempted to cater for those members 
promoted to foreman, for example the AEU with its Section (Rule) 13 member, with some 
success. 
Nevertheless, the manual unions lost the competition, to some degree, to the white collar 
unions and particularly to the recruitment and amalgamation aggressive ASTMS, itself an 
amalgamation of the foremans' union ASSET and the scientific workers' union AScW in 
1968. White collar trade union growth and mergers in the period 1960 - 1970 are well 
documented , as is the prognostication on its continuation. (Bain 1970 : Undy et al 1981 : 
Jenkins & Sherman 1979a : Child 1975 ) 
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Another group, although not affiliated to the TUC yet representative of employees, was 
establishing a higher profile, media attention and academic research, the staff association . 
Trade unions viewed them as management inspired, management aided and thus management 
controlled. This was not the complete raison d'etre as many reasons were given as to why these 
associations were formed. Some were sweetheart organisations set up by manageffi:ent to stop 
trade union encroachment into Office areas , however others had elements of what Blackburn 
termed unionateness . This concept of unionateness was measured against seven 
characteristics : 
1. It regards collective bargaining m1d the promotion of the interests of 
members, as employees, as its mainfimction, rather than, say 
professional actirities or 11-e/jare schemes. 
2. It is independent of employers for the pwpose of negotiations. 
3. It is prepared to be militant, using all forms of industrial action which may be 
effective . 
.:/. It declares itself to be a trade union. 
5. It is registered as a trade union. 
6. It is affiliated to the TUC. 
7. It is affiliated to the Labour Party. 
( R. M. Blackburn 1967) 
TUC affiliates were perceived, by this new potential membership, as anti - management, anti -
change and not able to fit the company culture with which they identified. So Staff 
Associations were established . Trade unions questioned their ability to provide equal benefits 
or have their resources and , at this point in time, be part of the direct discussions with the 
Government. 
"Small 01ganisations have increasingly found it impossible to cope 
with the exigencies of modem collective bargaining and their 
own sen,icing and cash flow problems. ll1ey have neither the 
expertise nor the money to buy in the expertise". (.Jenkins & Sherman 1979b.) 
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This was an oversimplification as many staff associations had developed structures, bought in 
expertise and, although house unions, had most of the unionateness characteristics and 
approaches of TUC affiliates. The issue ofunionateness will be revisited in Chapter 3 , when 
considering the culture of trade unions as a factor in mergers and then in Chapter 5 , referring 
to the later differentiation of society unionateness and enterprise unionateness in the 1980s. 
(Prandy, Blackburn & Stewart 1982.) Nevertheless, in the 1970s, the trade union qualitative 
resources argument was used successfully by the TUC unions in amalgamation discussions 
·with staff associations. 
Amongst the staff associations membership were employees who related to the heterogeneous 
title of manager, organised in particular companies where numbers determined a need for 
collecti-vism. Bamber in 1985, re-viewing the growth and development of manager trade 
unionism, clearly emphasised this amalgamation attraction of rue affiliated trade unions for 
these organisations. (Bamber 1986) 
During the 1960s and 1970s the earnings of manual and some staff were comparable. Also , as 
Lockwood found in his classic study of clerical workers, their market situation had been 
deteriorating since the 1930s, whilst the work environment had become bureaucratised . This 
resulted in trade union membership to protect their interests. Later , with Goldthorpe and 
others , it \Vas again argued that the level of earnings is not sufficient to create any 
commonality . The affluent manual workers join trade unions for purely instrumental reason of 
advancing their economic interests at the workplace. Unlike the staff worker, they did not 
adopt middle class patterns of sociability or community identity. They accepted there was a 
shift from "solidaristic collectivism" to an "instrumental collectivism" and that this was also the 
reason given for white collar workers joining trade unions. ( Lockwood 1966 : Goldthorpe et 
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all968: 1969) 
This acaderruc conceptualising , whether or not there was evident proletarianisation of white 
collar workers or embourgeoisement of the manual worker, continued throughout the late 
sixties and seventies. (Marcuse 1964 : Goldthorpe 1980: Westergaard & Resler 1980) 
However , in the workplace , attitudes developed from the need for econorruc protection and 
advancement through collective bargaining produced a convergence of values. There was a 
move to staff status from manual workers and the removal of those conditions of employment 
which categorised an office worker. The staff unions reciprocating by claiming better wages 
to reduce what was seen as a differential in favour of the manual worker. At the same time, in 
the latter part of the 1970s , embryonic joint unions' single table bargaining and Single Union 
Agreements v.~th employers were being agreed . It was "easy to exaggerate the differences" 
between manual and white collar workers, but when organised in their union they "are not 
fundamentally dissimilar". (Bain, Coates & Ellis 1973) 
In the amalgamation equation , this convergence manifested itself in the manual unions' merger 
discussions with white collar union to match the conglomerate development in industry. 
However, the concept held by academics and expounded in the media , that social 
stratification affected the relationship of workers, and the belief in traditional structural 
characteristics , led to the prognosis that white collar unions would amalgamate only "With other 
white collar unions. This had a direct effect on the merger discussions direction. 
Also at this time scientific management developed in the factory was now being applied to 
the office. Braverman, in 1974, identified in a perspicuous manner its profound impact upon 
the structure of American office labour, arguing that the present office staff bore no 
relationship to those of pre-monopoly capitalism. In this empirical study , which opened up 
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what has been called the "labour process debate " , he produces incisive evidence of how 
clerical labour "an intennediate stratum" was enlarged into mass employment divest of 
privilege by developed capitalism assisted by technical innovation. This raised the whole 
question of de-skilling and mechanisation in the offices, the gender division of labour and , 
from this analysis , an increasingly homogeneous worlcing class across manual and non-
manual employment. Although the debate had detractors , the effect of the changed labour 
process of the office environment affecting the character and composition of labC?ur has not 
been denied. The shift can readily perceived in the 
"rise of tertiary employment -white collar and professional 
employment -producing a new form of labour aristocracy which 
idem(fy ·with the middle class{. ... } modem technology 
increasingly created a stratum o.f professionals and technicians 
separately recruited from outside rather than promoted from those with 
workshop experience". (Hobsbawm1989) 
Reinforcing this, there has been a major reassertion of managerial control which is due, in no 
small measure, to micro technology, increasing unemployment and a Conservative Government 
intervention (from 1979) providing laws which restrict trade unions. This established an 
assertiveness which assists, and sometime succeeds, in marginalising the unions. This has 
assisted increasing the convergence of manual I white collar attitudes and values. The "affluent 
(manual) worker" studies in the 1960s, relevant at that time, were merely a snapshot of what 
prevailed.( Goldthorpe et al 1968 : 1969) What is now the reality thirty years later, is a 
convergence that is both internal (in the workplace) and external (in the community, home 
and socially). Socially the effects ofthe recession had changed the life gains of both manual 
and staff As Fiona Devine noted " conducting the research in Luton entailed 'revisiting' a 
town with a different economic and social structure from that previously described by 
Goldthorpe and his colleagues. In the intervening period between the Luton team's research in 
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1961-2 and this research in 1986-7, the town experienced economic restructuring - industrial 
and occupational shifts and their gendered and spatial consequences - as well as recession". 
(Devine 1992) 
As Braverman points out 
"the term 'working class' properly understood, never precisely 
delineated a specific body of people, but was rather an expression for 
an ongoing social process .• Vevertheless, to most people's minds it 
represented for along time a fairly well- defined part of the population 
in capitalist countries. But with the coming of broad occupational 
shifts, and a growing consciousness qf these shifts in recent decades, 
the term has lost much of its descriptive capacity." (Bravermanl974) 
The Conglomerate Union 
The trade unions again face the question of amalgamation to meet all these changes. 
Amalgamation , as a necessity to meet change, relates to achieving a profile that will create 
the organisation which most relates to the membership, and the potential membership. Of 
recent time both membership density and development into potential membership has been of 
great concern. 
"Smaller unions have increasingly tended to amalgamate into bigger 
ones, but while these amalgamations could be seen in the first half of 
The present century as a step towards Industrial Unionism, in the past 
twenty years they have looked increasingly like the formation qf new 
conglomerates of the genera/union t}pe". (Hobsbawm 1989) 
As the old divisions of labour become technologically obsolete the distinct competence to 
provide benefits will more and more be balanced alongside the union's capability to meet 
change by being particularly structured. As John Edmonds, GMB General Secretary, 
underlined in the debate on the, then proposed, APEX /GMB amalgamation at his unions 
Congress, echoing Hobsbawrn, "It is clear that the Super Unions will have a particular nature. 
They will be large general unions, some would say conglomerates". Trade unions have never 
Charactcrisitics affected by Socio-historic dctcnninism 
19 
evolved as inevitably as historians or hindsight would suggest (or often as unions would like), 
the indications are apparent that conglomerate trade unionism is the probable pattern for 
amalgamations. 
The pressure to amalgamate is often seen to be a direct result of the growth or decline in 
membership . As we will see later this is too simplistic. However the questions of recruiting 
potential members, more often in employing organisations outside the sectors o~ high trade 
union density , the incline or ,as of recent time , decline of membership , are important 
pressures. 
The Question of Size and Density 
Their gwwth or decline has exercised the mind of trade unions, as it has others, for many years 
. The reason for the increased interest is the level of recent decline. The extent of decline , the 
causation which provoked the TUC in 1988 to produced the document "Meeting the 
Challenge" w·hich promulgated a new role in the structural, organisational and recruitment 
process, hardly needs stating : statistics , nevertheless , are a stark indicator of what created 
this attitudinal shift. (TUC 1988) 
The decline in membership stimulated ideas of change. The need was underlined by the period 
of rapid incline of membership , in the the three decades prior to 1979 , and the immediate 
steep decline following as shown in Table 3 . 
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GROWTH INCLINE PERIOD of the TUC : TABLE 3 
YEAR :\1EMBERSHIP CHANGE CHANGE 
( OOOs) ( OOOs) % 
1940 4, 887 --- ---
1950 7,883 2,998 61 
1960 8,128 245 3 
1970 10,002 1,847 23 
1979 12,173 2,171 21 
1980 11,601 -572 -5 
1986 9,243 -2,358 -20 
1990 8,193 -I,050 -11 
1993 7,298 -895 -11 
Source TUC Report 
The decline of membership continues, the steep decline being in the first five years after 1979 
: 2. 9 million members lost between 1979 and 1986. 
MEMBERSHIP of UN10N by SIZE 1981--I986 : TABLE4.I 
per cent 
SIZE/YEAR 198I 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Under I 00 mbrs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
I00-499 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
500- 999 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
IOOO- 2499 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
2500-4999 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.7 
5000-9999 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 
I 0000 - 14999 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 
15000 - 24999 2.9 3.1 3.6 2.7 1.9 I.8 
25000 - 49999 5.0 4.7 4.9 6.0 7.5 8.6 
50000 - 99999 7.9 8.4 8.6 8.9 6.1 5.2 
I 00000 -249999 17.9 16.1 18.6 22.3 22.8 25.2 
250000 + 62.2 63.7 60.9 56.5 58.4 55.6 
All sizes 100 100 IOO 100 100 100 
Total membership 12106 11593 II236 I0994 10821 10539 
at end of year ( OOOs) 
Source: Dept. ofEmplo)nJcnt Gazette .Vol.96 May 1988 
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Significantly, all reviews of trade union membership show that although there is decline, the 
largest share of membership still remained with the large union. As can be seen from Table 
4.1 , throughout the 1980s , the union's with 100,000 and above membership continue to 
constitute the biggest percentage of the total membership even during the period of greatest 
decline. 
In 1986 there were 24 unions \\ith 100,000 or more members \Vith 80.8% of the total trade 
union membership by 1993 the number of unions in this category was 16 . Although the Dept. 
of Employment data referenced their trade union definition (includes ~;ton - TUC affiliations), 
Table 4.1 has a direct bearing upon the TUC debates , as most unions in that category can be 
found amongst its affiliates , the only exception being the RCN . The growth I decline of the 
large unions , therefore has the greatest impact on the politic of change in the structural and 
organisational tergiversation \Vithin the TUC and , more particularly , its affiliates . 
This has been the case throughout TUC history . After the rapid membership increase up to 
1920 (an increase of 4. 5 million in ten years ) the membership of 6. 5 million declined to 4. 9 
million by 1925 and continuing to decline into the late 1930s. The 1924 --1927 TUC 
Congresses debated restructuring and merging of unions ; the central theme being Industrial 
unionism expounded by the then large unions , the industrial and Craft unions. As we have seen 
socialisation \Vas to create the new large unions, the General unions. To this effect, the 1927 
TUC General Council Report on organisation stated that it was " impossible to define fixed 
boundaries of industry " and that it was " impracticable to formulate a scheme of 
organisation by industry that can apply to all industries" . When the debate was reopened in 
the mid -1940s under the debate title "Trade Union Structure and Closer Unity" , 
consultations had been thorough . 
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Membership Changes: Affiliates of the TUC :Table 4.2 
Membership over 100,000 in 1955 to 1990 membership in thousands 
Descending 1955 1965 1975 1980 1986 1988 1989 1990 
Order '90 
TGWU 1239 1447 1856 2086,1378 1313 1270 1224 
1'-H.JAW 135 135 85 } 
GMB 787 796 881 967 814 864 823 933 
ASB - 122 136} 
APEX 49 83 136 151 83 } 
1\TUTGW 124 111 109 117 176 76 73 } 
NALGO *1 - 349 625 753 750 756 751 744 
AEU 823 1049 1205 1218 1858 793 741 702 
MSF* 2 I 653 653 653 
ASTMS ' 374 491 I 390} 
TASS 140 201 241 } 
NUPE 175 248 584 692 658 635 1605 579 USDAW 344 349 327 470 382 396 376 362 
EETPU *3 216 283 420 420 336 -
UCATT*4 196 374 278 347 249 250 I 258 207 
COHSE 167 213 212 218 203 203 
ucw 161 175 185 203 192 198 202 201 
BIFU 102 132 159 168 170 171 
NUT 263 ' 282 249 184 172 172 169 
SOGAT * 5 142 225 195 206 199 183 176 166 
NCU 124 126 156 154 157 155 
' 
CPSA 144 146 : 225 224 150 143 128 123 
NGA 107 112 126 125 125 123 
NAS/UWT 122 124 Ills 118 120 
NUCPS * 6 I ; 118 116 113 
; 
RMT*7 371 255 180 180 125 llO 103 118 
ISTC 104 120 105 104 104 66 65 64 
NUM 657 446 262 253 --- 77 59 53 
i I 
!\OTE. • I !\ ALGO affiliated to the lTC in 1964. 
*2 \!SF; merger of AST\IS & TASS 
*3 EETPU; 1955 figuresETU only. Aller 1965 merger with PTU; 19R& e:.pelled 
fromTCC 
*4 L'CATT; 1955 figures AS\\' only. After 1965 mergerof4 unions. 
'5 SOGAT; 1955 figun:s~ATSOPAonly. 
'6 \"l'CPS; 1987 merger of SCPS & CSU 
*1 RMT; Figures to 1989 for :'\1.~ only. In 1990 l'i"l'R & \l.IS merged to form RMT 
Source: TI'C Congress Reports 
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Again the large General unions , aided by occupational unions, were to assure the drift away 
from industrial trade unionism in line with the need to meet the challenges of change in 
industry. The issue was revisited in 1963 with the conclusion that 
"no single form of organisation was suitable in all industries and that 
the diversity of circumstances between industries and within some 
industries made necessary diversity of union methods and 
stmcture ". (TUC 1963) 
George Woodcock , the General Secretary of the TUC ( 1960 --1969) stated that "without 
exception every trade union we have met resisted the idea of industrial trade unionism". This 
inevitably led to general trade unionism ethos spreading to all the large unions as considered 
in later Chapters. 
The large trade unions , as can be seen in Table 4.2 , addressed the question of merger not 
only from the aspect of maintaining size, but also the need to obtain access or better profile 
in what was perceived to be the gro\\th job territories. The other unions looking to gain the 
security of large organisation. This changed the trade unions' merger approach or style. (see 
nex1 Chapter) 
There was a recognition that the fall of membership was also accompanied by a decline in 
union density . However , as Table 4.3 shows, the effect on density was much less evident , in 
the heavy decline period ( 1979 - 1986) , than the overall loss of members. 
Therefore, trade union recognised from this the need to develop in new job territories and 
different employment contract sectors and this could be enhanced through mergers. 
The influential survey of workplace relations, 1980-1984, by l\1illward and Stevens , 
undertaken through collaboration with industrial relations agencies (DE; ESRC; PSI ; ACAS) 
had as its main core the question of density. They concluded that the structural changes in the 
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Trade Union & TUC Membership and Density . Table 4.3 
1970-86. 
Year Trade Union TUC Trade Union Trade Union 
Membership Membership Density Density B 
(OOOs) (OOOs) (%) (%) 
1970 11178 10002 49.9 48.8 
1975 12026 11036 53.2 50.7 
1979 13289 12173 57.3 54.1 
1980 12947 11601 57.9 52.6 
1981 12106 11601 I 56.1 49.4 1982 11593 10510 I 55.0 47.9 i 1983 11236 10082 I 53.2 46.4 1984 10994 9855 I 51.2 44.5 
1985 10716 9586 I 49.5 43.0 1986 10539 9243 I 48.5 42.5 
1992 9048 7303 I 35 32 
I 
Notes: Colunm I : Trade Union Membership as per the Certification Offic.cr details 
Cohmm 2: TUC Congress Reports 
Density A. Total trade tmion membership di\ided by ci,·ilian employees in emplo~ment 
Density B. Total trade union membership di,·ided by ci,·ilian employees plus tmemployed 
Source; .Tolm Kelly 1988 
Jim Conway Fmmdation 1989 
Dept. of Emplo~ment 199-l 
manufacturing sector was a maJor contribution to the decline in membership. ( Millward & 
Stevens 1988 ) 
Furthermore, information from the Certification Office , 1992, showed that the relative size 
of the workplace had a direct bearing on trade union membership decline, "especially as highly 
unionised industries are falling" . These statistics showed that trade union membership fell 
more sharply when employment levels were falling , than in the period 1984 - 1990 , when the 
employment levels showed some increase, mainly in the service sector. However 
"in most years the fall in membership was greater than the fall in 
employment levels in production industries, then the number of union 
members in the senice sector must have been falling even as 
employment levels were rising ". 
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(Dept. of Employment Ga=I!TTe June 199-1) 
Therefore a further portentous affect was the changing workplace characteristics with job 
growth transferring from the unionised to the new non-union service sectors , with most 
growth in these sectors being part-time workers. In the same period , we could see a pattern 
of full-time jobs in the unionised sector declining, whilst part-time jobs grew in the non- union 
sector. A significant factor was the need to recruit more women members. Despite the 
statistical analysis by sex for 1989 - 1992 , Certification Office data on this was not available 
for periods before 1989, showing that female membership increased to 40% , it showed a 
reversal of the growth pattern. The female membership figure dropped for the first time. 
( Dept. of Employment Gazette June 1994) 
Unionised sectors were the most affected by redundancies. Differing from previous periods , 
the trade unions in the public sector showed decline . Government policy, and action taken, 
to reduce labour overheads prior to the privatisation sale , reflects dramatically on the 
membership figures of the industrial unions in the previously public sector , as shown in Table 
4.2 (NUR, NUM, and ISTC are particular examples.) 
Another element of change comes under the terms of flexibility. The Atkinson model , which 
suggested the development of a core work force , relatively better paid with good job security 
and a peripheral work force of sub contract, trainees and casualisation, has been heavily 
criticised by other studies . (Atkinson I Il\1S 1985 & 1986 Pollert 1987 ; Macinnes 1987 ; TUC 
1986 ) A much broader concept of flexibility , as outlined in an ACAS report, showed 
various forms of working arrangements, which were now widespread and developing. (ACAS 
1988 ) Therefore , from the late 1980s and in the 1990s , flexibility had become a major 
negotiation subject for unionised workplaces . More particularly , it was an important human 
resource management tool of new inward investment both into low and high union density 
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sectors. 
The relevance to the union decline debate, and therefore to the question of trade union 
amalgamations, is three - fold . The emergence of a dual labour market would obviously 
produce new bargaining cultures which may be inherently different to previous collective 
bargaining. As has been seen aboYe, there will be the need for a well resourced approach to 
manage change . All, of this v.ill require trade unions large enough to cope with t~e transient 
nature , in both the length of contract or job geography , of the peripheral work force. 
Furthermore it has created the need for more joint union collective bargaining arrangements. 
The decline was also due more precisely to the management policies, attititude and 
government action affecting on recruitment and retention. Special reference was made to the 
government and employer attitude to recognition of trade unions , noting the demise of the 
assistance given by the legislation in the incline period . ( Bain & Price 1983) In the Chapters 
that follow, it will be shown that this has had an effect on the culture of the trade unions and 
the nature of mergers, breaking out ofthe traditional trade union characteristics. 
Trade unions have always also been the subject of academic research. However in previous 
research , it was noted that although reference is made to amalgamations , it is more in passing 
than a specific analysis. 
Undy had opined that mergers were in1portant factors to be considered and referred to 
varying styles ( see next Chapter ). Referring to the situation in 1981 , he stated that the "most 
important struggle may be over APEX" whilst also making a similar point about the ASB. 
The prognosis made was that APEX will probably merge with ASTMS (a white collar sectoral 
union amalgamation) and the ASB with the AEU ( a craft union amalgamation ). Tlus was in 
keeping with the historic background of characteristics of both the unions and potential 
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membership. (Undy et al 1981) Both APEX and ASB merged with the Gi\1\VU, a general 
union, now the GMB. There was a need, therefore , to consider the tendentious factors that 
effect the raison d' etre of union mergers, as the network of change to characteristics in Table 
1 has developed . In the Chapter that follows, these practical elements will be analysed. 
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On the crest of a wave. 
This chapter ''~11 be concerned \Vith the practical elements effecting mergers at the individual union 
level. The potency of the wider characteristic and historic changes referred to previously should be 
borne in mind as the continuing back cloth to the processes we are now going to consider. It is 
important to do so because, despite influential pressures at any given time which give lead to 
mergers, they are, nevertheless, ine\itably affected by the overall pattern created by these change 
factors. 
These factors alongside faster technology-led change and the impact of legislation coexiensive, 
with a shift in value priorities in the 1980s , have created a new merger wave. But merger waves 
have occurred in the past both at times of membership growth and decline. In the mid 1970s and 
early 1980s, research concluded that company mergers and industrial trends changed the 
occupational nature of union amalgamations; unions seeking " powerful partners rather than one 
in a contiguous trade " vvith merely a passing glance at the impact of financial pressures. 
(Buchanan 1974 & 1981) A funher study in 1988 revisited the analysis of the "waves of 
intensity in trade union mergers", but gave more consideration to a further raison d' etre, the 
ability of expanding a recruitment base without increased cost. This study by Waddington 
pointed to other elements; the impact of legislation and changes in the collective bargaining 
process. (Waddington 1988) 
These "intense periods of merger activity" have been the subject of much research. In 1987 the 
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Industrial Relations Review & Report (IRRR) pointed to the "scale and pace of proposed merger 
activity" paying particular attention to " APEX which in many ways exemplifies the current 
position (of mergers) in British Trade Unionism." Updating a previous review (1984) it made a 
thorough , if brief, examination of specific unions, six TUC affiliates and two non-affiliates. We 
will return to this argumentation when considering the factors which relate to these "merger 
waves". (IRRR 1987) 
A year later , Druker posed the question , "Unions in the '90s - Fewer but Fitter?" She 
concentrated on the creation ofMSF (merger of TASS & ASTMS 1988) and the "likely merger of 
APEX & GI\ffi". She also considered the saliency of the AEU and EETPU talks, reflecting on the 
courtship of both in respect of APEX. This \vill be expanded upon in some detail later. (Druker 
1988) 
By 1989 the IRRR opined that there was a "Union race to merger." The report noted the 
reduction in TUC affiliates in the "Thatcher decade" from 112 in 1979 to 80 in 1988 stating that 
TENDENTIOUS FACTORS THAT EFFECT THE RAISON D' EIRE 
OF UNION MERGERS Table 5 
INTRA- FACTORS EXTRA-FACTORS 
MERGER STYLES IMP ACT of LEGISLATION 
FINANCIAL STATUS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING CHANGES 
fNDIVIDUAL UNION CUL TlJRE CO:MP ANY CULTURE 
DECISION MAKERS & TAKERS 11\TJ)USTRIAL ORGANISATION CHANGES 
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"prompted by[ ... ] membership loss [ ... ]declining revenue, the move towards mergers has become 
a rush". However all these reports and studies merely alluded to the tendentious factors profiled 
in Table 5. 
MERGER STYLES. 
In the previous chapter it was established that the changing structural characteristics, which the 
potential union member perceived was aligned to a union's competency to provide _benefits and 
service, is advanced by mergers. So the "waves of intensity" of trade union mergers: i 918-1924; 
1944-1946 and from 1988 shows "merger style" has a great bearing upon progress. Waddington, 
whilst accepting the importance of the Undy et al concept of merger styles, questioned selective 
case studies being indicative of all mergers. (Buchanan 1981: Waddington 1988) 
Undy et al, in their study, established a line of analysis that, UK. unions' response to change since 
the 1960s could be seen through three trade union styles to their approach to mergers. These 
were defensive, consolidatory and aggressive . They deduced that most unions merger conditioned 
by either the need to consolidate a shared position in a given industry or occupational area (with 
particular reference to the AUEW), or aggressively move to expand and develop sometimes in 
quite new job territories (AST.MS & TGWU \Vere linked as specific general unions, staff and 
manual which took this approach) or act on defensive considerations and are attempting to 
forestall extinction or some lesser, but still adverse, eventuality of being um~able either in 
membership or in a corporate sense (the changes of structure which eventuated in UCATT). 
(Undy et al. 1981) In the 1980s the merger styles have become effected by the socialisation 
outlined in the previous chapter (Table 2) These can now be considered in tum. 
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CONSOLIDA TORY MERGER STYLE. 
The "consolidatory" merger style of the AEU (formerly the AUEW and now part of the AEEU) 
was described by Undy as being based on "craft roots" , but this was to be undermined by its 
technical and staff section (formerly DATA) leaving the amalgamated union and its federal rule 
book. 
AEEU 
Between 1944 and 1965 the AEU consolidated its position in engineering by six mergers. To 
contain its one union in engineering and shipbuilding policy , it agreed a federal system with the 
foundry workers (AUFW) in 1967 , the construction engineers (CEU) and draughtsmen 
(DATA) in 1971. The discussions with DATA fitted that union's advocacy also of "one union in 
engineering". Since its establishment as a craft- based organisation in engineering and 
shipbuilding, as the Association of Engineering and Shipbuilding Draughtsmen, it had drawn a 
number of its members from the skilled apprenticeship. Its General Secretary at the time of the 
merger with the AEU, George Doughty, stated that they had "always recognised the ultimate 
need for one strong union to cover all engineering workers". However as a staff organisation with 
a clear occupational identity, it was "more concerned with maintaining its autonomy than the other 
sections" of the amalgamated union. The three sections had their own rules, benefits, policies and 
more important, their own finance budget. OAT A had become the staff section of the AEU, but to 
all intent and purpose remained independent. (Doughty 1973 ) 
The AUEW I TASS, as the staff section was known, developed differing policies and political 
stance to the left of the engineering section of the amalgamated union. The break up in 1984 was 
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inevitable. Policy and the culture of the unions was to have its effect and the amalgamated union 
found, as others have, that federal structures have no commonality. The tendency to merge 
requires more than this consolidatory factor. Having left the amalgamation the draughtsmens' 
union retained the title TASS. (see below) 
The break up was sealed by the transfer of engagement of the Foundry and Construction Sections 
with the Engineering Section of the AUEW , thus removing the federal rules and. changing its 
name back to the AEU. (AEU 1986; see also Chapter 5 ) This concept of one engineering union 
was also inherent in the merger proposals put to APEX in 1986. Again the policy and culture of 
the AEU had a major effect on this dialogue and will be discussed later in this chapter and 
Chapters to follow. 
Finally the amalgamation in March 1992 with the EETPU to create the 1 million strong 
Amalgamated Engineering & Electrical Union achieved the breakaway from the restrictive and 
declining job territory of the engineering industry. This inability, in the past, to attain a positive 
merger style led to the AEU being OYertaken by NALGO as the third biggest union in the rue. 
(TUC 1990 : Table 4.2.) We will see later that the merger of public sector unions in 1993 , 
including NALGO , to create U1\1JSON , establishing the largest union . 
UNISON 
This was a large "consolidatory" merger which although not directed towards a conglomerate 
union certainly established a "super union" in the public sector. The merger discussion and 
"closer working arrangements" as a prelude to the amalgamation ofNUPE, NALGO and COHSE 
started in 1988 with "a brief interim report to the 1\TUPE and NALGO conferences in 1989". In 
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the same year," COHSE agreed to explore the possibility of joining such a New Union " .. and .. 
"joined the talks as a full and equal partner in the autumn of 1989". Progress was pursued with 
the decision - makers, the Executives, outlining the issues, the arguments for and the process of 
change to the decision - takers, the activists and members, in four documents produced to coincide 
with the Unions' Conferences 1990: 1991:1992 (2). This created this public services union, 
UNISON, with 1.4 million members. The reasoning documented to the unions' respective 
memberships included the combined bargaining approach to negotiations with the "same 
employer", combined financial resources for a wider range of services, and to be better equipped 
to face competition from merged and "super" unions". It claims to be ideologically outwith what it 
calls, but undefines, "the disadvantages experienced by the general unions who straddle many 
industries". There are still some hurdles, on policy, culture and the financing ofthe structures and 
organisation, to be overcome. (NALGO l\TUPE COHSE 1989:1990:1991: 1992 alb) 
DEFENSIVE MERGER STYLE 
In this style there was a clear indication that all action was influenced by the need to guard 
against extinction. 
UCATT 
Undy et al. made reference to the "defensive" approach of UCATT, underlining the point that 
federal structures had little effect in respect of commonality. In the construction industry the 
federal structure had been liquidated and replaced with the amalgamation of the construction 
related unions, as a protection against declining membership and financial difficulties. As a 
defensive measure, particularly to provide resources and services , the federal system had some 
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worth. Hmvever , in the face of financial problems , and the inability to consolidate further in the 
specific craft or trade , due to decline in employment or job territory, the federation looked to 
greater security in merger. 
UCATT is again the focus of attention in this 1990s merger wave. This time the list of suitors 
were the AEEU and the general unions MSF, TGWU and GMB. (Construction News 1990) Its 
financial instability has continued and merger seems inevitable; discussions with the_ TGWU , in 
1994 , appear to favour its eventual assimilation into that union's Building, Construction and 
aligned sectors Trade Group. Its financial instability is still the major question for any suitor to 
take on board. 
Federations as a defensiYe measure: 
Roberts , in his major work on trade union government and administration in the mid 1950s , 
showed the difference bet\veen collective bargaining federalism and policy, benefit and service 
based federalism. Since then history has shown that the latter is a recipe for a future merger 
scenario. It is, therefore , somewhat surprising that the federal defensive approach is being argued 
by a "professional employees" union, IPMS (formerly the civil service union IPCS). 
Brett, General Secretary of IPMS in 1989, "urged other specialist unions to come together as a 
federation". He argued that the "growth of generalist super unions '"rithin the trade union 
movement, and demands for new services, create an opportunity for realignment among small 
unions." However in the same press release he informs that "three staff associations are balloting 
on a merger with IPMS ", the main 'marketing' platform being "political independence." (IPMS 
1989) 
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RMT 
A recent defensive merger was the amalgamation of the NUR and NUS which merged in 
September 1990 to form the RMT \\ith a membership of 125,000, a culmination of four years of 
talks. At the outset of discussions the ::--rus considered the TGWU. This was a direction towards 
a "consolidatory" merger in the transport sector. Even though the TGWU offered "industrial 
independence" as a trade group in 1988 , this was to have Jess attraction than the .feasibility of 
creating a brand new transport union through a merger of the NUS and l\TUR. The pressure on 
making a decision was enhanced , in 1988 , by the sequestration of NUS funds and assets imposed 
by the High Court, because of secondary action in the P & 0 Ferries industrial dispute . This 
added to the problems of its declining membership. The NUS was to resolve its problems by 
merging into a "specialist union that understands the needs of maritime and other transport 
workers." The General Secretary , McCuskie , stated that this was the only alternative "to going 
it alone but having to make such drastic cutbacks that it would be virtually impossible to carry out 
the task of protecting and representing members properly". (Me Cluskie 1990) AJthough a 
defensive amalgamation it had all the aspects of a sectoral consolidation in transport . 
Consolidatory and defensive amalgamations , as perceived by Undy et al. , have been affected by 
the socio-industrial changes referred to in the previous Chapter. These major merger styles are 
effected by the emergence of the trend to conglomerate trade unionism which has changed the 
direction of the search for the best 'defences and consolidating'. 
A major factor in all pre-merger debate is the retention of the culture and traditions of both the 
amalgamators. Tllis also affects what Undy et al. termed the aggressive merger style. 
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AGGRESSIVE MERGER STYLE. 
The whole industria-political environment of the 1970s provided impetus in the merger wave for 
certain large unions to pursue amalgamations. The TGWU and ASTMS pursued mergers "more 
aggressively than other major merging unions". Providing for those seeking merger for defensive 
reasons a levels of autonomy, these unions were able to "market" this sectional interes~ "provision" 
which was more important to these "smaUer unions" than any ideology of "one union, in one 
industry." 
TGWU 
The TGWU continued the structural pattern of trade groups developed by Ernie Bevin, General 
Secretary of the TGWU, at the time of the great amalgamation of the 1920s. (Bullock 1960: 
Evans 1946) The autocratic and conservative style of Bevin and his successors Deakin and 
Cousins, was to change with the election of Jack Jones in 1968. Cousins, however began a crucial 
shift to strengthening the shop steward structure and a move to the left politically. (Goodman 
1979) This created the window of opportunity for his successor to achieve further changes in 
attitude to amalgamation policy. Jones had and still has a personal ideology which created a great 
bond \Vith the activists in his union. He had established his credentials as TGWU District Secretary 
in Coventry for 16 years until 1955 when he became the M.idland Regional Secretary. His 
objective \Vas to establish the major manual general union, restructured away from being only 
identified as the unskilled workers union. 
Along with Hugh Scanlon, then president of the AUEW, Jack Jones played a major role in the 
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debates, and consultations, often to the extent of directly effecting, government policy. The uruon 
therefore saw growth being driven by mergers, and used the confidence of its power and role in 
the national arena of government and Labour Party to strengthen its appeal. (Jones 1986: cf 
Crossman 1976: Benn 1989.) 
In terms of merger policy his period was fundamental. As Undy et al put it, there was an "about 
face over merger policy", the obstacle of "refusing amalgamations to uruons in financial 
difficulties" was voted out at conference. Also the conference in 1967 passed a motion calling on 
the national Executive to give consideration to "removing any constitutional obstacles to 
attracting other unions to amalgamate with the TG\VU". The sigillficance of this move to 
aggressively approaching merger potentials was indicated by Undy et al. showing that "between 
1951 and 1961 no uruons merged with the TGWU and between 1961 and 1965 only 3000 
members were added to the TGWU through mergers. Yet, following the rise to pO\ver within the 
union of Jones, the TG\VU completed fifteen mergers between 1968 and 1975". (Undy et al 
1981) To facilitate this new trade group sections were established to recognise the need for the 
identity of the amalgamating 'minor' union to be afforded within the established TGWU structure, 
particularly craft identity. 
Again a cultural change was to assist progressive merger strategy. Jones successor, Moss Evans, 
General Secretary 1978, was faced with a totally different political environment, social and 
industrial change, declirllng membership and financial difficulties (see later this chapter). 
Aggressive style advanced by the confident union, of amalgamation within its tenns , ended. 
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ASTMS 
ASTMS formed m 1968 by a merger between ASSET and AScW. The latter's previous 
discussions with DATA had foundered on the "one union in engineering" principle (see earlier). 
ASTMS had designs on being the white collar general union. Undy et al indicated its successful 
expansionist approach 1969 -1976 in the staff sector including non-TUC affiliates. The reason for 
this period of expansion amongst white collar employees has been discussed in the previous 
Chapter. But it needs to be stressed that ASTMS because of its aggressive merger styl_e, leadership 
and cultural stance, could and did take advantage of the time. Jenkins, General Secretary, could 
state "in the white-collar sphere the only general union is ASTMS" outlining the wide industrial, 
commercial, and "even wider skill range". (Jenkins & Sherman 1979) 
Jenkins became General Secretary of ASSET in 1961 and subsequent to the merger, of ASTMS in 
1968. The union originally held its membership eligibility to supervisory grades, technicians, and 
executives , concentrating its activities in engineering, chemicals and the metal industries. But the 
objective of growth through recruitment and mergers was manifest in its evidence to the 
Donovan Commission in 1966. In advocating " The Case for a Specialist Union " the stall was 
being set for a membership growth through acquisitions. (ASSET 1966) The growth from 15,000 
in 1955 (ASSET) to 65,000 in 1965 and 491000 in 1980 shows the participation in the growth 
period . This involvement in the white-collar element of the gwwth period is important as 
"between 1960 and 1970 as many as 500,000 trade unionists were involved in mergers and 125 
unions vanished as a result with about a quarter being wholly white collar , accounting for 20 per 
cent of the total transferred membership." (Taylor 1980 ) The structure of autonomous groups , 
the persuasiveness of numbers, the appeal made to loosely defined white-collar occupational 
groups and the favourable political climate , was the method used. by the union to aggressively 
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pursue unions both affiliates and non-affiliates of the TUC . After the merger in 1968 the 
targeted unions joined, for defensive or consolidatory reasons, the confident and expanding 
ASTMS. 
In their study Undy et al. lists 16 unions that merged ·with ASTMS between 1969 and 1976 adding 
that others not listed "wound themselves up and joined en bloc rather than going through the 
transfer of engagement process." As with the TGWU , the socio -industrial . and political 
environment change and financial difficulties in the 1980s altered the previous rationale of this 
merger style. ( Undy et al. 1981 ) This shifted their style to one of defensive and in 1988 
they merged with TASS to form MSF. 
GMWU 
The less merger aggressive G.MWU made little progress during this merger wave periods and 
only sustained their position in the "league" by the recruitment activities of particular Regions of 
the union , the Northern and Scottish regions. (Undy et al. 1981) Changes in the 1980s was to 
move this union to be a principal advocate of the amalgamation - fiiendly style. This will be 
considered in detail in the case study. 
AMALGAMATION- FRIENDLY STYLE 
The present merger wave of the 1990s shows the "aggressive merger style" transforming into an 
"amalgamation-friendly" style. The effects of the socio-industrial changes outlined in the 
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previous chapter, amid a continuing fall in membership in 1990 among rue affiliates, including 
the general unions, the need to merge and therefore to strengthen their recruitment job territory 
has changed the approach. The GI\ffi was to develop this style as the major element of its merger 
strategy. This will be clearly exposed in the Case Study. To be amalgamation-friendly means the 
proposing union in the courtship producing a dov.rry which includes resources, retention of 
identity , sectoral profile, and financial stability. 
The traditional classification of trade unions have played a part in the attitude to merger styles. 
However we have noted the shift to an amalgamation - friendly style which has developed through 
the factors outlined in Chapter I . 
COUNTING THE COST 
All the reports have made reference to "the absorption of lesser unions by greater ones" however 
some are "fusions quite simply of achieving a critical minimum size, in order to remain 
economically viable whilst providing the necessary levels of service to members" as Coates and 
Topham put it in 1988. They went on to say that "as funds become less and less adequate mergers 
accelerate." (Coates & Topham 1988) l\1ore brutally four years earlier the Sunday Times in a 
major focus stated that unions were "looking for ways to stanch the haemorrhage of members and 
money." The article was dedicated to the fact that considering the 1983 accounts of 15 major 
unions as filed with the certification officer for "over half, expenditure per member grew faster 
than income" and further membership decline could further undermine union finance. (Sunday 
Times 1984) 
Despite this, there has been little analysis of union finances in the UK. until the Dept. of 
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Employment produced Research Paper 62 in 1988. Based on data drawn from "the 
comprehensive returns" to the Certification Otlicer over the eleven year period, 1975-1985 , this 
was the first systematic review since 1970. Recognising that unions "are not in existence to 
optimise their financial perfonnance" and in fact "many appear from their action to accept 
considerable financial penalties in pursuit of policy objectives", it concluded that a "minimum level 
of net worth and solvency is necessary in order to maintain independent existence." Willman and 
J\Jorris in this Research Paper considered data from 56 unions with more than 20000 members in 
1984. (Willman & Morris 1988) 
They noted that Layettes analysis of trade unions in the 1960s showed that the finances of many 
unions were w·eakening, but there was no subsequent e\·idence of financial failure. One explanation 
was that unions merged. 
Declining membership is not the complete picture, as Buchanan found that mergers also occurred 
when membership was rising in the 1970s and at the beginning of the decline in the early 1980s. 
The merger waves relationship to finance is not simply attributal to subscription loss due to 
membership decline. (Latta 1972: Buchanan 1974 & 1981) The Research Paper noted for 
example that trade union grow1h was not the most significant factor in financial viability. It was 
difticult to define financial health as it showed in the analysis period, 1975-85, three unions, ISTC, 
NUR and NGA " were much richer in per capita terms than others". Apart from the NGA, "all 
have declining membership, all are manual." 
The paper considered in detail the income/expenditure/membership of the twenty largest unions 
(membership 100 000) remaining with that status during the analysis period. In 1975 there had 
been twenty six, but in the decade that followed , six memberships fell outside the criteria . IPCS 
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ncome, Membership & Net \Vorth: Largest Unions 1975-1985 TABLE 6 
~ON MEMBERSHIP REAL INCOME NET WORTH REAL 
CHANGE CHANGE 1985 CHANGE IN 
NET 
WORTH 
(%) (%) (£000) (%) 
TGWU -22.7 I 16.4 66 470 -12.1 
~EU -24.7 I -19.6 20 236 -42.8 
GMB -6.2 I 12.8 33 632 -u.s ~ALGO 20.3 I 210.4 34 422 193.0 
~UPE 13.6 I 61.8 18 043 98.6 
EETPU -9.9 I 27.3 13 418 4.7 
USDA\V 2.2 I 33.9 10 290 19.5 I 
:\.STMS 11.1 I 31.8 4 596 31.4 NUM -33.7 I -16.5 18 647 -51.6 
NUT -10.9 ! 100.8 9 709 -22.1 
IUCATT -10.6 I -30.0 4 881 -4.2 I 
TASS 70.5 I 116.0 8 128 80.6 
CORSE 27.4 I 171.8 7 442 344.7 
SOGAT 8.9 173.4 16 441 128.5 
ucw 5.0 88.3 8 911 104.5 
CPSA -34.8 35.2 8 641 61.7 
BIFU 53.9 205.1 2 686 644.7 
~UR -28.2 -8.1 26 170 -45.3 
~GA 21.2 173.2 22 474 I -7.9 
~cu 28.8 103.2 4 815 I -17.0 
~.B DESCB\TDING ORDER IS AS AT 1985. SOURCE: Willman & Monis 1988. 
(now IPMS), SCPS (merged with CSU to form l\TUCPS 1987), APEX (Merged with GMB 
1988), NUTGW (transfer of engagement to GMB 1991 ), and ISTC all fell below the threshold . 
The ASB merged with GMWU to form GMBATU (now GMB). 
It would appear from Table 6 that membership changes had been relatively unimportant in 
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determining real income grmvth across the period. But most unions saw a greater rise in real 
expenditure than in real income. The result was that few unions were more solvent in 1985 than 
1975. Several unions showed consistent decline in solvency ratio particular reference being made 
to AEU and APEX. The research makes the point that "the effects of mergers is of considerable 
importance, although it may have uneven impact [ ... ]Both TGWU and Gl\1BATU experienced 
improvements in 1982 and 1983 following the absorption of the 1\TUDB and ASB respectively. 
The rationalisation of the AEU structure appears to have had no similar effect in 198~. The NGA 
and SOGAT merger v.~th SLADE and NATSOPA respectively also improved their financial 
position." 
Specific reference was made to the ''financial plight " of the NUM, which due to the 1984-85 
strike, saw its net worth halved and its investments reduced by three quarters. Across the decade 
it had been amongst the richest unions, even in 1985 it "still held over half a year's worth of 
expenditure in its funds". Since this research was undertaken the decline in the :NUM has 
accelerated. At the start of the 1980s, membership was declared at 104 000. The union entered 
the 1990s with a membership of 65 000 and by 1994 it had slumped further to 18,227 . The year 
long dispute, sequestration in 1985 for failing to pay fines of £200,000 and the appointing of a 
Receiver by the Court, all affected the ability to maintain the fabric of the union. Alongside this is 
the dramatic decline in the mining sector of employment. It is known to be in talks with the 
TGWU. 
Although the success in attracting merger candidates by the larger rue affiliates is documented, 
the Research Paper particularly draws attention to these unions "benefiting not only from raised 
level of subscription income, but also asset inflow." Obviously it underlined the use to which assets 
are put in defining investment income. Table 6 shows the changes in net 
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worth (i.e. assets less liabilities) and net worth per capita. Although the largest increases were by 
white collar unions, "the funds of the two general unions are equivalent to those of the six next 
largest". 
From this sample of union funds, it stated that the most worrying situation was "faced by AEU, 
NUT and NCU, whose net worth per capita is low and are experiencing falls in per capita income 
in real terms. For the latter two, involvement in strike action may be the cause. How_ever, for the 
AEU, it may be related to low per capita subscription return." Interestingly it also found that "low 
subscription unions have declined more rapidly than high subscription ones". (Willman & Morris 
1988) 
AEU 
The AEU is a case in point. Speculation on the AEU's need to expand its membership and job 
territory was the main theme when Boyd became General Secretary in 1974. During the previous 
period the sanctioning of local strikes had "hit the union's assets very badly. The sum in the central 
fund dropped from £17m. in 1967 to £11.7m. in 1973". By the late seventies the position had 
improved by financial management, however inflation and arrears of subscriptions was to burgeon 
the union. (Taylor 1980) Mergers with the AEU have taken place, but as referred to in the 
previous section of this chapter, the consolidatory merger style was a constraint on projecting 
outside a declining manufacturing sector. It was in the dawn of the 1980s merger wave that 
''financial crisis struck more brutally. A drastic decline in AEU membership became apparent at the 
end of 1986 resulted in a decision to dispense with 200 full time officers". (Coates & Topham 
I 988) The union has by rationalisation, turned "a large deficit rising at one time to almost £3m." 
to the General Fund in 1988 showing "a surplus of £2,695,000". Again there was a reduction in 
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officers . "In 1985 the union had 226 full-time officers", by 1989 there was "only 166". (IRIS 
NEWS 1989) The AEU still required mergers to underpin the \~ability created by the 
streamlining and the "modern approach". The failure in the talks with APEX and the "off-on" 
discussions with the EETPU were effected by a further tendentious factor, union culture. We 
will consider this later in this chapter. 
TGWU 
Willman and Morris research noted that the membership decline in the TGWU (reduction of 
36.7% Dec.1978- 1988) had taken its toll. Despite this decline income from membership rose by 
154%, "even so there was a deficit of £3.2 m. which had to be met from other sources which 
produced a surplus" of£ 1.2m. (Willman & Morris 1988) 
Therefore, the TGWU , it was reported , "has agreed to make savage cuts in its operations in an 
attempt to control an estimated £9 million deficit" in 1990, "more than double the £4 million it 
recorded in 1989." (Guardian 1990) 
These financial difficulties resulted in the TGWU Executive Council commissioning the US-
based union consultants , .KJein & Co Inc. , to assist their working party , set up to determine the 
changes needed . Their report , which was submitted to the National Executive in May - June 
1992 entitled "ONE UNION - T & G ", outlined the operating deficit ( which had increased 
since 1990) and the need for major organisational and financial restructuring. This entailed 
merging certain Regions where "membership has shrunk to such a level where the region is no 
longer ~able". It looked to further rationalisation decisions, because "even with the contribution 
increases agreed .. there will be no surplus for investment for the future " ( Klein 1992. ) 
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Referring to the discussions , in the late 1980s between the TGWU and MSF, other research 
concluded that there was "no certainty that a merger betv.'een these two large unions would solve 
the underlying problems faced by them". (IRIS 1989) In the mid 1990s, it is further known that 
MSF is also being linked to discussions with the new amalgamation , the AEEU . 
.MSF 
It was noted , however, that the MSF accounts " showed a deficit of £3,664 000 ( 1988), even 
after the sale of over £1 million of assets. Its problems are far greater than those faced by the 
AEU, and seem to indicate that the merger of TASS and ASTMS created more problems than it 
solved." (IRIS 1989) 
With regards the possible merger v.ith UCATT , as referred above in the merger styles , its 
financial status is a difficulty . In fact , at the 1994 TUC Congress a temporary rule change \Vas 
agreed to allow the union to attend. 
Unison 
"Given the se''ere financial d[fficulties facing UCA IT, the General Council 
at its meeting on September I exercised its powers under Rule 15(a) to e_ffect a tempora~y 
rule change to allow for the participation of the union in the 199-1 Congress which would 
not otheni'ise be possible due to UCATT's non-paymellt of its a_ffiliationfees" (TUC 199-1) 
In the section on merger styles reference was made to the financial difficulties and cultural 
problems that are surfacing in the consolidatory public sector merger. The financial difficulties 
were reported as being "a deficjt of more than £5m ... " in 1994 and "may rise to £18m (the) 
nex1 year". Furthennore 400 employees would be made redundant , a quarter of all staff. This was 
necessary to live within its subscription income". ( Sunday Times 1994) 
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Conclusion: 
Financial viability is therefore a major tendentious factor in the merger appraisal, however it must 
be recognised that other tendentious factors can play as important a role as that of finance. 
Although the trade union raison d'etre has not been merely or primarily to optimise their financial 
perfonnance, potential and existing union members are paying closer attention to this , as an 
indicator of the professionalism of the union. 
Willman and Morris summed it up in the concluding sentence of their Research Paper "if in the 
1990s union membership continues to decline, the effective management of union financial 
resources is likely to become a bigger issue for union officials and members, and for employers and 
thus a topic worthy of further interest". 
THE INHERITANCE 
Finance is a major motivation in the T.U. amalgan1ation equation, as it is , .. ~th mergers in 
business. But mergers are also all affected directly by the culture of the potential amalgamators. 
In trade unions , the culture consist of the values of the activist , officials and, through them, the 
membership. Tt is effected by the norms they follow, which affects the structure and organic 
shape they produce. Values are abstract ideals, that they "belong to " a particular union and 
identify \\~th its style and/or the leadership. The nonns are definite principles, the Rules. These 
prO\·ide the direction for conduct . So Culture is the whole identity of the union. It is not merely 
the written word, but also the collection of ideas, habits transmitted from generation to generation 
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of activists, officials and members. There is this inheritance of values and norms , which is 
learned and shared collectively, creating the totality of the organisation. The commitment to the 
traditional principles , of trade unionism and the labour movement , is also part of this heritage, 
or, is subsequently developed by the socialisation , referred to in the previous chapter. This is the 
ideological element of British trade unionism, that is , the legitimation of ideals over and above 
sectional interests, 'unionateness'. Not only independence from employers in collective bargaining 
and representation of members , and being willing, if necessary, to use industrial acti?n , but also 
affiliation to the TUC and , possibly, the Labour Party. (Blackburn 1967 : see also Chapter 1 
reference to staff associations and Chapter 5 reference to "enterprise unionateness" ) 
AEU 
A good frame of reference was the AEU, which had as we have seen an established norm of "one 
union in engineering". In fact Rule 1 :2 stated categorically that the union's objective is to bring 
into existence "one union for the foundry, engineering shipbuilding and kindred trades". Rule 14:3 
stated firmly that "the Executive Council's hours of business shall be from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. \vith 
one hour allowed for dinner, Monday to Friday ... " There were in fact rules for every eventuality. 
The union had ( and still has in the new merged union , AEEU ) this inheritance of its craftsman 
past. This effects also the values, the identification with the norm, the constitutional safeguards of 
the Rules, a state of almost permanent elections. All Officials, this includes full-time officials, from 
President and Executive Council to the District Secretary stand for election every 5 years. There 
is a rider that in the event of any officer "having completed successive periods of office, and being 
sixty years of age, or over, he shall not be required to seek election ... " 
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Most action for change is, therefore , virtually ah:vays motivated to a greater or lesser degree by 
internal politicking. It often appears that one power group in the union, and not always on 
distinct political lines, is continually trying to dissipate the strength of the others. However the 
political grouping, of "left and right" does have a strong bearing upon the activities, not only of 
the groups, but also, on how any union is identified externally by other unions and potential 
members. Added to this is the autonomy of the District Committees in the AEU, protected in 
Rule. Any member can "raise matters affecting working conditions [ ... ] at their Bt:anch. These 
issues then go to the District Committee", this can cause some difficulties because branch 
membership is "organised on a (members') residential rather than workplace basis " . This adapted 
constitution, the norms and values developed by the ASE over a century ago on the model of the 
American constitution has served the membership well. Nevertheless, it has created problems in 
an ever changing industrial environment and major difficulties for merger potentials. 
This was also clearly exposed during the period of amalgamation in the early 1970s referred to 
earlier. DATA, the draughtsmen's union, in merging into , what was then called , the AUEW, 
apart from needing to retain its sectional identity, had other norms and values. These were 
encapsulated by Doughty when he stated that they "had always recognised the ultimate need for 
one strong union to cover all engineering workers". He then went on to say 
"this was the reason for the breakdown of our discussions with the Assoc. of Scientific 
Workers in the mid-1960's. That organisation wanted tofonn a conglomerate union of 
white collar unions without a common industrial i11ferest. They decided to join in 
ASTMS. lhey now organise doctors, nurses, lecturer" (Doughty 1973). 
This was echoed by activists, and through them the members , that this was "occupational 
autonomy without industrial solidarity." (Doughty 1973) FUJ1hermore both unions (AEU and 
DATA) were identified, at that time , as being on the "left". So in the aftermath of a political 
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change of leadership and orientation of the union in the engineering section , and factors referred 
earlier, there was an inevitability for the staff section , TASS, to leave the "federal constitution" 
of the Engineers union. That norms and values can change, will be further explored when 
considering the merger of TASS with that very same ASTMS to form MSF. 
Furthermore , in rule, the AEU made a direct object of reference to membership of the TUC and 
Labour Party. In fact it outlines representational arrangements for national meetings and 
Parliamentary candidate panel. 
EETPU 
The AEU has always had a long links with another craft based union, the EETPU , the union 
created by the merger in 1968 of the electricians union (ETU) and the plumbers union (PTU). 
With the shift to the "right" in the AEU leadership, the links \\~th the EETPU grew stronger. 
The membership values in the EETPU developed out of the manipulative controls of the ETU , 
established by communists from the mid 1940s to the High Court Trial in 1961. ( Byrne & 
Chapple v Foulkes & Others) At the trial leading national officers , all communists , \vere found 
guilty of ballot rigging in the election of officers. (Rolph 1962) Furthermore, the judge found that 
there was significant elements of control from the Communist Party . Although the issues had been 
drawn to its attention prior to any legal action, the TUC did little to bring these issues to the 
fore, nor did it give great assistance to those embittered at the time. (Cannon & Anderson 1973) 
This is not the place to develop any further on the details, suffice to say , that it has given the 
inheritance for the union of being distant from TUC mainstream and a bulwark against the 
"left". Furthermore , the EETPU had ex1ended its job territory primarily through mergers as was 
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outlined in chapter I. It had become a general union v.-ith a significant craft base. 
This union was accompanied by the :\EU, in the early 1980s, in its "flexible approach " to trade 
union legislation and the advocacy of single-union agreements/no strike agreements, often 
confronting the line of the rue, even to the near expulsion of both. (TUe 1985) When 
considering this later we will see a difference between attitude to single union agreements in 
"green field sites", primarily that of foreign inward investment, as against the convers~on of multi-
union established companies. Furthermore, on a multi-craft basis both unions have eXtended into 
craft skill training. 
AEEU 
Throughout the late 1980s, therefore, the possibility of merger was always there, discussions 
reaching a close stage. This was dashed when , in 1988, the EETPU was suspended from the 
rue in July and expelled in the October. At the Congress of that year the decision was taken , 
because the EETPU refused to "accept rue General Council directives requiring the union to 
accept two Dispute Committee awards." It is not \\~thin the purview of this study to probe 
into the facts of this issue , nor the processes of the TUe detailed in the Special Report to 
Congress, interest here is with regards the effect on the values of the AEU. (TUe Special 
Report 1988) 
The expulsion was to add to other concerns outlined in the Financial Times at that time: the role 
of the merged unions conference- the AEU wanting it to be binding, the EETPU insisting it can be 
overruled sometimes by a membership ballot : the full time official establishment - the AEU 
requesting all new officials be elected, EETPU favouring appointing for two years before election 
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and the leadership equation. On this latter item Hammond , the EETPU General Secretary, 
offered to stand down. This was to facilitate the establishment of a single president and two 
General Secretaries , with the EETPU electing their sectional leadership after the merger. 
(Financial Times 1988) 
Although progress was being made, the policy making AEU National Committee voted 
unanimously in April 1989, to withdraw the rights of AEU leadership to consider me:ger with 
non - rue unions foliOV\~ng the expulsion. The decision reported in the newspapers outlined how 
significant the inherited values and norms prevail. (Guardian 1989) 
However, to show that changes can take place, in 1990 , the National Committee surprisingly 
agreed unanimously to reopen amalgamation discussions \\~th kindred unions, whether rue 
affiliates or not, on the understanding that the amalgamated union would be affiliated to the rue . 
This was a definitive shift , but still retained clear aspects of AEU inheritance. There was still 
difficulties v.~th the EETPU bullish style to recruitment and the links , or merger discussions , 
with breakaway unions such as the UD.M, dissident members of the l'HJM , and the European 
Ferrymens' Association, dissident members of the NUS , who left during the P&O Dispute, 1988 
. The latter is now a part of EETPTU. ( The Seaman 1989) The AEU national bureaucracy was, 
however , anxious to establish changes to respond to industrial innovation and its financial 
difficulties . (IRIS 1990) 
In this direction , the AEU instituted a new industrial structure in 1991 , establishing sectorised 
national industrial conferences which has direct input into the Executive Council. Further 
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discussions took place with the EETPU and , at the recalled National Committee in December 
1991 , it was agreed to ballot the membership for merger. The EETPU had already obtained a 
positive conference decision on tllis matter . The membership vote of both unions was to be on 
two issues ; the merger and the name of the new union. The AEU , in all its documents, referred 
to the historic links of both the unions .... 
.. "the first attempt (at merger) was in 1890 when the electricians tried to join the AEU, 
then the ASE, and were turned away by the Executive Council of the day on the grounds 
that they were not skilled enough! Instead they went away with the ASE minute book and 
set up their own union ". (AEU 1992) 
It showed a common identity. 
Progressing the issue , the AEU referred to the EETPU's "unrivalled staff section , the Federation 
of Professional Associations" , which was in many sectors and had many categories of staff in its 
ranks , "including the Institute of Journalists". Outlining the need , determined by the changes in 
industry , to strengthen and develop collective bargaining , reference was also made to the 
financial viability of the EETPTU . This gave credence to the claim , that a merged union would 
have strength , and the necessary structure , to meet the challenge of the recession and be able to 
withstand the difficulties of legislation. (AEU 1992 ) General Secretary , Gavin Laird argued 
that 
"without amalgamation ... the AEU would have to cut the number of full-time officers to 
take account of the jobs and members lost as a result of the recession". 
and that the membership had ..... . 
':fundamental choice ... merge with the EElPU or we canyon as we are, 
diminishing as our membership declines to a second division union ". 
(The Joumall992) 
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The unions had pointed to all the factor that give reason to merge. On March 4 1992 the new 
union came into being, the Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union , the AEEU . Laird 
announced that the new union \:vould recruit "wherever it could" and sign up "anyone that wants 
to join 11 • (Guardian 1992) A shift from the "one union in engineering 11 stance. 
In 1993 , the retention of unionateness, which would be reflected in membership of the TUe , 
was tested , when the union balloted to decide whether the AEEU would apply to join the 
rue . The AEEU Executive unanimously urged the membership to vote yes. In the statement 
sent to all members , the union outlined the benefits under the broad headings of the rue being 
the organisation 
: for campaigning on legislation and socio economic issues as the national trade union 
centre 
:able to raise the profile of trade unionism by gaining public support: for the dialogue 
within Europe. 
This latter item was emphasised in the statement that "in trade union terms , Europe deals 
almost exclusively \Vith national trade union centres. In our case this means the rue and its 
affiliation to the European TUC". This was a clear indication of the intent , hov>ever, the ballot 
paper contained a pragmatic approach . The actual statement voted upon was an addition to the 
union's objectives ..... 
"Rule 1 -Clause 2. Objectives. (addition) 
To be an a,ffiliate of the l'UC provide that the terms of enfTJ' are 
approved by at least 75% of the AEEU .txecutive Council" 
It was not to be unionateness at any price. The union returned to the TUC , the third largest 
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union with 835,000 members. 
MSF 
TASS was to take on a new approach and culture, having left the Engineering Union , and had 
mergers with craft unions as diverse as tobacco workers, goldsmiths, pattern makers, and sheet 
metal workers, establishing its position as a general union. In 1988 they amalgamated with 
ASTMS to form MSF, a cultural shift for both unions. This change, to the aforementioned values 
and norms, was hastened by what the joint Executives saw as a "drastic decline in the UK's 
manufacturing base ... " and grov.th in "... sectors of the economy employing the computer -
literate young whose skills fit them to work anywhere - in engineering, chemicals, the finance 
industries, the National Health Senice, Universities and so on." (TASS I ASTMS 1986 ) 
Once again the union, MSF , is considering the merger route in the late 1990s, 'vith two unions 
appearing in the frame, the AEEU and the TG\VU. MSF , faced with its financial problems, which 
it has seriously addressed , and , more particularly, the development of the ''super unions" is 
once again revisiting its analysis of the situation as it has now changed. 
TGWU 
The TG\VU has within its rule that the 
"membership shall be divided into national trade groups and sections, 
including craft sections, according to the occupation of members of 
the Union". It has as its main objective :- " the organisation of all 
members and other persons qualified for membership, seafarers and 
employees in port , harbour, dock, warehouse, waterside, watenmy, 
road, aerial, and other transport sen•ices, general workers, and 
such other workers as may be deemed eligible by the General 
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Executive Council of the Union ... " 
The trade group structure is an inheritance from the unions history enshrined in the rules. This was 
unique in its inception in 1922 . Whilst recognising regions I districts , the fourteen amalgamating 
unions were transformed into trade groups their executives into trade group committees and their 
General Secretaries into trade group national secretaries. This structure has continued and proved 
to be easy accessible for amalgamations. (Clegg 1964 : also see Chapter 4) 
Earlier , when referring to the merger style of the TGWU , it was noted how further trade groups 
were added . It was able to break down the vehicle manufacturing craft elitism of the NUVB 
integrating through merger into Vehicle Building and Automotive Trade Group in 1972. This 
was in the words of Jack Jones, a merger which was " ... one of the most significant in the history 
of trade unionism." (Jones 1986) 
It created the basis for a craft identity , in what was ostensibly an unskilled I semiskilled union. 
Farm workers ofthe N1JAAW and te\.iile workers ofthe 1\ruDBTW followed, all by assimilation 
, in the 1980s , into their respective trade groups. This adaption to changed circumstances needed 
not only rule changes, but also , the need for the lay activist in the trade group to be assured that 
there was no abandoning of its basic structural principles. The value frame of the TGWU 
continued to be the Trade Group. 
Although there may be slight variations, at regional level the lay membership activist, usually a 
workplace representative, is delegated to a Regional Trade Group Co1Tl1Tlittee, from and by 
which, is elected the Regional Committee. This is the presiding committee , which considers 
issues across trade groups regionally and all specific regional matters. However, each Trade 
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Group also has a National Committee of lay members, elected • by and from, each regional trade 
group. These national committees meet quarterly. The principal governing body during the 
period between Biennial Conferences is the General Executive Council. The G.E.C. is composed 
of both regionally elected members and National Trade Group members. All elected under rule, 
the norm being that all voting members are lay members " still at their job in industry". ( TGWU 
1986) 
The TGWU, therefore, has a distinct "national I regional " profile. This is the quintessence of its 
norms and creates values which more relate to the "trade groups" than to the Region. The 
decision making determinants are clearly relative to this culture , and affect the perception of 
political profile, which is to the left. The decision of the l\TUS to reject the TGWU in favour of the 
NUR related to tms perception of the political profile. The NUS chose to merge into a new 
union in the mainstream of the trade union movement, creating a competitor to the core TGWU 
transport trade group. 
The Klein report on finance and organisation to which reference was made above, considered 
changes in the structure and the introduction of cost efficiency measures, but did not recommend 
any reduction in the number of trade groups. It did propose that .. 
"the national trade group officers be 'clustered' by industrial sector and that one of the 
national officers become the Union's lead officer in that sector .. (to) promote better 
strategic planning". (Klein 1992) 
This move away from trade group to industrial sectors is significant . We will see later , in 
Chapter 7, that the GMB, in 1991, also developed a Sectional organisation on an industrial sector 
basis. This , most certainly assisted the opening of discussions for a major merger between the 
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TGWU and GMB. 
UNISON 
There was a challenge to the proposition that consolidatory mergers are not viable propositions 
by the amalgamation of NALGO, COHSE and NOPE to create UNISON . This "purpose-built, 
brand new public service union of 1.6 million members", was necessary , NALGq claimed, to 
establish a union that is" capable of opposing the destruction of public services." 
All three unions took decisions at their Conferences which underlined the commitment to this 
objective. However there are still hurdles relative to cultures of the component unions- of this 
"general" public sector union .. 
NALGO , a staff union in the public sector , had a vertical structure of membership from chief to 
junior and sideways through a heterogeneous collection of professions and occupations. It started 
out in the early part of the nventieth century as a fusion of "jealously autonomous guilds, in a 
service stratified into rigid castes," due to the "desire of a few chief officers for pensions, and the 
staffs of a few local authorities for a fuller social life". It was founded by "men who would have 
no truck with the trade unionism of their day". HO\vever the socialisation effects referred to in the 
previous chapter affected the organisation and it registered as a trade union in 1920. The 
establishment of a method of collective bargaining "Whitleyism" was to provide a vehicle for 
grov.rth of membership in the years after the first World War. It was not until the Second 
World War and after, when a national machinery for collective bargaining in all parts of the 
public sector (certain municipal activities had been put into National Boards e.g. electricity and 
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Votes on NALGO 's affiliation to the T U C. TABLE7 
%VOTING FOR (%} AGAINST {%) 
1942 57.4 40733 (58. 7) 28715 (41.3) 
1948 71.2 46200 (35.6) 83443 (64.4) 
1955 63.9 73151 (48.5) 77592 (51.5) 
1958 75.5 82618 (43.2) 108615 56.8) 
1962 77.5 111489(48.7) 117312 (51.3) 
1964 77.7 138120(53.8) 118531 (41.2) 
SOURCE: R.Taylor "The Fifth Estate" Pan 1980. 
gas) that there was rapid membership growth. (Spoors 1955; Lockwood 1958) In the 1950-
1960s workers entered white collar work with strong trade union traditions and had expectations 
not found in the first generation of NALGO members. This was to underline the distinction made 
by Blackburn, between a trade union attraction to potential members and growth 
(completeness) and unionateness. (Blackburn 1967) 
In 1961 it adopted a strike clause in its constitution and for the next few years debated rue 
affiliation . However, before being able to throw aside its approach values, as affiliation to the 
rue was too strong a commitment to a body outside of what was perceived as professionalism, it 
supported an initiative of the NUT to establish the Conference of Public & Professional Services 
Organisations . This was an attempt to establish an alternative white collar rue . The group was 
mainly non-rue organisations, with the exceptions COHSE, LCe Staff Assoc., and AScW., 
with NUBE amongst the observers. (Undy et al 1981) The NUBE delegate to the 1962 rue 
Congress , advising that his union had attended eOPPSO as an observer , said that they left when 
they found "the conflict of loyalty v.~th the TUe" and it was seen, by his union 11 as a sort of 
rival white-collar non-party political rue II. However he did point to the need for the rue to 
remain non-aligned in party political terms, this would aid the affiliation of NUT & NALGO. As 
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it was the government Incomes Policy, and its effect on the public and service sectors , that 
inspired the formation of COPPSO , it was to be that organisation's inability to be part of the 
tripartite (TUC I employers I government) bodies, particularly the 1\TEDC , that led to its demise. 
It also provided further reasons for TUC affiliation. (TUC 1962) The battle for TUC affiliation 
in NALGO, resulting in a successful ballot in 1964, is shown below in Table 8 (Taylor 1980). 
Furthermore, during the 1970s, the union sanctioned its first-ever strike , and has sine~ maintained 
a solidaristic profile towards dispute requests. (Taylor 1980) This change gave an impetus to the 
left faction, NALGO Action Group. With this heritage of lay prerogative in leadership roles, this 
group changed the culture from a reactive organisation to one of campaign and selective action. 
With these developments in the 1960s and 1970s moves to a political profile was established. 
However, although it had an overwhelming majority vote for the inchoation of a political fund, 
affiliation to the Labour Party has always eluded the union. In many ways NALGO maintains a 
profile of staff unionism. (Taylor 1980) 
The unionateness of NUPE has never been in question. In its inception . It has a near continuous 
affiliation to the TUC and the Labour Party. Membership was primarily local government manual 
workers, hospital ancillary staff, canteen workers, caretakers, nurses and ambulance staff (the 
latter enhanced by an amalgamation with the National Ambulance Services Assoc. in 1965) , 
although it had a very small number of staff members. Its commitment was always to be an 
industrial trade union "similar in pat1em to the National Union of Mine workers .. confined to a 
public service, aimed to cover in its membership all, and only, the different categories or grades of 
men and women employed in that service". (Craik 1968) This to some degree was the continuing 
nom1 , until the appointment of Allen Fisher as general secretary in 1968, of seeking "always to 
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import its leading officers from other trade unions " - building worker, miner, and engineer. This 
obviously effected its value judgments. (Craik 1968) However, in the 1970s, the union also began 
to appoint full - time officers with academic background and , more often than not , those with a 
left political tendency. As with NALGO , there was a culture change from a reactive to a 
campaigning organisation using selective action. 
COHSE was established in 1910 as a union specifically for mental hospital staff, as. The Mental 
Hospital and Institutional Workers' Union. It merged with the National Union of County Officers 
in 1946, in response to the creation ofthe NHS, and retitled COHSE. 
Its unionateness is shown in its long association with the Labour Party (affiliated 1914) and the 
rue (affiliated 1924 "as the early pioneers felt the rue was too right wing"). It was however 
up until the 1960s , still a union composed of employees in the mental health sphere, its job 
territory was to extended into the whole health service in the next decade . Membership increased 
particularly with the pay campaign and disputes in the early 1970s. Table shows that membership 
growth had been continuous, in all three unions until the late 1980s and the 1990s. The decline 
thereafter is inevitably due to the changing employment factors in the public sector .. 
To pursue the establishment of the new union , later to be titled UNISON, all three unions 
produced a supplement to their house journals under the title "The Challenge of a New Union". 
These four page documents were similar in their portrayal of a commonality of bargaining 
sectors, sounder financial base, and the shift towards super unions. 
However NALGO, m its supplement, made particular reference to the continuance of the 
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expressed conunitment that had "been made, not to use the political fund for any party political 
purpose" which was provided for in its rules. It advised that separate political funds would be 
established "reflecting the existing unions' own arrangements and rules. In NALGO's case this 
would mean continuing a fund "expressly restricted to non- party political activities [ ... ]under the 
control of elected members drawn from the former NALGO divisions of any new union" . The rule 
book of the new union UNISON, states that there will be two political funds to " reflect the 
traditions " of the unions. So there is still this difficulty in both value and norm c~mmonality in 
the amalgamated union . 
A further change in their norm is shown in the development of a new general objectives in the 
merged unions' Rules ...... . 
"To arrange amalgamations or transfer of engagements with other trade 
unions". (Rule B.f) 
It has lost its specific reference to merger with unions in the public sector and its inherent 
industrial trade unionism ethos , to that of a more general union. ( NALGO , J\TUPE , COHSE ; 
1989; 1990; 1991; 1992 alb; UNISON 1993) The clear differences in the cultural inheritance of 
the unions and attempts to provide the value basis through the rules has created the "wrangles 
that followed the merger". (Sunday Times 1994) 
Conclusion 
Therefore union culture is changeable. This has been seen in the DATA to MSF transformation, 
the AEU I EETPU discussions which led to their amalgamation and to a degree w·ith the 
NALGO I NUPE I COHSE merger. Obviously , unions with a new strategic vision recognising 
the old adage , "history we inherit, the future we claim" , know that they need to change, but 
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these value legacies, beliefs and ways of doing things , have an important impact. The inherent 
link of merger style and culture values are confronted by the socialisation of capital I labour 
nexus, the work force composition, and membership density equation , as outlined in Chapter 1. 
Added to this are the effects of the financial factors , whether or not a union has stability and 
viability. This has ensured a shift , by most unions, to extend there job tenitory , which provides 
input from a new membership source, unaffected by previous values. Therefore, the major factor 
to be resolved are the marrying of the culture ; the rules, the identity , the special ~nterests, the 
title and the leadership of the unions. It is obvious that a major effect on this cultural change lies 
'"~th the decision determinant, the leadership. 
FOLLOW THE LEADER 
From all the aforegoing , it is clear that leaders do not merely respond to the preferences, or 
appraisal of the membership, but also shape the preferences and appraisal of the situation. This is 
understandable , when one considers that in the industrial environment, vvith regards the every-day 
contact, an authoritative agent is the regional, district or national full-time official. When Robert 
t\1ichels VvTote his analysis of the nature of socialist political parties in 1911 , which had a 
pessimistic Vlew of bureaucracy, he nevertheless established the point that "democracy is 
inconceivable without organisation" and particularly that organisation will spavm the decision 
detenninaht , a representative system whereby "delegates represent the mass and carry out its 
will." But he claimed this founders due to the growth of the organisation, its administrative 
functioning, and the establishment of an elite of decision-takers. His pessimism concludes that this 
leads inevitably to what he termed, his "iron law of oligarchy". His identification of leadership 
traits is a sweeping generalisation , based on the particular parties studied, nevertheless it did 
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give expression to the fact that strong established culture can be effected by the leadership. In the 
introduction to the edition produced in 1962, Lipset specifically referred to trade unions, 
asserting that , although there was entrenched administration and leadership, "unions still fulfil 
their primary function from the point of view of their members 11 • Michels' commitment, to 
socialist principles in his younger days , gave way to this belief in the inevitability of oligarchy and 
his later allegiance to Mussolini. (Michels 1962) However, in terms of the leadership effect , 
Michels' indicators to the role, power and objectives of bureaucratic leadership is a $cod starting 
point. 
It is not the purpose of this study to consider the fluctuating opinions, on where lies the power in 
the trade unions . Undy et al showed in their study , a typology of union government portraying 
most clearly the centralised versus regional power structures, and factionalism. ( Undy et al 1981 
) In this study reference has been made only to the power equation in the merger debate. We 
have seen that in all the cases above, the leadership has played a significant role and has been the 
driving force for change. It clearly underlines the Weberian concept of social power. There is in 
trade unions , as there is in most organisations, an acknowledgement of status with resultant 
esteem accorded to the 11 decision - makers 11 , the leadership. The activist , and through them the 
membership, as the "decision - takers" , often defer to the knowledge ofthe leadership. 
However, it is not the power of command. The leadership, be it the National Committee of lay 
members and workplace representatives , the conference or the individual leaders, does have 
enormous influence on the phases of change. The bureaucracy, it must be recognised , has the 
channels of communication. Through this ability to disseminate its ideology , the leadership can 
shape the dynamism of the change, generate support, and alter the preexisting modes in thought , 
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so as to overturn the previously established order. The case study , later , outlines how decision 
involves choice and the accountability which acts as a balance of power. 
The aggressive merger style unions of the 1970s , that had the major merger success , also had 
dynamic leadership. The personal charisma of Jack Jones in the TGWU assisted his clearly thought 
out approach to progress . From his background of fighting in the Spanish Civil War, a local 
Liverpool councillor in the 1930s to his election and ability as a full-time oftk!al , all was 
acknowledged and recognised by the activists in the union. This was crucial to achieve the 
changes necessary for progress and the ability to influence the "decision - takers " through the lay 
representatives on the Trade Group conmlittees. 
Similarly, although of differing characteristics, Clive Jenkins had a strong personality and a life 
style v,ihich, he contended , assisted in his objective of "Organising the middle classes" . Further, it 
was his directed democracy and personality that achieved the changes to allow for the "shrewd 
mergers and amalgamations". (Jones 1986: Taylor 1980.) In the merger to establish MSF, the 
General Secretaries ofthe two amalgamating unions, Jenlcins (ASTMS) and Gill (TASS) both had 
considerable credibility , but more important the lay representative 
overwhelmingly supported the proposals put to the membership. 
executives also 
The establishment in NALGO of lay representative prerogative power, as referred to above, the 
full-time officials discharged their function in accordance with this established norm . This 
changed and some would say "threatened the nature of NALGO's traditional leadership, to some 
extent undermining its authority". (Undy et al. 1981) This found voice in the merger discussions 
to establish UNISON. The developed structures of lay participative committees on all aspects of 
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policy , at both national and regional level , was clearly an expression of this position . Despite 
this , due cognizance was accorded to the NALGO membership's rejection of Labour Party 
affiliation , as observed earlier, in establishing two political funds in the new union. 
In the case study , it will be noted that individual leadership had an affect on the change factors. 
Even so , other leadership elements , in the decision making process, acted as a counterbalance to 
the inevitable ability of the individual leadership to pursue their aims and further thei!lterests they 
hold. 
Some factors , however , are outside the trade unions' control . For this we must tum to the 
extra, or external tendentious factors , the socio-industrial environment that presses in upon the 
union, and those that assist the process of change. 
THE IMPACT OF LEGISLATION 
The relationship between the state and the trade unions is a subject of much analysis and research 
in its ov.-n right. By the state , as against any other definition , reference here is to the system , the 
bureaucracy comprising the centralised legislature , the government. Apart from the central 
executive power of Parliament , it also includes the administration , the hierarchy of civil servants 
and the judiciary. Trade unions have faced a long history of state antagonism and interference. 
This has often placed their legality in doubt and affected the development of trade union 
characteristics and attitudes. (Thompson 1968) However, leaving aside early legislation outlawing 
combinations and the treating of trade unions as a conspiracy against the state, modem legislation 
impacting on trade unions was concerned primarily with industrial relations and conditions of 
employment. 
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At present the impact on trade unions is not only concerning the role of law in industrial relations 
and the regulating of trade union action, but also regulating the unions' internal organisation. In 
this section we will consider the direct and indirect influence of legislation o.n trade union 
amalgamation . 
The early legal position required the consent of two- thirds of the membership until the Trade 
Union (Amalgamation) Act 1917. This changed to 50% ofthe membership had to have voted, 
and the proposal for amalgamation secure a 20% majority of those voting . There was still with 
no ability for transfer of engagements . Despite these changes , it did not create the necessary 
facility for change , as "voting in large unions rarely reaches the 50% mark [ ... ] the pre-1964 law 
mitigated against union mergers." (Undy et al 1981 ) 
In 1963 discussions were initiated by the General Council of the TUC \Vith the .Minister of Labour, 
to repeal and replace the restrictive legislation. In the following year the legislation was 
introduced. The Trade Union (Amalgamation etc.) Act 1964 relaxed the law on mergers, as here 
summarised by the rue : 
"171e main points of the Act are : 
Amalgamations. 
a) ~{two or more unions wish to amalgamate they must first drmi' up an 
instrument of amalgamation and arrange for a ballot vote of their 
membership upon it. lhe information to be included in the instrumems is set out in the 
Regulations. 
b) Every member of each union must be given reasonable opportunity of voting and of 
receiving before the voting a notice setting out either the instrument in full or a summary 
of it giving the effects of the amalgamation. The instmment and notice must be approved 
by the Registrar. 
[Note. l11e Registrar of Friendly Societies role was taken over by the Certification 
Officer for Trade Unions and Employers' Associations established in/976. This is 
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merely one of the responsibiliTies of this function (Jones and 111orris 1982)] 
c) The national exec..'utive of a union is empowered to make any arrangements it thinks fit 
for the ballot in order to comply with the provisions in the Act that eve1y member is given 
'so jar as is reasonably possible a fair opportunity of voting'. How ever, unions may take 
away this discretiona~y power from executives by adopting new rules for the ballot -
providing the new rules give all members a fair opportunity of voting. 
d) The amalgamation resolution will be carried by a simple majority of those voting, 
notwithstanding anything at present in a union's rules which require a larger 
majority [. . .) 
e) Members may appeal ... that the conditions of voting were not carried out[. .. ) 
Transfer of Engagements, made amalgamation , 
j) Where a union wishes to tramfer its engagemellfs to another which is vdl!ing to accept 
them an instrument of transfer must be drawn up and the first union must take a ballot in 
the same way as for an amalgamation[. .. ) 
g) The Act empowers the national executive of a union willing to accept the transfer of 
another to alter its union's rules in order to give e,ffectto the trai1sjer but a union 
may adopt niles to provide e>..press/y that its executive shall not have this discretionary 
power. " (rue 196-1) 
There then followed new provisions in respect of Political Funds, Changes of Names, and 
Northern Ireland. The Act does not apply in Northern Ireland and unions need to satisfy the 
requirements of earlier legislation v.ith regards the province. For example in the G.MB/APEX 
amalgamation ( 1989), both unions having offices in Northern Ireland, they were required to pass a 
resolution requesting the Registrar in Belfast to "~thdraw the Certificate of Registry and then 
applying for registration of the new union. 
The Certification Office for Trade Unions and Employers' Associations provides a guide which 
explains that "the statutory procedures are to facilitate the process of merger and at the same 
time to safeguard the rights of the members affected .... " The Office's role in approving "certain 
documents " is also outlined, ie. instruments of transfer or amalgamation, voting and registration 
procedures and dealing with complaints. Complaints can only be made on "grounds specified in the 
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statute". The guide, however, is "not to be regarded as an authoritative statement of the law ", 
but does give the necessary guidance for merging unions. 
( Certification Office for Trade Unions & Employers' Assocs. 1989) 
There is no doubt that this Act intensified the tendency to merge, particularly through transfers 
of engagement. It did not change the nature of mergers, the aforementioned intra-union factors 
are still as relevant, however it removed significant obstacles which affected the merger waves. It 
must be acknowledged that the vote of the membership in an amalgamation is now probably the 
simplest part of the proceedings , if all relevant data, addresses etc. are correct, a formidable task 
for some unions. Therefore , this Act has had a direct effect on the ease of establishing a merger. 
There is need now to consider other changes to industrial relations, employment and trade union 
legislation which indirectly influences the merger equation. 
During the period oftheLabour Government (1974-1979) a different climate prevailed to that in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Employment legislation was intended to be beneficial to \vorking people 
and trade unions and reduced , to some degree, the suspicion and distrust of the law in the 
workplace. It has been noted, that the 'special relationship' with the Labour Government ofthe 
1970s, created an environment conducive to amalgamations . This close relationship with trade 
unions of the late seventies was undermined by economic problems, the voluntary incomes 
policy agreed with the rue collapsed and a general election returned a Conservative 
government. (Coates 1980; Hobsbawm 1989; Coates & Topham 1988) 
It is not the purpose of this section to consider in detail the variety of legal measures of the 
successive Conservative governments since 1979 . These measures were said to be enacted 
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"heaping (of) privilege without responsibility o11the trade unions, Labour 
have given the minority of extremists the power to abuse individual 
liberties and thwart Britain's chances of success." 
(Consen1ative Party Manifesto 1979) 
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In the 1980s, the whole concept of any trade union role in government policy formation or 
consultation was swept aside. 
"In one sense , there was no point in ministers holding talks with union 
leaders; they were simply not prepared to trim their policies for, in 
Mrs. ]hatcher's words 'there was no altematire'." ( A1cllroy 1990) 
The overall stance towards trade unions was also reflected in the Conservative government's 
unilateral decision , as the employer , to ban independent trade unions in the surveillance and 
monitoring centre, GCHQ in 1984 '\vithout any warning , let alone prior consultation with the 
unions concerned." ( Hain 1986 ) 
The list of measures , which the union-based research organisation Labour Research Department 
noted was "at the rate of a statute almost every year", covered a wide front. With regards 
employment law , they include changes in protection legislation regarding unfair dismissal , and 
arrangements for maternity leave and pay made more complex . Also the provisions in the 
Employment Protection Acts ( 1975 and Consolidation 1978), such as those that provided for the 
extension of recognised terms and conditions of employment by compulsory arbitration , 
procedures to assist trade union recognition and other legislative support to collective bargaining, 
were removed to facilitate labour market deregulation. In the industrial relations sphere , there 
was a redefinition of what constitutes lawful industrial dispute and an ex-tension of employers' 
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protection when dismissing an employee taking industrial action. The unions lost their immunities 
if they supported, or failed to repudiate, industrial action taken without a secret ballot. Further to 
this, procedures for a full postal ballot using external counting agencies, and the creating of new 
responsibilities on advising employers and notice periods , was established by the Trade Union 
Reform and Employment Rights Act in 1993. Even after a secret ballot supports industrial action, 
the law classified it as unjustifiable for a union to discipline a member who does not take part in 
the dispute. All statutory support for the 'closed shop ', or union membership agr~ements, was 
removed which made them, effectively, prohibited. 
The internal practices, inherent in the culture of the union, were also changed by law. 
Requirements were established for union elections by secret postal ballot of the president, 
General Secretary and members of the principal executive committee. Also changes to the law on 
union 'immunities' meant union funds were now open to legal action. To help members to take 
court proceedings against their union under these measures, the Conunissioner for the Rights of 
Trade Union Members was established, with discretionary powers to assist by paying for legal 
advice, representation and any costs awarded against the individual. Therefore, trade unions 
operate in a stricter legislative framework with a liability to damages. (LRD 1990: Dept. of 
Employment 1984 & 1988: Wedderburn 1986) 
British membership of the European Union has made the government conform to certain 
Regulations which enhance employee protection. The agenda is now set to promote new 
employment, industrial relations and trade union rights. The Charter of Fundamental Social 
Rights, the social dimension of the Single European Act 198 7 , was adopted by most member 
states of the E.U. The " Social Charter", as it became known, was rejected only by Britain. 
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Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that it will have a fundamental effect in Britain. (Wedderburn 
1990: TUC 1988 & 1989-: E.E.F. 1989: T.E.C. Director 1990) 
Conclusion 
Suffice to say that these fundamental shifts in employment, industrial relations and trade union law, 
require trade union research and back-up resources that only large unions can provide adequately. 
This has given an indirect impetus to trade union mergers. A major point in the lead-':Jp discussion 
has always included an analysis of the ability of the amalgamators, by joining together their 
technical departments or, in many instances , the large union alone, to manage these change factors 
BARGAINING TRENDS AND C0.:\1P ANY ORGANISATION/CULTURAL CHANGE 
The impact of legislation in the 1980s and 1990s has also transformed, some would say 
undermined, collective bargaining. Also, company organisational and industria - cultural changes 
have taken place outside, or peripheral to, any trade union dialogue. In the earlier part of this 
chapter, reference was made to Waddington's analysis of trade union mergers, stating that a 
pnmary variable of union structural development is the collective bargaining environment. 
(Waddington 1988) In this, he drew attention to the trade union theory of Hugh Clegg, who in 
1976 advanced the collective bargaining theses of the Webbs. This created a standard work on the 
subject. His definition of collective bargaining is clear. 
"Its subject-matter is terms of employment. It is collective because 
On the Crest of a WaYe 
employees associate together normally if not invariably in trade unions, in order 
to bargain with their employer{ .. ] Mere representation of views or appeal for 
collSideration is not bargaining." 17te term is used "to cover both negotiations and the 
administration of agreements." (Clegg 1976) 
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There has since the beginning of this century been an acceptance that this was the best method of 
determining differences of interest in industrial relations. Broadly speaking two trends can be 
identified . Firstly, in the 1980s, due to the labour market shortages particularly in the South 
East, employers demanded greater flexibility, across crafts , skills and occupations, This trend, 
evident from the 1950's, has accelerated and applies now to all regions of Britain. Secondly, there 
is evidence, in the 1990s, of a growing number of companies, m a range of sectors, 
decentralising to the level of the business unit, profit centre or plant, a greater local focused 
management. 
Added to this, privatisation, decentralisation and contracting out in the public sector has also had a 
direct effect, on these high density sectors of trade unionism. Such was the exient of this changed 
environment, during 1990 the TUC endorsed a programme of Regional Seminars on the general 
subject of collective bargaining. Attended by over I 00 union participants, virtually all full-time 
officers, it was noted that 
"many of the changes introduced by management 1-rere ad-hoc,[ .. ] some more tempormy 
thanfimdamental (and could be reversed as the economic and political climate changed) 
... However there was a sea change ... increased centralisation of strategy at enterprise 
level, while devolving operational responsibility (including bargaining) to 
establishment level, and an increased emphasis being given to performance of the 
company, the establishment and the individual. (D1ese) were not being introduced in a 
vacuum, but in the context of broader economic, industrial and labour market 
developments." (TUC 1990) 
Apart from multi-skilling, single employee status, and single union agreements, there has been a 
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reassertion of managerial controls. The systematic approach to these controls has come under the 
catch - all phrase , Human Resource Management. This has also , sometimes, been a hidden 
agenda of anti - union policy or , at best, a reducing of union influence. 
The TUC produced a key document on the subject for the 1994 Congress. It recognised the need 
to respond to the challenge. Trade unions and workplace representatives , particularly, were now 
faced with the change culture, greater focus at line manager level and the move, often, to 
individual performance appraisal , the introduction of performance related pay and casualisation . 
( TUC 1994 ) This has challenged traditional collective bargaining and the well resourced trade 
unions, consequently, have redefined their strategy. 
Alongside this, there were broader economic, industrial and labour market developments. The 
separation of ownership from control, which was seen as a fragmented share ownership dispersed 
amongst small shareholders, has lost to the effects of, what is often termed, the "corporate 
network". This is share ownership by financial institutions, pension fund management 
corporations, insurance and banking. Strategy is now closely linked to centralised ownership. Any 
concept of managerial social responsibility is offset by this centrism. Other small or medium sized 
companies are affected by the company culture of the larger enterprise, to whom they are supply 
tied. 
Inward investment by foreign companies, especially to local economies faring worst from the 
recession, have further accelerated these changes. This has led to the packaged consultant-led 
search for excellence with many seminars, videos, tapes and literature to lead management to a 
panacea, "best practice", "close to the customer", "bias for action" also directed away from the 
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collective approach to industrial relations. ( Peters and Waterman. 1982) In some unionised 
companies , this has been a catalyst when initiating management of change programmes ; 
innovative employee involvement through team briefing ; quality circles ; work organisation 
changes such as "just in time", short-runs and flexible manufacturing; total quality management 
and continuously changing technology, and, particularly, the active approach to training policies 
(TUC 1994) 
It is fashionable to believe that the inward investment by Japanese companies had a major effect in 
this redirection, termed "Japonisation". However it is now recognised that there are differing 
approaches by inward investors. Japanese or any other inward investor do not merely transfer 
external practices to Britain. They often merely advance current practices and always take 
account of prevailing industrial relation . British companies have had some difficulties in 
applying, v..~thout taking account of the prevailing cultures , the new practices as exampled at 
Fords. (Wickens 1987: Dore 1973: White & Treves 1983: JCF 1990 & 1993) 
At the same time development arose in the public sector '"'ith public enterprises sold to private 
investors: British Steel, British Telecom , British Gas, water supply and electricity supply and 
generating, British Coal and British Rail. This established new commercial objectives and a move 
away from the national, industry-wide bargaining to decentralised and local negotiations. The 
process is being projected for other public sectors. 
But a changing industrial environment, and the effects on collective bargaining, is not new and 
trade unions have had to meet the challenges in the past . (ACAS 1982) It must be added , all this 
did bring an impetus for change in employment relationships. 
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With the present situation, the trade unions have had to acquire a broader approach. In green field 
sites the development of single union agreements has taken place. These agreements have been 
surrounded by controversy (particularly regarding the EEPTU see earlier in this chapter). Most 
of the deals have been employer initiatives and the choice of union is related to many differing 
factors defined overtly or covertly by the employer. (cfWicken 1988) 
A survey of 76 single union deals in 1989 showed that 
"they hm'e largely been limited to four unions- the TGWU, the EETPU, the AEU and the 
GMB. There are at least as many UK .firms as, for example, Japanese companies 
im•olved, but the unions see the issue, particularly among the domestic firms, as of 
diminish;ng significance." (LRD 1989) 
A similar survey of 81 such agreements signed since then shows the same unions, however now 
including MSF, obtaining the major share. The AEEU had signed 53 agreements. ( LRD 1994) 
Gavin Laird, General Secretary of the AEU wrote in the union journal, that "the general unions 
abandoned joint approaches to several recent Japanese inward investors, not because they each 
wanted to grab the \Vhole deal for themselves, but because they realised that no new employer was 
going to saddle themselves with a multi-union deal at a new site." (AEU 1990) It is interesting to 
note that he includes his union in the definition of "general union." 
These changes have also generated new trade union methods of discharging their responsibilities. 
The term "corporate trade unionism" has been used to cover a number of differing approaches. 
At first this term was almost always pejorative.• In spite of tllis, the prevailing situation to which 
trade unions have had to adapt, has required them to provide sophisticated benefits outside the 
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normal convention of collective bargaining, such as financial services package inclusive of 
discounted mortgages, personal loans and insurances; travel discount; legal assistance and 
consultation. In a modem context they echo the friendly society benefits of the early trade unions 
Conclusion 
As confidence returns to the trade unions in the 1990's, there is a recognition of. the need to 
review organisational structure. The earlier LRD survey, referred to above, continued by outlined 
the development of collective bargaining at multi-union companies by single table bargaining. 
Whilst the 1994 survey concentrated on the recognition successes of unions. The need , therefore, 
is for mergers that can pro\~de trade unions capable of meeting these challenges and the ever 
changing scenario, for collective bargaining is a major tendentious factor. As Waddington 
concluded "variations in the level of collective bargaining are at least concurrent with intense 
periods of merger interest." (Waddington 1988) 
L~ CONCLUSION ... 
This chapter underlined the fact, that to singling out one tendency or factor as the key to merger 
reasoning , is untenable. We have seen that there is an interplay of all inter-union tendentious 
factors and the extra-tendentious factors, through concrete cases. 
The merger styles , consolidatory, defensive and aggressive , are interrelated to all the other 
tendentious factors , to the extent that there is an interaction due to the exiernal "market 
variables" of government action , industrial and societal changes, a new bargaining environment 
and changed company culture. The merger - progressive union , which in the 1960-1970s had an 
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aggressive approach , now has to be amalgamation fiiendly. The union must show an ability to 
'deliver the goods' : meet the needs of functional specialism through research , retention of 
sectoral profile and identity, perceived ability in the bargaining circumstance and show stability. 
To ascertain whether a union has stability reference is made to its financial status. In this chapter, 
it has been noted that sound finance is neither an indication of a unions potential for growth , or 
fitted to other amalgamation friendly elements. Nevertheless financial \~ability is. an important 
factor in appraisal of the necessity to merge, the appeal of the amalgamator, and long term 
prospects. It may even be a basis for a reasoned approach. It is , however only equal to other 
factors. In fact a major factor as underlined above is the culture of the union. 
Trade unions are not monolithic entities, they exist on many different structured organisational 
levels, norms and values ; what has been termed the culture of a union . This has a major effect 
on the merger appeal, approach and acceptance. Although composed of diverse groups the 
heritage of a particular union unifies the membership. The merger style is closely related to, or 
enl1anced by, the culture of the union. More particularly it is what 'may allow' a merger to take 
place. No unidirectional causality is to be assumed as the culture can change, as has been 
established. But the force of the culture is paramount . Changes to this rely often upon the 
decision makers and takers. 
It has been shown that the leadership in a union is an important merger facet . It should not be 
assumed that the leadership determines the culture ( it inevitably restricts the progress at times 
e g. AEU) , or that cultural factors are always determinative of the leadership, be it a national 
committee , lay membership conference or individual leaders. The merger progressive unions do, 
On the Crest of a Wan 
79 
however, appear to have strong indi\idual leadership. The social and trade union imagery of 
Jones ( TGWU) and Jenkins ( ASTMS) were cited as strong influence for change. It was also 
noted that, strong leadership was able to guide through. or restrict, the changes in culture, and 
make the necessary statements to extend membership and activists awareness. This process is not 
a desertion of democratic principle , but it shows that the commonality of the trade unions prefer 
authoritative solutions to important problems as a means to decision -taking. 
E;...""ternal to the trade union organisation , other factors have added to the tendency to merge. 
The impact of legislation cannot be o\·erlooked. The relaxation of the law which related directly 
to trade union mergers has assisted an1algamations. Laws with a direct effect on trade unions 
have had an indirect effect on the push to amalgamate. This also applies to the employment and 
industrial relations law changes which creates a need for further and better research back up . 
In tandem with the legislative changes are the variation in company organisation and culture . 
The effect of these changes was to make collective bargaining no longer the unique method of job 
and remuneration regulation. It was noted however that v.ithin these trends some trade unions , 
those with the resources , v.·ere meeting the challenge . In terms of the appeal to potential merger 
partners, tll.is ability to meet all the challenges is an essential element of the amalgamation 
friendly style. 
All this linked to what was percei·ved as changes in industria- social perspective in chapter I. 
Staff and manual employees cannot be polarised in terms of their image of society , industry or 
trade union. The direction is to establishing the conglomerate trade union with the 'ability to 
deliver the goods', \\ith the research functional specialism and structure to meet change. 
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Any analysis which is over economistic, or sets culture against structural factors, will not have a 
full picture of the network which is explored through this study . The case study that follows of 
a specific amalgamation, G.MB I APEX , is particularly relevant to this network analysis . 
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A Case Study .... the Methods. 
Background to the case study. 
The point of departure, in processing this case study, was the importance noted by many sources 
that the amalgamation of the staff union , APEX, v.~th whoever, would have a significant 
impact in the amalgamation scenario. It became even more significant when the merg~r was ~th a 
general, and ostensibly a manual, trades union, the GMBATU. This raised new perspectives of a 
raison d' etre of amalgamation. In addition, the previous chapters outline the network of change 
factors . This case study will be used to explore and build upon these factors, ~th a view to 
documenting and examining the process of amalgamation. The research into the specific intra-
trade union factors will be augmented by reference to the extra- trade union factors as listed in 
Table 1 and Table 5 . 
Case Study Objectives. 
The main objective is to assess the value judgment of the model developed in Table 1 and Table 5, 
by an overall perception of change in a particular merger. The focus is on change and the process 
of change. The key indicators are those outlined in these Tables and elaborated upon in Chapters 1 
and 2 . The case study is an objective measure of these elements. The central focus throughout 
will be to explore, explain and clarify the changing pattern of these elements. Most of the key 
factors v.~ll be specific to each union, but there will necessarily be the need to cross-refer. Other 
influences will be largely external in origin, for example industrial and legislation impact. 
Consideration will be made of the relative importance of each factor , but more particularly the 
symmetry of the model established by linking the factors of Table 1 and Table 5 . 
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More specifically , therefore, a number of hypothesis \vill be tested . The major hypothesis is that 
the intra- and extra-factors of trade union amalgamation point to the eventuality of 
conglomerate trade unionism and the super union, achieved through the process of merger. 
Accepting that the aggressive style has metamorphosed into the amalgamation- fiiendly style, this 
will be explored. A related hypothesis is that the occupational, cultural and solidaristic profile are 
dissolving. Manual and staff, blue and white collar , skilled and unskilled, as identifiable reasons 
against particular mergers, because of the social and industrial relations gap, is being superseded. 
The body corporate of the unions, identifYing the culture changes necessary to accommodate a 
broad coherent and single status commonality, is studied. This has been established m 
previous Chapters across a broad canvas, the case study will relate to the specific. 
Access to Information Sources. 
Access to information sources was in no way hindered, except by the limits oftime and research 
resources. Assistance was sought from officials, lay members , research and information held at 
the GMB College, Manchester. As a senior trade union official , of both APEX and eventually 
the G!vffi, I was in a unique position to gain access to information. 
Interviews were inevitably \vith those directly involved in the processing of the amalgamation (the 
decision makers), however a small number of members whose role was the eventual acceptance of 
this process (the decision takers) were interviewed. These however were, therefore, only a 
supplementary source of infom1ation. It was not possible to rely on a single method , in fact a 
composite picture was achieved by using a number of methods. 
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Case Study Design 
Chapter four will briefly outline the history, structure and organisation of the two unions, APEX 
and the GMBATU. It will be noted that change has been evolutionary rather than revolutionary, 
and that there were similarities, and dissimilarities, in culture and job territory. Chapter five will 
consider in detail the actual merger , the motivation and the various negotiations . Due 
consideration is given to discussions APEX and GMBATU had with other unions, the mergers 
that created the two unions and the GMBATU development of the amalgamation - fijendly style. 
In the process we will discover what both unions hoped to gain . Chapter six will look at the 
after affects of the merger in the new union, GMB. Due consideration will be given to the attitude 
of the decision - makers now that the decision had been made by the decision - takers. The 
opinions of the latter will be tested . Furthermore, any changes to organisation or structure will 
be analysed. 
This will be an analytical consideration of the relationship between all the factors, and entails a 
detailed case study approach by a pliant enquiry, through three main data sources with 
supplementary sources. Although the case study \\~ll address the factors to each union , APEX 
and the GMBATU, there will also be the comparative focus also evident. 
Data Sources. 
Three main sources of data: 
a) Historical information. 
b) Documents. 
c) InteiViews. 
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Secondary data sources used will include newspapers and specialist literature 
Historical Information. 
From a literature search it was established that there is material gathered , by a number of authors, 
which assist in developing a picture of the historical background to which reference will be made 
in the case study. However, there is little previous literature directly regardi_ng mergers. 
Therefore, the starting point for this section was ine\~tably Clegg's important studies on GMB 
history , (Clegg 1954 & 1964); Hughes and Marsh studies of APEX history (Hughes 1953 : 
Marsh 1978 ) . With regards the actual merger there is little published information outside union 
documents. Obviously reference was made to relevant research . 
Documents. 
Many documents were analysed including policy statements: reports , some previously 
confidential : procedures : minutes of meetings: guidance documents : correspondence: union 
newspapers : Conference reports. In addition notes made by author at the time of the merger 
negotiations. 
Representative Interviews. 
Due to the constraints of time and resources and within the strategy determined, the interview 
respondents were selected in an attempt to cover a broad spectrum of experience and knowledge 
of the merger. Emphasis was placed on intervie\\'ing differing strands of opinion , whilst 
recognising that the merger had majority favour. Also the selection was made so as to deploy the 
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limited resources to meet the case study objectives . 
Although not formally structured , the method used was the extended focus interviews. This 
was discussion headings focusing on particular elements of the merger, to facilitate the 
discovery of qualitative data. The discussion headings for those directly involved in the merger 
negotiations differed from those applicable to other decision makers, as the latter did from the 
decision takers. Anonymity where requested by individual respondents was stricti~ maintained. 
Recognising that the disadvantage of this method is that the interviewers can possibly effect the 
results by communicating their attitudes , the representative respondents were of a calibre that 
this did not occur. In fact this method allowed greater flexibility to probe for shades of meaning 
and avoid the seeking of 'non existent ' facts. 
Added to the interviews , basically by questionnaire and open dialogue, the observation and 
analysis was assisted by the author's 27 years as a full time trade union official , the senior 
regional post of APEX at the time of the amalgamation . I was also one of the six APEX 
representatives on the joint committee with the G?\1B that considered government and structure 
of the proposed new union. 
Conclusion 
The three data sources - historical literature , documents and interviews was a cross referencing 
and a check balance to remove preconceptions or assumptions. This gave the qualitative data 
to assess the validity of the Intra and Extra Trade Union Factors which effect An1algamations. 
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Parallel Development of the GMB & APEX. 
In the period that historians term the ''birth of new unionism", the last decade ofthe 19th century, 
the exclusiveness and social closure practices of the craft unions were challenged by the socialist 
ideology ofthe time. This was a period of political agitation, working class radicals were assisted 
by the Social Democratic Federation (SDF) providing an analysis , producing p3:mph1ets and 
documents. New ideas were abroad. Great figures in the world of letters were springing to the 
side of the workers . At the centre stage were those workers who suffered from unemployment , 
some whh the worst wages , but all suffering from a lack of organisation and disregard by the craft 
unions. It was at this whirligig of time; trade union membership grov.,rth, changing industrial 
characteristics and a period of prosperity for industry, that the two unions , the G.MB and Apex, 
have their origin. 
The formation of the National Union of Gas Workers and General Labourers, the precursor of 
the G.MB , in 1889 , along \vith the Dockers' & General Workers union , the precursor of the 
TGWU, in 1890, was to start the development of the continuing general trade unionism ethos. 
Clegg, in his short history of the NUG.MW, points out that it is 
"one of history's half-truths" to suggest that this ''l-ras only a movement of 
unskilled labourers". " fl1e new unions therefore were not based on a single 
principle of organisation Instead they tried to fill in the various gaps left by 
the existing forms of trade unionism" (Clegg 1 964). 
The strength of these new general unions lay in the broadness of their appeal, to which Will 
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Thome and Ben Tillett were inextricably linked. Both, in fact , were nominated to lead the Gas 
Workers, but it was to be Thome who became the General Secretary. Thome had been a member 
of the SDF almost from its inception and from this he gained great experience, support , 
confidence and leadership qualities. (Radice 1974) The well documented victory ofBeckton gas 
workers for "the eight hour day" helped the union's rapid spread to other regions and other 
sectors . After six months the membership had reached 20,000 with 60 branches throughout the 
country. (Kapp 1989: Thome 1925: Clegg 1954/1964: Radice 1974) 
The Gas workers' dispute, the match-girls strike in 1888, and the great Dock Strike 1889 , all have 
their place in the history books. Tillett was the leader in the dock strike , which was a turning 
point in advancing this New Unionism. However Thome's " idea of one great union 
encompassing all sections of labour was rejected by Tillett", the latter consolidated the docker 
organisation and " set about organising other sections of workers in different trades and 
industries ... " ( Pelling 1967: McCarthy 1988) 
The period was also fundamental to the birth of the clerks' union. Marsh noted that the labour 
market status of office workers had deteriorated , due to the fact that " the supply of clerks had 
far outstripped the demand, and the general standard of payment was very poor ". (Marsh 1978) 
Wages were depressed and they had poor working conditions. However the discontent amongst 
office workers was passive for want of a coherent organisation. In May 1890 , a union was 
formed primarily for London clerks , the National Union of Clerks , the precursor of APEX. 
Nevertheless from the beginning they looked to a national organisation being formed . ( 
Hughes 1953: Marsh 1978) 
During the initial year organisation of clerks appeared elsewhere in Britain , some were branches 
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of the National Union of Clerks. However, in Leeds a National Clerks Association had been 
fanned in 1894 , registered as a trade union , independent of the London organisation. They 
merged in 1897 . Another organisation existed , as Hughes recalls in his personal history of the 
union, 
" ... a group of London city women founded an Association of Shorthmui 
Writers muJ ljpists in 1903 ·which took on a more definitely 'feminist' 
mentality m1d in1912 ... men (who had been a small and diminishing factor) were 
excluded altogether, mui the title became 'The Association of Women Clerks m1d 
Secretaries'". (Hughes 1953) 
The attempt to achieve merger between theN. U.C and the A WCS, and the eventual amalgamation 
in 1941, showed the difficulties of different cultures coming together. 
The first decade and a half of the twentieth century was markedly a period of industrial conflict 
and labour unrest . It was also a period when amalgamation was a major polemic in the trade 
unions. Two "general worker federations " were set up , the Transport Workers Federation and 
the General Labourers' National Council. The Dock workers' & General Workers Union was in the 
fanner federation, whereas, the Gas workers' union was a member of both bodies. 
"In July 1914, a joint meeting of the two organisations, at which thirty-one 
unions were represented, approved a common scheme of amalgamation. On the 
outbreak of war however, the[ . .] two bodies agreed to defer the amalgamation[ .. } 
the scheme was never taken up again." (Radice 197-1) 
Despite this , there was discussions and eventual amalgamation ballot between the two major 
general unions. 
Amalgamation was now somewhat easier since the change of law in 1917 ( see Chapter 2 ) and the 
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two unions had a commonality of members, traditions , history and recognition of the need to 
extend membership growth into new job territories. However in the ballot held in 1919, " not 
enough members of the Dockers voted to satisfy the legal requirement. " (Radice 1974) The 
amalgamation would not have suited Ernest Bevin , the Dockers' National Organiser, who was 
effectively running the union and was Tlllett's obvious successor . In the new union he would have 
come well down in the hierarchy. The Dockers had returned a good majority , but a low vote. 
"In Bristol, by far the largest district and Bevin's stronghold, the proportion 
voting wa~ dav.n by 2 7 per cent. I11ere can be little doubt that if Bevin had 
backed the scheme it would hm·e gone through. Bevin at once launched 
another scheme for amalgamation based on the Transport Workers' 
Federation v.•hich brought the Transport and General Workers Union into 
being during 1921, with himself as general secretary." (Clegg 1964) 
Thus the two great general unions of today divided at this crossroad in trade union history. 
In this early wave of amalgamation , however , the merger direction of these general unions was 
to be significant. 
The Gas Workers and General Labourers' Union was to amalgamate with National Amalgamated 
union of Labour (NAUL}, established in 1889 as the Tyneside & National Labourers Union for the 
semi -skilled and unskilled workers in the shipbuilding and engineering sector. Its major 
membership was on Tyneside, Wearside and Teesside, but it had spread outside its regional base. 
Ironically, most early disputes were not with the employer, but with the Boilermakers' Society. At 
the time , the plater's helpers ( NAUL members) were employed by the platers ( Boilermakers' 
Society) and paid out of their earnings. It was a considerable advance when , in 1892, the 
Sunderland District obtained recognition from the shipbuilding employers. ( Hyman 197 I : Clegg 
1954/1964; GMB notes.) This established the Northern regional base ofthe union . 
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Alongside the Gas workers union, groups of municipal authority workers joined together to form 
trade unions during the late nineteenth century. With mergers, the largest union in that sphere was 
the Municipal Employees Association (MEA) , a more aggressive recruiting trade union based on 
the London County Council , in 1894 , in direct competition to the Gas workers Union . However 
in the MEA there was to be , apart from the public battle with rival unions, a private internal battle 
which created a split and the formation of the breakaway union, the Nation~ Union of 
Corporation Workers (NUCW) , the precursor of NUPE. Both the NUCW and the MEA had 
many clashes wi.th the general unions in recruitment campaigns and at TUC level. Nevertheless the 
MEA regarded itself as a sectoral general union and recognised the need to amalgamate \Vith the 
new force in trade unionism, general unions. The NUCW had an ideology of industrial unionism, 
which continued in the culture of its progeny NUPE. (Dix & Williams 1987 : also see reference to 
l\TUPE in Chapter 2: Clegg 1954/1964 .) The MEA was also to merge with the Gas Workers 
'Union. 
Women workers in the sweated and exploited trades also were finding expression in the Women's 
Protective & Provident League League which was formed by Emma Patterson in 1874 , mainly 
middle class led. Although Emma Patterson was not the first to bring women into trade unions , 
as Goldman shows in the short biography of "trade unionism's forgotten woman ", she pioneered 
a lasting "and an enduring trade union understanding among women". In the formative years she, 
along with her husband, were active in the Working Men's Club and Institute where she gained 
experience of administration and organisation. In her brief life of thirty-eight years she was to 
introduce many women into the male preserve of the TUC. 
Mary MacArthur was to become Patterson's successor as general secretary , having been 
Parallel de\•elopment 
91 
introduced to the union by Margaret Bondfield, who was then an organiser for the National 
Amalgamated Union of Shop Assistants (precursor ofUSDAW.) In 1906 she led a number of 
women's unions to form the National Federation of Women Worker, with Margaret Bondfield as 
Assistant Secretary. (Goldman 1974) Membership grew steadily as the War had created the 
necessity to employ women workers which " not even the post-war depression could wipe out". 
and the NFWW "decided that the large increase in female membership in trade unions in general 
- from 433,000 in 1913 to 1,326,000 in 1919 - had rendered a separate women's. trade union 
obsolete". (Clegg 1964) 
Thorne's General Union right from its origination had a progressive approach and recruited 
women into membership . The first women's branch of the Gas worker's Union under the 
secretaryship of Eleanor Marx dates back to 1890. She had in fact been unanimously elected a 
member of its National Executive at their first Annual Conference in Iv1ay of that year. ( Evans 
1982) So it was not surprising that \Yhen MacArthur planned to absorb her women members into 
this general union . It was agreed that she would be at the head of the 40,000 strong women's 
section , accompanied by Margaret Bondfield as a national officer. Unfortunately on the morning 
of the date designated for the amalgamation, January 1st 1921 , Mary MacArthur died and 
Margaret Bondfield took her place at the head of the women's section . She was to be Chief 
Women's Officer 1921-1936 and , having been sponsored by the union, one of Britain's first 
women MPs - 1923 - 1924 & 1926 - 1931, becoming the first woman Cabinet Minister as :Minister 
of Labour 1929-1931. (Goldman 1974) 
Another amalgamation of a general nature was taking place in Birmingham. In 1915 a local Gas 
worker, Brick makers and General Labourers Society merged with another Birmingham union, 
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General Unions' Membership 1920 & 1923 Table 8 
UNION Membership Membership o/o 
1920 1923 Loss 
All Unions 8,346,000 5,428,000 35 
National Union of 
General Workers 490,000 221,000 55 
National Amalg. 
Union ofLabour 143,000 53,000 63 
Municipal 
Employees' As soc 65,000 41,000 37 
Workers' Union 450,000 140,000 69 
Transport & General 430,000 307,000 30 
Workers Union 
National Union of 
Clerical & Admin. 40,000 11,000 25 
Workers 
Association of 6,000 3,000 50 
Women Clerks 
& Secretaries 
I 
source Clegg 1964; APEX statistics; rue 
the Birmingham District Municipal Employees Association to form the Amalgamated Society of 
Gas, Municipal and General Workers. This organisation continued to function as a local 
Birmingham based Union. By the end of the decade they realised that they needed to amalgamate 
with a major union and the obvious choice was the National Union of General Workers, bringing 
50,000 members into that union. This also created a major region of the union. 
In the summer of 1920 with the ending of the post-war boom unemployment grew rapidly, 
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recovery was slow and trade unions suffered a dectine in membership. The general unions being 
severely effected. The pressures to amalgamate in the face of the worst depression is shown in 
the membership figures in Table 8. In fact the NUGW total was assisted by the recent 
amalgamations of the NWWF and the Binningham based ASGMGW referred to earlier in this 
Chapter. Without these mergers the loss would have been 60% and comparable with the other 
general unions. 
During 1920 , a further plan of amalgamating the general unions was again hammered out and 
leading the discussions was the Gas workers union , now with the title National Union of General 
Workers (NUGW) . This again failed, but put pressure on others to amalgamate. 
On 1st July 1924, the MEA, the NAUL and the NUGW amalgamated to form the National 
Union of General and Municipal Workers (NUGMW) 
In this period the membership of the NUC was also grov.~ng rapidly and were showing signs of 
their developing unionateness. In his study Lockwood disputed any proletarianisation of the 
clerical worker ( and similar groups) , considering these workers in terms of their market 
situation, work situation and status situation. He concluded that although the status was changing, 
the other elements of market and work were still so particularly extrinsic as to facilitate their 
opinion of themselves as a different class from the manual worker. This will be further considered 
in this and the next chapter. (Lod.-wood 1966) Nevertheless even Lockwood recognised the 
manifest unionateness even in these early days which clearly effects the culture of the Union. ( 
Blackburn 1967) 
The union was now clearly a national organisation recognised in the trade union family and by the 
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government, gtvmg evidence to !\finisters and actively pursuing legislative issues. Having 
absorbed a number of very small organisations, however its progress towards collective 
bargaining had been slow. During the First World War this changed and Hughes (1953) relates 
the negotiations undertaken " some friendly, some acrimonious". Growth of membership was 
across all sectors , but significantly in manufacturing. Both Hughes and Marsh outline three 
factors, other than collective bargaining , which are significant in this period of growth : regional 
identity, guild sectionalism and the friction with the A WCS. 
The eight regions always pursued their element of autonomy ; comparable to that of the National 
Union of General Workers. The union had accepted that Area (Regional ) Councils would be 
responsible for local negotiations and administration. Guild sectionalism , G.D.H. Cole' s belief 
that trade unions must take the form of Guilds controlling production and services had much 
support amongst the l'nJC leadership. 
"evolved by a group of middle class inteffectual socialists , particularly at the 
universities, who attempted to adapt the idea of syndicalism to the conditions of British 
parliamentary politics ... m1d replace capitalism m1d the capitalist state by Guild 
Socialism in which each union would take charge of its respective industry ... This 
movement, confused as it was, did for a time win the support ofmml)' militant trade 
unionists mui socialists." (Jvforton & Tate 1956) 
Eventually, it outlived its favour \\rith the activists , and was restricted " to the formulation of 
their industrial claims ". (Marsh 1978 ) Nevertheless it did establish the acceptance of industrial 
sectoral needs, by then already accepted in the general unions. 
Friction between the NUC and the A WCS was continuous mainly in London. Nevertheless the 
latter had a membership of under 900 in 1906 which "rose to a peak variously estimated at 7,500 
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and 8,500 in 1920". (Marsh 1978) They registered as a trade union in 1916 and formally accepted 
into the TUC in 1919 on "the understanding that discussions would be opened with a view to the 
amalgamation of the two organisations". (Hughes 1953) It was to take a further twenty years to 
end the friction . 
During the 1920s, unemployment grew rapidly , the trade unions had to then face the action of 
employers seeking to force down labour costs to recover their profit margins. T~us disputes 
occurred across the whole industrial front including a national lock-out by employers. in the coal 
and engineering industries . The latter was to have an effect on the finances of the craft , the 
general and the clerks' unions . However it was not only the financial effects that affected the 
general unions, 
"a further factor pushing the unions towards amalgamation was the 
comersion of the powerful Amalgamated Engineering Union (created ill 1920 by the 
amalgamation of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers and several smaller craft 
unions) to the cause of industrial unionism. Early ill 19 2 3, the Engineers wrote to 
the General Workers to tenninate a previous agreement not to recruit unskilled workers". 
(Pelling 1967) 
Furthermore , in 1926 the General Strike called by the TUC to compel attention to the injustices 
suffered by the miners, was supported by all affiliates , including the NUGMW , the NUC and the 
AWCS. Within the compass of this work there can be no attempt either to indicate the extent of 
the miners' grievance or give account to the self- sacrifice of miners' and other trade unions' 
members . The period has been the subject of much research , analysis and local studies including 
the effect ofthe nine days of National Strike, as the TUC General Council preferred to call it , 
on the trade union movement. The Strike ended unsuccessfully , a return to work without any 
concessions , a loss of prestige for the unions and particularly for the miners. This led to the 
Trade Disputes and Trade Union Act, 1927, which placed many constraints on the unions more 
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particularly it heralded a further decline in rue affiliated membership "by almost half a million 
between 1925 and 1927 ". (Pelting 1967 ) 
Although "most unions accumulated large reserves during the first world war , when strikes were 
illegal", the cost of disputes and particularly the General Strike, the payment of unemployment 
benefits (eventually abandoned by most unions including the general workers and the clerks' union 
, due to the heavy unemployment of that period) and the cost of administration was ~o create the 
pressure for a further amalgamation . Nevertheless all proposals for one great general union, 
echoing that of Thorne , made to the joint committee of the TGWU and the NUGMW was 
allowed to lapse. Bevin , as General Secretary of the TGWU, had now become one of the most 
influential leaders in the trade union movement . Radice stressed a reason for the decline in 
profile of the NUGMW, 
" Thome and Clyne were less effective than in the past. The we a/mess of the GA1WU 
(NUGMW) duumvirate gave the TGWU the initiative in general union affairs. " Thorne 
was 69 years of age and Bevin 35 years of age in 1926, and it was clear that the 
former's "horizons had narrowed ·with age. If Thome could have been backed by 
younger men, it would have been some compensation, but most of the district secretaries 
were also growing old". (Radice 1974) 
The TGWU weathered the storm somewhat better than most unions , due to the sheltered nafure 
of the docks and transport. 
The only other major general union, the Workers' Union, was in a state of collapse . (See Table 8) 
This union had always been an advocate of amalgamation and, although it had broken from 
previous merger talks, it recorded its commitment to the principle at its Triennial Conferences in 
1923 and 1926. As Hyman outlines in his history ofthe Workers' Union, 
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desirable objective but an urgent necessity if bankruptcy was to be avoided Only two 
organisations could reasonab~v be approached". (Hyman1971} 
The NUGMW was still the main contender as it had a similar culture to the Workers' Union, 
"they were both tnily general unions, whereas up to this time Bevin's union had been 
primarily a transport union, although with wide secondary interests outside". 
(Hyman1971) 
However the opportunity was missed. No approach was made by the NUGMW 
"its tired administration was no attraction to the leaders of the Workers' Union to 
!.wallow their pride and make a new initiative. 111e other alternative ·was the TGWU, 
which had by contrast achieved a forceful reputation and was in tenns of membership 
clearly the more successful". (Hyman1971) 
The Workers' Union amalgamated \\ith the TGWU in 1929. 
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The consequence of this was TGWU membership rose to 423,000 , whilst the NUGMW rose to 
only 291,000 in 1929. As Hyman stressed, although the TGWU took into its ranks a financially 
ailing union, the amalgamation transformed the union into a truly general union, 
"more than doubling the size of the existing General Workers' 
Trade Group and greatly extending its industrial coverage perhaps 
even more important in the long nm , it also brought recognition ... The 
TGWU thus acquired a standing in a range of industries which allowed 
ready facilities for expansion when conditions became more favourable 
for union organisation." (Hyman1971.) 
Brought into the TGWU as part of a tra9e group, the amalgamating uruon did not enhance the 
regional structure, as we have seen was the case \\ith the NUGMW mergers. In this instance the 
introduction of a further truly general union into the trade group structure meant that 
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"this could only be a temporary solution with so ramified m1 organisation as the Workers' 
Union, and it was agreed thm within two years a complete regrouping should be worked 
out". (Hyman1971) 
In fact had the NUGMW pressed its case or at least made an approach to the Workers' Union 
"they might have brought off the deal ; mrd their union would then have been certain of 
becoming far m1d away the largest in the country". (Clegg 1964) 
Meanwhile clerical employees and their union , the NUCA W , had been dramatically effected by 
the economic crisis and unemployment of the 1920s. As a small union it had fewer reserves and, 
overdravm at the bank , it was now back to its prewar position . Its activities for the most part 
reverting to representation of individual members and propaganda. 
The Engineering Employers' lockout, referred to above, and the effects of the depression saw the 
National Union of Clerks membership in engineering dv.tindle from 15,000, claimed in 1920, to 
730 for the combined engineering, shipbuilding and metal trades. The manual unions in this 
industry were helpful and friendly , but as stated above were taking action themselves to protect 
their interests. 
n 
By 1930 the total membership of the NUC was only 7,404 contained mainly in the cocoa , 
cooperative societies and wholesale, trade union and other labour movement staff, with merely 
pockets of , and sometimes individual, membership in other industrial sectors. The AWCS 
stabilised around 3,000 mainly in London . (Lockwood 1966) 
There was no attempt at joining into a manual union , although there is reference to 'shop floor 
stafP in both the NUGMW and the TGWU. In fact the latter established a non - manual trade 
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group in the initial amalgamation mainly catering for such staff, mainly supervisors, in the sectors 
in which the union predominated. 
The Governments of the early 1930s all held office during a period of world economic crisis. 
Unemployment , as it had been in the 1920s, was still centred in the UK. heavy industry . Although 
a national problem governments treated the issue as essentially regional in character with aid 
policies to little avail. Unemployment increased with an inimical affect on trade union !llembership. 
Attitude to trade unions by the Conservatives was one of either tolerance or outright hostility. 
The NUCAW membership appears to have been stabilised at around 7,500 throughout this 
period. The NUGM\V membership decreased by 23,000 during 1930 to 1931 and 26,000 in 1932. 
The TGWU benefited from the important amalgamation with the Workers' Union and the 
consequent opening up of new job territory for consolidatory recruitment , but also by Bevin 
introducing what was to be its continuous aggressive merger style . (see Chapter 2 ) No real 
account was to be taken of the financial status of the amalgamatee, as they were to assess 
goodwill higher than money and the trade group structure was well adapted to amalgamation . 
This was to be the differing heritage and culture of the two general workers unions. The NUGMW 
, Clegg was to underline is 
"considerably more decentra/i:ed than other unions and is in strong 
contrast to the TGWU, in v.hich devolution of authority is by industry 
rather than by area". (Clegg 195-1 & 1964) 
In the late 1930s to the early 1940s, employment began to improve with the rearmament 
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programme and the Second World War. Technology led change, time study implications ofthe 
Bedaux system and early forms of automation , particularly in the new car industry , was moving 
the workers back to collective prot~-tion. The NUGMW under a new general secretary, carried 
out a drastic reorganisation. The structure was streamlined to ten districts (regions) and financial 
administration was given priority. At the head office , a research department was established and 
new national officers appointed . Compulsory retirement was introduced for full time officials. 
(Clegg 1954) 
This was a period of consolidating membership , which the restructuring assisted and resulted in 
growth . Both the NUGMW and the TGWU did arrange mergers during this period. However the 
consolidatory merger style of the former did not produce the same results as the aggressive style 
of the latter. The consolidation activities did , nevertheless, create an increase of 94% in the 
period from 1933 to 1939 for the NuGl\1W (467,000), which may have lessened the resolve to 
change the amalgamation style. Clegg noted that none of the unions, that amalgamated with the 
1\TUGMW, "brought in large numbers or a claim to organise in a wider field of industry". (Clegg 
1954) 
The NUCAW was also beginning to see signs of growth again, but this was also consolidation 
rather than changes in job territory. Despite the union in some areas organising its affairs as if it 
was a debating club, outside of the area I branch machine the industrial activists were attaining 
some successes . Both clerical unions were involved in political identity struggles . The AWCS 
had the bulk of their membership in London. As most of the propagandist activity was in the 
capital , inevitably its activists were politically motivated. Also , as it so happened the NUCAW 
"became absorbed in the 1930s with popular left- wing issues of the day ... Behind these 
lay the activities of the Communist Party." (Marsh 1978) 
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This constant political bickering militated against building effective organisation . Despite this, the 
membership of the NUCAW was growing, especially in the manufacturing sectors. The AWCS 
did not benefit from this industrial sector growth and its membership was stagnating. This caused 
the question of merger to be raised again . The TUC had held many meetings with the two 
unions, in line with its policy of structural change. In the General Council Report, 193 8, it stated, 
·with regards office workers, that 
"one combined union for this profession ... did not prove to be 
practical politics, but the NUC4 W intimated their willingness to enter into 
amalgamation proceedings". (TUC 1938) 
The TUC acted as the facilitator to the drafting of the instrument of amalgamation , through 
transfer of engagements, during 1939 and 1940. The attainment ofthe requisite majority lay with 
the AWCS as the transferee . (TUC 1938 & 1939 ) 
During 1939 negotiations nearly broke down as the NUCAW General Secretary, Elvin, was 
against giving national status to the two existing paid officials of the AWCS. He wanted to give 
them Area status only. However the new NUCAW President won the argument at his executive 
. This was endorsed at the subsequent Annual Conference in March 1940 , even though the 
transferring membership from the A WCS was below that of the NUCA W women membership . 
The transfer of engagement terms were approved by the AWCS membership and, in 1941, the 
new union came into existence. The merger created one identifiable occupational union for clerical 
and administrative staff (Hughes 1953) 
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The Clerical & Administrative Workers' Union :the CAWU 
Within the new rules of the new union were the election of President, and two Vice- Presidents , 
not more than two of the three to be of the same sex and, two additional women reserve seats 
on the Executive for an interim period of three years. 
The Second World War was to have a profound effect on trade unions , their influence and 
growth. Bevin, now (Cabinet rank) Minister of Labour, steered through policies ~hich created 
social partnership of employers, trade unions and government , the concept which lasted until 
the late 1970s . Membership growth was inevitable. 
The structural change of industry , and the attitudinal change of the craft industrial unions to 
semi and unskilled workers as potential members, was to advance further the cause of 
consolidation of membership. For example, the AEU, in 1942, decided to admit women into 
membership, prior to this only the two general unions represented them on the shop floor . This 
move of job territory , whilst maintaining it as a consolidation in a specific industry, was to create 
a new competition for potential membership with the general unions. The craft I industrial unions 
had become more "open" trade unions, but the broad increase in membership levels allayed any 
alarm. As Pelling outlined 
" ll1e Transport and General rose from less than 700,000 to over a million 
members ... the AEU became for a time the second largest union, more than doubling its 
size from 334,000 in 1939 to 825,000 in 1943, but later falling back with the 
contraction of the engineering industry in the last phases of the war ... the General and 
:Municipal Workers challenged the AEU for second place : it rose from 467,000 in1939 
to a peak of 726,000 in 1943 ... Mearrwhile smaller unions ... more than doubled their 
membership" (Felling 1967 ) 
So this grovv-th was not by mergers essentially. The TUC in 1944 offered the suggestion that 
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amalgamations should be encouraged and in 1946 produced the report "Trade Union Structure 
and Closer Unity" . Securing the level of approval by members, as required by law, was still most 
difficult. (see chapter 2) 
Consolidatory mergers did take place, from miners' federation to the NUM : USDA W formed 
from two major shop assistants unions and the AEU had three unions transfer engagements. The 
general trade unions were not participant in this merger wave, their efforts were concentrated on 
continuing consolidation of their established sectors. The membership figures increased, bolstered 
by the new status and security for a vast number of workers. (TUC 1944 - 1945) 
With the election of a majority Labour Government in 1945, the social partnership principle in 
industry was given further accord by the TUC, British Employers' Confederation (forerunner of 
the CBI) and government. However the task of restoring the economy ravaged by war, and the 
policy to extend the welfare system, was to place great strain on the external and internal 
relationships of trade unions. The government carried out a radical change to ov·mership of 
sectors of industry through nationalisation - coa~ public utilities, railways , the airlines , iron and 
steel - and created the National Health Service, alongside other welfare benefits. Nevertheless, 
most industrial sectors remained in private corporations. In this environment an amalgamation of 
the general unions would appear to be probable. But as Clegg records , possibly the last time for 
forty years , the question of the "one big union " was broached and failed . (Clegg 1964 ) A 
resolution on amalgamation ·with the TGWU was withdrawn at the 1948 NUGMW Congress due 
to organisational dissimilarity: 
"the differences in structure between the regionally decentralised 
NUGA1W and the industrially decentralised TGWU and the great 
difficulties which ·would be raised over finding suitable posts for the leaders ". 
(NUGA1W Joumal/948) 
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The CAVIU membersillp also rose steadily during the 1940s having become the sectoral union of 
clerks and administrative staff The membersillp increased from 18,4 78 in 1941, to nearly 
40,000 at the end of the decade and, by 1956, now the largest staff unions, to 53,000 members 
As with the general unions the character of the union had changed , in tills instance quite 
dramatically. By the early 1950s around 23,000 members were employed in engineering, but by 
1956 it was about 30,000, ·with a national officer specifically appointed having tills industry as 
ills prime duty 
The unions were strong , but now faced employers seeking to reassert the prerogatives they had 
in the pre- war years. Alongside tills was the austerity programme period of Sir Stafford Cripps, 
the .Minister for Economic Affairs , commencing with a warning of prices and incomes controls in 
a White Paper " Personal Incomes Cost and Prices ". Even so the unions, particularly the new 
"giant" general unions, gave a commitment to wage restraint. To a great degree the leadersillp, 
although their was some unofficial disputes readily diso·wned by the unions, carried the opinion of 
their members until 1948 . However, it was unreasonable to expect that in such a climate a 
voluntary adopted policy could easily be maintained and , more particularly , to convince their 
membersillp to what was tantamount to a wage - freeze. The growing opposition is often linked 
to, as Pelling puts it, "communist penetration of the trade unions" evidencing the positions held 
at national level in certain craft I industrial unions, including the ETU and AEU. Both general 
unions and the CAWU had rules preventing communists holding key posts. Because oftills the 
I\TUGMW stated that 
"in view of the fact that certain unions were pressing their wage claims 
irTespectil•e of the policy, there should be some form of voluntary 
machinery in the Trade Union Movement to coordinate wage claims. The 
eJ.planation·was accepted but nothing was done". (Felling 1967) 
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Their policy was crumbling, more particularly, because of a rising cost of living and a fiustrated 
work force, as some workers had their remuneration enhanced through payment by result 
bonuses, overtime and by other methods. In defiance of the General Council advice, and the 
protestations of the General Unions, a composite resolution was carried at the TUC Congress in 
1950 which formally ended wage restraint. The Labour Government elected in 1950, with a 
majority of five , lasted just over a year. With the death of Ernie Bevin in 1951, the ~arly chapter 
of great general union amalgamations was closed. (Pelling 1976 : TUC 1945 - 1950 : Marsh 1978 
: Bullock 1967) 
The three consecutive Conservative governments, during the 1950s, under four prime ministers , 
accepted the concept that to manage the economy required the continuation of social 
partnership and collective bargaining . To some analysts of that period it has been construed that 
trade unions had become part of an ex1ended State. The details of the debate surrounding these 
points does not impinge upon the effects on the trade unions in respect of the question of 
mergers and need not concern us here. However , it is important to recognise this means of 
managing the national economy was central to trade union and employer relations, and, more 
particularly, the relationship with government which existed until1979. 
The trade unions continued consolidatory action during the 1950s , the general unions within their 
sectors rather than merging to extend job territory. Even so there was a slight dip in membership 
after the war. An examination of rue reports of the period shows that inter union disputes 
more often involved the general unions with industrial unions . Encroachment due to the change 
in accepting other than skilled workers was creating a diversion from previous recruitment 
practices. 
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In engineering, shipbuilding and associated industry, assisted by the growth of employment in 
these sectors, the AEU membership increased by recruitment and mergers to 888,000 in 1959. 
By the end of the decade the TGWU was the largest union with 1,240,000 members and the 
NUGMW, with 769,000 members, dropped to third place in the TUC membership league table. 
Both general unions had become major unions in manufacturing and processing industries. ( TUC 
1950-1959) The I\TUGMW still had (and has) a major membership in local gove~ent manual 
workers. 
The NUGMW began to hold regional ad hoc meetings were held relating to specific sectors of the 
union . These were held under the instruction of the Regional Secretary and were agenda driven 
by a full time Regional Organiser. Broad policy determination stayed with the Annual Congress 
and the national Executive Council. The Regional Council , however, remained the agency for 
developing input into these bodies. 
It was at this time, also, that the CA WU ad-hoc conferences of engineering and shipbuilding 
representatives were formalised in Rule. Initially they were to have only an Area (regional ) 
profile, but, in the mid 1940s, a National Engineering Advisory Council was approved. It 
followed that in . other industrial sectors, as and when membership size determined, advisory 
machinery was also set up. However policymaking still lay '"~th the National Executive between 
annual conferences. Practical application of the policy remained the responsibility of the Area 
Councils , which jealously guarded the level of autonomy they retained. An example of this was 
the attempt to centralise accounts, even a partial approach in respect of current accounts, in 1956. 
Area Councils would hear nothing of it . Membership by the beginning of the 1960s had increased 
to 64,000 by 1962. 
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Apart from the NUGMW and the TG\\U both absorbing three small unions in their traditional 
job territories, there was no developed strategy towards amalgamation in the general or sectoral 
unions. 
The sixties brought into focus, at the TUC , further debates on the structure of trade unions. In 
1963, it invited comments and suggestions about possible amalgamations, although the_result was 
a restatement of the status quo. Throughout the decade this was to be the cornerstone. Although 
group conferences were called by the rue , which drew together unions in particular industries 
or sectors, it did not create a momentum to challenge change. What was clearly taking shape, was 
the need to adapt trade unions to the new structure of industrial ownership and control, the 
mechanising of what was once termed skilled functions, government inspired productivity 
bargaining and the ex-tended use of time study. Government provided the facility in law to be 
involved . The details of that debate serves as a reminder of the socialisation effects of capital I 
labour changing the characteristics of unions discussed in Chapter 1. ( see also Table 2) The only 
model that could meet the change was general trade unionism. 
Externally discussions were being held with the Minister of Labour requesting the repeal of 
legislation which mitigated against amalgamation of trade unions. The Act which received Royal 
Assent in March 1964, the Trade Union (Amalgamation etc.) Act , contained all the main points 
raised by the TUC , as outlined in Chapter 2. Later that year the Conservatives lost the election. 
The incoming Labour Government was to usher in industrial relation reforms, which assisted the 
profile of the trade unions. Nevertheless, the decentralised system of collective bargaining which 
had developed during the 1950s, with shop stewards committees and plant negotiations , was to 
make the TUC attempts to maintain a wage restraint policy ineffective. 
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The seventies saw the political debate shift to direct legislation on trade union organisation and 
the involvement in collective bargaining. Nevertheless the growth of membership continued during 
the Conservative government of 1970 and the subsequent Labour minority governments of 1974-
1979. This was the period of amalgamations by all those unions that had those distinctive merger 
style discussed in Chapter 2 : consolidatory, defensive and aggressive . At the same time a pattern 
was being established by the introduction of the philosophy of law into the indust.rial relations 
system by the Conservative Industrial Relations Act 1971 . This law provided a framework of 
institutional arrangements, organisational reconciliations, law on collective bargaining and legal 
remedies. Legalism had replaced the "voluntary 11 system. All the tendentious factors were in 
place , it now required a change of trade union characteristic. The major unions, irrespective of 
their antecedents and evolution , were to take on the main attributes of general trade unionism. 
This was exposed particularly in this amalgamation wave and recruitment . (see Chapter 2) 
The 1\TUGMW during the sixties and early seventies suffered from a stance which was atavistic . 
Cooper, the General Secretary ( 1962 -1973 ) continued the right- v.~ng approach of all his 
predecessors since Thome. He retained a leading edge in the political arena by supporting "every 
twist and tum of Labour orthodox)' 11, Instead of looking to amalgamation and, therefore 
developing in new job territories, continued consolidation and gave precedence to a co.ntinuing 
benefit- led membership role. The union developed a professionalism, both regional and national, 
through research facilities, financial services, legal sections and, enhanced stewards and lay 
activists training. This attuned local negotiators to meet the criteria for obtaining productivity 
deals, over and above the Labour Government's salary increase norms. The new National Board 
for Prices & Incomes (NBPI) produced reports and guidelines , which were supported by the 
unions as a means of assisting collective bargaining and, the avoidance of industrial disputes. 
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(N13PI 1969) The NUG.MW financial reserves more than doubled during the period. 
In the sixties and seventies the white collar labour force was expanding. In his Research Paper 
to the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, Bain referred to the 
"critical period in the history of the British trade union movement. While the 
number of manual workers is declining, the number of white -collar 
workers is increasing so rapidly that they will soon be in the majority". (Bain1967) 
He then demonstrated the extent of expansion , unionisation and the problems of recognition 
impeding the growth of white-collar unions. ( Bain 1967) 
The growth of the CA WU was constant, but not exceptional . In the decade membership rose 
from 59,500 (1960) to 86,500 (1969). The increase in membership was primarily by consolidation 
and particularly in the heavy manufacturing industries. In 1961 the national Executive Council 
formally set up the National (industrial) Advisory Council in the union's Rules. Combine 
Committees were organised, to mirror the major engineering groups and the centralised industrial 
relations management structure of these companies. These changes not only developed, but also 
transformed , the union into an industrial identifying union. As was to happen in the GMWU in 
the mid 1970s (see later this Chapter) this increased the scope for the lay activist with the internal 
power structure remaining intact. ( Fig l ) 
The establishment of the r-...TBPI , was to have an even greater affect on the office staff 
unionisation. This was a new environment , trade unionism for white collar employees was 
apparently publicly desirable. There was an acceptability within the Trade Union Movement , with 
expressions of support and respectability in industry. In the NBPI report on salary structures 
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reference was made to the levels of pay , but also to the need for rationalised salary structures. The 
union had initiated research and produced guidelines on job evaluation. This was used to assist the 
membership in many industrial and commercial sectors to achieve such a rationale. It also served 
as a most useful organising vehicle, both in consolidating and recruiting new membership. With , __ 
this approach, underlined by 1'-.TBPI documents on job evaluation, employers organisations and 
business consultants continually stressed the need for trade union participation. (NBPI 1968a: 
1968b) Productivity agreements had become the basis for increases above the statu~ory norm and 
credence was given to white collar employee productivity in NBPI Report 123 
"The first major conclusion to be dravm from the case studies is that work 
measurement techniques and other methods of improving efficiency can be applied 
to a wide variety of clerical and non- manual jobs, and that their use can lead 
to substantial increases in efficiency and reduction in labour costs." (NBPI 1969) 
Further to this , the Engineering Employers' Federation stated in their research paper that 
"The notion that white-collar, especially clerical, workers cannot be measured 
effectively is a myth that must be dispelled. Im·estigations made during the course of 
this study have shown that there are few areas indeed which are impractical 
or non-economic to measure ... Insta/lation of control techniques almost im,ariably 
increase total effectiveness by at least 25%." (Bayhylle 1968 quoted by Cliff 1970) 
To offset these developments, white collar employees joined the unions for the expertise and 
ability to deal successfully ·with consultants and the ways of maximising the benefits that could 
accrue. 
There was still some problems with recognition by employers , but that too was to be addressed 
in 1968 by proposals in the Donovan Report to establish a special forum for settling recognition 
disputes. Recognition traditionally in Britain had little to do with the law, and more to do with 
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the trade union traditional reaction to any refusal. It was this reluctance to recognise the rapidly 
growing white collar trade unionism by some employers that prompted a response. The Labour 
Government established the Commission on Industrial Relations (later to become ACAS ) to 
facilitate this and other conciliation in 1969. 
These extensions to the viability of collective bargaining, and the dynamic shift in the industrial 
and occupational composition of v.-ork, was to give a confidence for the future a~ this decade 
ended. Nevertheless, the activists in the CA WU were now calling for the union ·to look to 
amalgamation . Three identifiable strands appeared in motions to the 1968 Annual Conference : 
merger with DATA and AEU , a powerful sectoral arguments as the DATA I AEU merger was 
then taking shape (see previous Chapter ) and the largest membership group was in engineering : 
white collar trade unions mergers , supported by evidence using the analysis of growth potential: 
general trade unionism , supported strongly by the industrial sector activists. However the left 
activism of the TGWU did not have much support , but neither did the ex1reme moderation of the 
1\/lJGMW. 
"Such was the 'moderation 'of the GMWU (NUGA1W) that Lord Cooper was even quite 
ready to register under the 1971/ndustria/ Relations Act. Only a threat of revolt from 
the union's r.xecutive Council held him in check." (Taylor 1980) 
The TUC had taken a policy stance not to register under this Act. It had become the symbol of 
reaction to legislation on trade union rights. This was to establish a trade union shibboleth , which 
would create difficulties in the 1980s. 
John Edmonds , new from Oxford University , who had been appointed a research assistant 
during this difficult period recollected 
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"the considerable complications so far as Cooper's persona/life was concemed which 
diverted his interests, but it was his political style that frankly put us (the union) just 
miles out of step with the rest ojrhe trade union movement. (Edmonds interview 1992) 
Referring to the registration issue , which Cooper saw as 'left led ', Edmonds recalls that it was 
Cooper's tum to chair the TUC Congress that year ( 1971) 
"on the eve of Congress when he expressed his view that the union should register under 
the Act. Now this was at a time when the TUC was building up a big campaign against 
registration. So for that reason there were no options on amalgamation . Who· would 
amalgamate with the NUGMW in what was such a difficult period for the union." 
(Edmonds inten'iew 1992) 
Cooper's attitude was no doubt established back in the mid 1940s and early 1950s when he was 
the full time official called upon to trouble-shoot the problems of "communist organising " in the 
union. Furthermore he had always supported national pay bargaining and incomes policy. (Clegg 
1954 & 1964) 
However as officials negotiating at that time have stated , there was a definitive change of attitude 
in the rank and file member . There \vas a proactive approach to bargaining, and an impatience in 
these first years of full employment and rising living standards. The prevailing employee culture 
had shifted , from the need for security of employment of the post war period, to a demand 
approach by local negotiators to achieve the maintenance , but, more particularly, the 
advancement, of their standard of living. 
In 1968 the NUGMW Congress decided to investigate a national trade group structure. All that 
was achieved was a system of ad hoc national industrial conferences. They were to be entirely 
consultative with no direct input into the Executive Council. Policy judgment and advice was to 
be left to the full time officials. ( GMWU 1969) This was comparable to the situation in the 
CA WU in the late 1950s, referred to earlier. However, the NUGMW had to wait until 1975, and 
a new General Secretary, before industrial conferences were formalised and part of the union 
structure . Nevertheless this 
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Edmonds now an Organiser in the Southern Region in 1970, noted the difference to other unions. 
"So the union was very much out in the wildemess, the house view was that you should 
not have a dispute about anything, under any circumstances. So the union was way 
out of touch with "W'hat was going on." (Edmonds inten,iew 1992) 
This slow approach at understanding the new pressures in industry and changed attitudes was 
clearly seen in the unofficial dispute at Pilkington glass works, 1970. At this time most unions 
were having difficulty coping ·with changing nonns : the AEU and ETU were in a state of 
continuous political argument at their National Committees and the TGWU had its rough patch 
of rank and file argument within the trade groups . But the Pilkington issue was different . Here it 
was a lack of awareness regarding the age profile-change at the company, and its effect on the 
socio-industrial makeup. Further there was a perceived inertness of the officials. As Lane and 
Roberts point out in their account of this strike , this was a company that for years had wages 
and conditions better than most in the vicinity . Their account outlines fully the changed job 
environment , the changed expectations of the workers and the effect this seven week unofficial 
strike had on the company , the local community, the union members and particularly the union. 
What is important here is that this unofficial strike at "Pilkingtons proved to be a watershed in the 
union's history" ( Lane & Roberts 1971) 
David Basnett , General Secretary in 1973 , was certainly affected by the Pilkington dispute, he 
had been the national officer for the glass industry at the time. Basnett stated three years into his 
office 
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"Our trouble was we were not attuned to elpansion . The leadership was simply unaware 
of what was going on". (Taylor 1980) 
The Undy et al. study underlined this inability to attune to expansion. Particularly cross 
referencing the NUGMW and the TGWU in the late 1960s to the mid 1970s, they noted the 
difference in organisation and structure , the containment within a given job territory and job 
regulation. 
''Membership (of the NUGAfH') rose from 795,767 to 88/,356 or 10.9%. Of this 
increase however, 11,074 was the direct result of mergers. Thus 'natural' growth 
contributed some 9.-1%" of this growth. 111e TGWU expandedfar more rapidly 
1,481,565 to 1,856,165 in the same period (1965- 1975) or 25.3%. The major element 
ofthis growth was merger. Between1961 and 1975 twenty-one unions merged·with the 
IGWU. The merger of the NUVB in1972 gave it a "craft dimension" and signiftcmJtly 
broke the traditional general·worker profile". (Undy eta/ 1981) . 
Th~ GMWU, as Undy's tabulations show, had its membership growth tied directly to closing up 
particular sectors "where they already had a substantial membership" and more particularly, the 
differing leadership styles in the Regions. "All regions of the TGWU, unlike those in the GMWU, 
increased their membership over the 1965 -1975 period." (Undy et a! 1981) 
"It cm1 be reasonably suggested therefore that the GMWU's growth in membership 
was very largely the result of internal change agents ... 171lls, since at the beginning of 
the period studied, commitment to growth objectives and priorities, were confined to two 
regions, differential rates of growth emerged in those regions . But as more regional 
secretaries came to accept growth as a priority, and the new General Secretary 
promoted concomitant national changes ... the union begm1 to grow on a national rather 
than a regional basis." (Undy et al1981) 
Edmonds ( a national officer from 1972 ) recalled that at national level 
"Bassnet filled the leadership vacuum putting an end to the rather strange 
attitude towards disputes, towards the organisation of the union. He was keen to go for 
expansion m1d to look for amalgamations. There was a whole range of schemes 
including APEX, the EETPU and a three way amalgamation between the AEU, 
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amalgamations. However there was little achievement of amalgamation ... until 
eventually with the Boilermakers." (Edmonds inten,iew 1992) 
As we have seen, CA WU lay activists were suggesting the union review the position on mergers. 
At national level the reaffirmation of independence from other unions was also expressed . The 
leadership stance was stated by David Currie, CA WU President; 
"Facing the facts that these are the days of the big unions the C /erical and 
Administrative Workers needs to expand by amalgamation and growth to build a large 
union .. Our future does not lie in a particular industry or group of industries. It 
stretches throughout the field of clerical employment. The way to expand is not by 
amalgamation with workers with quite d(fferent skills, but by vigorously pursuing closer 
working with the positive end of amalgamation with other clerical unions". 
(The Clerk Jan. 1970.) 
Currie's attitude was coloured by the culture of the union, which still held at bay the undercurrent 
of change being generated through the industrial advisories and the joint working at workplace 
level. He returned to this theme at the 1970 Conference , as it once again discussed 
amalgamation. The motions repeated the call for a merger away from the tight constraints of staff 
unions only 
"to pursue discussions with other unions not necessarily only those catering v.>hol/y or 
mainly for clerical workers , and report back to the next Annual Conference .. " 
(tA.WU Conference 1970) . 
"open negotiations with the A!:.F" (as the AEU was now titled). 
(CAWU Conference 1970) 
However Currie repeated that the union was 
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This was echoed at that Conference by Henry Chapman the retiring General Secretary . The 
membership had topped 100,000 v.ith a record 14,000 increase from the previous year. The 
incoming General Secretary Roy Grantham speaking to an Executive report on amalgamation , 
however, referred to the growth of skilled technicians and , due to computerisation , the 
employment of fewer routine clerks. He warned that the changes in industry would make staff 
status common for manual workers. He told delegates that the background to amalgamation 
should be the membership explosion as this gives a better bargaining position. He further advised 
that informal discussions had been held with the AEF, NUGMW and some staff unions. 
Basnett , as a decision maker , in seeking to alter the merger style and enhance growth , needed 
a variation to the unions cultural foundation. By the mid 1970s the "General Worker Section" 
ofthe TUC was composed ofthe NTGI\1W only. Basnett had led discussions and finalised the 
transfer of engagements with last remaining two smaller unions in that Section : the National 
Union of Water Works Employees and the Rubber Plastic and Allied Workers' Union . But 
these were still consolidatory mergers. For development the union needed to move into new job 
'territory and change in its characteristic profile. 
In 1975 the variation to the culture was established. The union Congress delegates , the decisiq,n-
takers , agreed changes which streamlined the government of the union from a two tiered 
executive to a single Executive Council , to consist of the Chair of the union ( later termed 
President) elected by Congress, the General Secretary, 2 lay members from each region and the 
Pal'lllkl denlopmeot 
117 
Regional Secretaries. In addition it also adopted proposals to formalise the system of industrial 
conferences. Seventeen industries were identified where National and Regional Industrial 
Conferences must be held . Conferences could also be held for other groups of the membership ( 
which may be a sub group of the industry) as and when required. In addition there was an annual 
conference for MATSA, the non-manual section established in 1972. This extended the role of 
the Jay activist without drastically changing the internal power structure. ( Fig. 2 ) 
The purpose of the Industrial Conferences was further underlined at the 1981 Congress and in the 
guidelines subsequently produced, "Success in the 1990s ". As we will see later, this was to be 
significant in progressing amalgamations. In 1979 the union also emphasised its general profile by 
agreeing a change of name to the General & Municipal Workers' Union, the GMWU 
CA WU membership was to still show constant grO\vth however not to the ex1ent envisaged by 
the union. The union's journal , The Clerk , under a front page graph showing membership 
"soaring to 120,000" , prophesied, 
''At this rate CA.WUwi/1 be orera quarter of a million strong in December 1972 -pass 
the ha(fmi/lion mark in early 1975" (lhe Clerk August;September 1970.) 
The figures for the period however indicated a slower growih. This was due to the effects of new 
competitive trade unionism, the large manual unions having changed to a wider and less clearly 
defined recruitment sectors. The unions new approach, of being more involved in industrial 
disputes, aided consolidation, but hampered fast gwwth in new sectors. The membership was to 
reach only 128,000 by 1974. 
The union changed its name, after consultation with members, to the Association of Professional 
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Executive Clerical and Computer Staff, using the acronym APEX. It was hoped that this 
redesignation would assist in recruiting across a broader spectrum and into the new and growing 
high and information technology sectors. 
A new phenomena, at this time, was the occupation of factories or workplaces as a form of 
industrial action . The most notable was the Upper Clyde Shipyard in 1971, however there was at 
"least another two hundred " during the 1970s. In these circumstance manual and. office staff 
came together to prevent closures or the diminution of trade union rights. APEX ·played an 
important part in most of these actions, as the major clerical union in the heavy manufacturing 
industries. This also significantly effected the attitude at the National Advisory Council for the 
Engineering I Shipbuilding Industries. ( Thompson & Hart 1972 : TUSIU 1976) During this 
period the union was also active in pursuing "phasing in" agreements on equal pay for women 
member, by rationalising salary structures, having become recognised as expert in the 
negotiating of job evaluation schemes . (NBPI 1968) The Equal Pay Act 1970, introduced by the 
Labour Government, had the unprecedented lead in period of five years . All these activities 
drawing a closer relationship with non-staff unions. 
Recognition by the company was still a problem for all unions, when recruiting new members. 
Identified in the Industrial Relations Act 1971 , legal sanctions were outlined for "sole bargaining 
agents", that is the sole union recognition for wholly or a particular occupation or grade. However 
this and other advantages could only be used if the trade union registered under the Act. (Dept. of 
Employment 1971 : SehV)'Il 1971 : Simpson 1991) APEX did not register, like the majority of 
TUC affiliates , as part of a policy of total opposition to the Act. The penalty for breaching policy 
was suspension from the TUC. APEX and the GMWU amongst many others, hO\vever , took a 
pragmatic approach to protecting their interests at Industrial Tribunals and the National Industrial 
119 
Relations Court. The latter being set up by the Act as "a new branch of the High Court" . ( TUC 
Special Congress 1971 & TUC 1971/1972) 
These difficulties were somewhat alle\iated by the return of a Labour government in 1974. The 
Employment Protection Act 1975 section 11 created " procedure for reference of recognition 
issues to ACAS" and was " quite widely used ·with some 1,600 references to ACAS made over 
four and a half years " This section of this Act, alongside its Schedule 11, which. gave legal 
means of establishing "the going rate" and underlined the purpose of collective bargaining, was to 
give impetus to trade union growth. 
Nevertheless the incidence at Grum\ick (1976-1978), showed the inadequacy of the Act. A 
group of Asian workers, mainly women, in dispute with their employer joined APEX. Apart from 
the reasons for the strike , and the uncovering of loopholes in the recognition law by the company, 
it became the arena for outside agencies' activity. It also became a media show of mass picketing 
with the attendant police/pickets aggravation. What was most important , an employer refused to 
abide by the traditional position and agreed conventions. Grum\~ck management supported by 
Conservative ideology, was said to stand for "company freedom against the dictates of the state". 
ACAS Council, the tripartite national body, had written to the Secretary of State for Employment 
in 1979 stating that the law as interpreted by the courts was preventing ACAS from operating the 
procedure satisfactorily. There was to be no changes except that of a change of government in 
1979. ( Dromey 1978: Ward 1977) 
The political consequence of the industrial disputes of 1978 and the early months of 1979 assisted 
the electoral prospects of the Conservative Party. The Conservatives returned to government in 
1979 determined to pursue policies which were diametrical to the union encorporatism of 
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previous Labour and Conservative governments. The Conservatives returned to government in 
1979 , detennined to pursue policies which were diametrical to the union encorporatism of 
previous Labour and Conservative governments. This Government's response was to repeal the 
Employment Protection Act. Replaced by the Employment Act 1980, it changed significantly the 
State's relationship to trade unions and an end to tripartitism . A radical change of politic from 
previous governments, social partnership was ended. 
The distinct change at the end of the seventies , which would be significant \Vith regards future 
amalgamations, was the evident shift in trade unions' culture , the values of the activist, officials 
and through them the membership, of the white collar and skilled Worker 
Clerical workers, and to some degree all office workers, pat1icularly in the manufacturing and 
service sectors, were now more clearly identit)'ing \Vith the manual worker . Their relationship to , 
and their own functions taking on, the mode of production process , created a shared status . It 
was a shift from the long held acceptance of the classic Lockwood "black coated worker" analysis, 
which underpinned in the 1950s and 1960s, the notion that identification would be with other 
white collar unions . The concepts developed by Braverman plays a much more clearer role in 
this analysis. The "labour process" debate took a shift in emphasis which was to have effect on the 
merger equation. 
The general unions , having merely dabbled in white collar and skilled sectors , were now faced 
with further potential decline if they did not change their job territory. Meanwhile the skilled craft 
industrial unions , in mirroring this , were becoming in all aspects general unions. Staff unions 
recognised the need to develop membership services, to have better research and resources and 
the changed identification with other manual trade unionists . 
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In APEX , this developing change was not only due to clerical and administrative wages falling 
relative to production workers . The aspects of scientific management techniques, necessary for 
productivity agreements , clerical work measurement , organisation method work study , all 
placed the staff in direct comparability with the manual workers identification of role/status. Job 
evaluation, referred previously, also created salary structures which indicated union collective 
approach to job status. The perceiYed in built sexism of most work measurement allowance 
tables, and the inequality of the the male/ female scales established in the structures, using wages 
levels prevailing at the time, was to link the campaign for equal pay to collective bargaining. 
Gl\1WU had established the basis for recovering lost ground. Its financial status was good, and 
the continuing commitment to professionalism, with the internal reforms, created a firm 
foundation for mergers. The in1pact of legislation , changes in collective bargaining, company 
culture and organisational change, as explored in Chapters 2, created the need for progress in 
merger style change. The early 1980s had become a period when the extra tendentious factors 
created the need for such change , but there was also an anticipated return of a Labour 
government which would facilitate the necessary environment to stave off the haemorrhage of 
membership. Nevertheless , no doubt due to all the tendentious factors outlined in Tables 1 and 
6, an amalgamation took place , which was significant in providing the start of the GMWU's 
orientation to growth, by providing new open - union characteristics. 
The ASBSBSW , the Boilermakers' Society , itself formed by an amalgamation of three craft 
unions, had been the subject of incorrect prognostication regarding a further craft union merger. It 
amalgamated with the general union , the GMWU in 1981 . As with the 1\TUVB I TGWU merger 
, the union had broken the traditionalist general worker profile. Now it was to develop the 
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amalgamation friendly merger style \\ith its new title the General Municipal Boilermakers and 
Allied Trades Union, GMBATU. 
This amalgamation will be further considered in the next Chapter. 
Meanwhile the concept of the " market situation of clerks" had become even more insufficient in 
terms of distinguishing them from the manual worker. Computerisation and the use _of the visual 
display unit , which was to become all embracing in the 1980s and thereafter , had become a threat 
for the future. Updating Bravenn.an, a study by Crompton and Jones (1984) showed that this 
computerised information technology was (and is ) perceived to threatened skills , job security 
and salary levels. They also portrayed a continuation ofthe in built sexism of industry in respect of 
promotion of males. What was significant, was the relationship to management Staff workers 
were now more aware that they needed protection through collective bargaining. A.PEX and many 
other unions , manual and staff , negotiated new technology agreements and entered into 
discussion on job design. 
Moving into the 1980s , the long established non-proletarianisation theories of the "Black coated 
Worker", based on continuing white collar trade unionism growth of the 1950- 60's, alongside 
the non-embourgeoisement theories of the Affluent Worker studies of the 1960s, all appear to be 
time locked statements. ( Lockwood 1966 : Goldthorpe & Lockwood et al 1968 & 1969) They 
had become less relevant to what was taking place in the workplace. Single union agreements at 
green field sites, single table bargaining at multi union sites, often joint staff and manual, 
harmonisation of conditions and single status employment, all were emerging as the main elements 
of the unions' new agenda. 
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Alongside this was the major factor noted by the Certification Officer. 
"Thus the rapid growth over the past decade comes to an end in1980. The substantial 
decrease in membership is doubtless associated with the current economic conditions, 
particularly rising unemplo;ment. "(Certification Office for Trade Unions & Employers' 
Associations 1981) 
Redundancies, "natural " wastage of employed labour, ie the non-replacement of leavers, and early 
retirement was now usually negotiated on a multi-union basis. This was establishing an "enterprise 
unionateness", as against the wider "society unionateness ". (Prandy, Blackburn & Stewart 1983) 
This found expression at union conferences as an end to the staff/ manual worker divide. 
Conclusion. 
In preparation and writing of this chapter a decision was made to relate to the unions' historical 
development. However this could not be merely the compiling of dates and names nor extracts 
from reports although all these played a part. To make this the raison d'etre of the chapter would 
have placed undue emphasis on stressing division rather than parallel development . 
An examination of the relevant literature revealed, that whilst there were distinct differences in 
historical development , there were distinct common threads of development. The change factors 
and the grow1h and density statistics analysed in Chapter 1, alongside the components of change 
considered in Chapters 2 , have shown in this Chapter to be fundamental in why a white collar 
union could decide to amalgamate vvith a manual general union. As the frame of reference for 
change, they were pivotal in understanding the components of change outlined. The synthesis in 
this chapter indicates why a white collar union would merge with a manual union, and why a 
general union would be such an amalgamator. 
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It further focused on the parallells of the two unions, APEX and GI\1BATU. It only partially 
answers how these parallells eventually come together. The next chapter will examine the 
acceleration of these change factors in the 1980s, the actual negotiations and participation of the 
decision makers and decision takers which shaped the amalgamation. 
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The Decade of Decisions 
Concluding from the chair what he had called a "unique conference, the first of its kind in the 
history ofthis union", Cyril Unwin GMWU .Midland Regional Secretary, in the course of his 
reply to questions, made the follm\ing statement : 
"Amalgamation, of course, is not the answer to increasing membership 
... but it does lead us to situatiom 1rl1ere we do increase membership ... alw equally 
important, it means we can get into new field'i that we were not in before ... it gives 
us a new image 11 • (GA11VU 1980) 
This was indeed a unique conference. In May 1980 the GM\VU called together all full time 
officials and the ExecutiYe of the union to "collectively consider" the problems that faced the 
union. The conference was timely as trade union membership was beginning to decline and 
there were certainly new problems to overcome. 
Both the GM\\'U and APEX \Vere taking stock of their position in the first six months of 
1980. APEX recognised that it had not made the growth progress of ASHv1S probably due to 
the differing merger styles and leadership . (see Chapter 2) Grantham, the General Secretary of 
APEX, repmied to the Annual Conference the difficult state of the finances due to the decline 
in membership . The Conference itself gave a distinct perspective of the effects of the 
problems as all Branches of the union with a membership of 40 or more had a delegate in 
attendance . Reflecting upon tllis he recalled .. 
11 So APh..X, which had 150,000 members in the 1970s had a collfinuously falling 
membership lthich barely exceeded 80,000 when the decision to amalgamate was 
taken . lhe union managed its finances well, but Branches were closed and most oj 
the remaining Branches had manyfewer members. Delegates to Annual Conference 
fell sign(fica11fly and it was this physical change in the number of delegates 
meeting in Conference Halls we once filled that sparked the support for an 
amalgamation. 11(Grallfham inten·iew 1993) 
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The reason for the decline has already been outlined earlier, and both decision-makers and 
decision-takers referred generally to the Conservative Government economic and industrial 
relations policies and the effect on the manufacturing industry as a major cause : 
" companies gone to the wall or severely cut employment. Aided by computers the 
largest cut had been in the clerical staff." (Gramham interTieu• 1993) 
Area Full time Officials pointed to the loss of the Union Membership Agreements, the post -
entry closed shops which having been "amicably reached ", no longer gave the necessary 
support to the attained 100% membership. There was a loss of experienced workplace 
representatives also, due to redundancies. Often the young successors had little experience and 
, of course now, no legislative support. 
However the firm impression oftlus cross section of opinion was 
"the impact of legislation was hmited" (Gram ham interview 1993) 
"Legislation came into it, but ... " (Travis, National Vice President and senior 
workplace representative at British Leyland, Midlands interriew 1993.) 
"it may have been the originating cause of the effects to move the union to 
seriously consider amalgamation but ... " (A1oran, Area Chair London & Home 
Counties & Senior worf..place representative at British Aerospace inteniew 
1989) 
Others made no reference to the legislation changes at all, although Ged Moran possibly 
expressed the underlying thoughts. 
All concentrated on the other tendentious factors: 
culture changes of companies , necessitating union change .... 
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There was 
"changing culture ofmm1Ggement which became much more macho and no 
longer provide recruitmeJJt facilities ... Single table bargaining, particularly all 
unions' representatives jointly addressing issues like company and job 
restructuring and redundancies , the growth of common pension schemes as a result 
of joint negotiations were a major cultural factor in preparing delegates and 
members to consider amalgamation with unions other than white collar. fl1is 
was reinforced by the aggressive poaching by TASS (at that time still in the 
AUEW). APEX had been a major advocate of single status (agreements) at 
Conferences like the CSEU and had to some extent educated manual· unions to 
a more positive recognition of the values of common stm1dards 11 
(Grantham intenievv 1993) 
Collective bargaining and industrial relations structures were changing : 
11 There was an increasing move to sta,tf status on behalf of the manual workers to a 
degree our membership resented the consequential loss of differentials and some 
wondered if they should now be part of a larger group. Single union agreements were 
forcing APE¥ to face merger with unions llho could provide , with us, one union 
cover. D1e over-riding factors, in my recollection, were the rapid declining 
membership , financial strictures arising therefrom, and a comequential inability to 
guarm1tee absolutely a cominuity of employment for officials m1d sta,tf m1d the 
provision of service to the members ". 
(Ken Smith then a National l·'ice President and was National President at the time 
of the amalgamationll'ith the GMBATU interview 1993) 
Industrial organisation was changing alongside the company culture: 
11 Information Teclmology was effecting all parts of the offices , the union had 
produced a number of documents on this e1·en negotiating agreements. A committee 
was set up nationally to monitor the change. Nevertheless it had m1 immediate 
e.ffect upon the number ofstqtf employed and their skill.<s. A1ore and more we 
were sitting down with ourshop floor colleagues to discuss jointly this or that issue 
... redundancies, priratisation, pensions, Joillf negotiations, more and more sta,tf 
conditions of employment were becoming the norm for manual workers." 
(Moran inten•iew 1989) 
The decision -takers were taking note of the changes and what was needed 
"Single union agreements , single status, common bm·gaining issues, multinational 
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companies changed company structures ... We had to face d(fficult redundancy 
situations together (with tht! other unions) so strength innumberbecame buzz words". 
(Travis inteniew 1993) 
Thus at the 1980 Annual Conference 12 motions, with an equal number of amendments, 
appeared on the agenda calling for action on amalgamation , all recognised the action taken by 
the Executive in having discussions \\·ith other unions. They were now becoming more specific 
and fell into three categories : those that recognised that there exists a basic identity of interest 
between manual and non-manual workers and Jinks should be sought accordingly, some 
specifying the G.tvfWU; those which felt that the membership's interest was best served by 
linking to a white collar union , some specifying ASTMS ; those which merely called for 
progress but outlined the process of consultation and special Conference requirement. In the 
end the Executive and General Secretary were given direction by the acceptance of their report 
to seek further discussions with unions including the feasibility of a Confederation of unions. 
APEX was at a cultural crossroad as far as the decision -takers were concerned. The 
decision-makers, the Executive Council and the General Secretary , however were to some 
degree taking particular political stances. Ken Smith recalls 
"there were two schools o.fthought: one mainly ASTMS oriented, the other AEU 
(then actually known as the AUEW). Some desultory, in my ''iew,negotwtwns 
with the GMB (then the GA.fWU) with David Basnett present were undertaken. 
these jell through, ostensibly, because (o.f) Basnett 's preoccupation with the Isle o.f 
Grain dispute which had just arisen, as I recall. (inter-union dispute between the 
GMWU, AUEWand particularly the }.'EPTU see TUC Reports 1980 & 1981) I felt 
that] detected a relief in the eyes of the senior (lay and full-time) national 
o.fficers when the GA1B jell through and A SIMS never really got off the 
ground" ( 51nith interview 1993) 
There was some still 
"hoping APEX could go it alone for a jew more years". 
(Travis illferview 1993) 
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The GMWU was similarly at a crossroad . At this unique One Day Conference of Full- time 
Officials , 1980, , Basnett pulled no punches in outlining the "failure 11 in not employing an an 
aggressive approach to membership growth . Using "change statistics 11 of ten major unions 
over a 14 year period (1964-78) and divided this into 5 year periods, he showed how there 
had been insufficient consolidation. The GMWU had, during the growth period ofthe 1960s 
"failed in relation to the growth of public sel1'ices in the 1970s and lastly, · 
in the important period, .. .failed to really get into the white collar field". · 
(GMWU 1980) 
In a full analysis , looking at regional differences, recruitment ratio, and projected 
employment changes , he concluded that the union had 
"to make sure that ... there are no bmTiers in our structure or the way 11·e work to 
maintaining and improving our membership pe1:{onnance". (GMWU 1980) 
There then followed a lively and frank debate with the Officials. In particular, the important 
points related to amalgamations. Basnett drew attention to the fact that the union had "failed 
to achieve any major amalgamation''. In the 14 year period the TGWU had increased its 
membership by 856, 000 of which 153,000 was by amalgamation, ASTMS by 435,000 and 
43,000 by amalgamation with a shift into new job territory. The GMWU increased its 
membership by 180,000 with only 10,000 by amalgamation. 
Reference was made to the unsuccessful (at that time ) discussions ¥.ith the Boilermakers 
Society and in reply to criticism of the union's approach, Unwin responded. 
"As far as the Boilermakers are concerned, I certainly would not 
accept that it was a 'softly, softly' approach. lhere was a hell of a lot of 
time spent with the Boilermakers on discussing the possibility of 
amalgamation and in fact we did reach agreement with them at Executive leve/ ... 1l1eir 
Conference took a decision against that amalgamation. So it is unfair to say that we 
were pussy-footing and 'softly, softly ' on that one. It is a fact that 
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amalgamations are time consuming. Nonetheless they are areas we have to look at, 
that we have to spend time on and have to be more flexible than/ think we have been 
on some occasions in the past in relation to amalgamations". (GM1VU 1980) 
There was vital concern regarding this proposed amalgamation as it would create the means 
for extending a craft profile in the union , the TGWU having achieved this with their 
amalgamation in 1972 with the l\ l..JVB. ( See Chapter 4 ). Although discussions were 
continuing with other unions ( including APEX ) this proposal to amalgamate. was given 
priority. 
The Amalgamated Society ofBoilem1akers, Ship wrights, Blacksmiths and Structural Workers, 
the full title of the Boilem1akers Society, was formed itself by a merger , in 1963 , of three 
of the oldest craft unions : the United Society of Boilermakers (est 1834) , the Ship 
constructers and Ship wrights Assoc. (est. 1882- the Ship \vrights Assoc. of South Shields 
being formed in 1795 ) and the Associated Blacksmiths, Forge & Smithy Workers Soc. (est. 
1857). This was a union with strong cultural values and norms . (see Chapter 2 ) There was, 
according to the full time officials who recall this period, an anti-General worker attitude 
amongst most members . In fact the attitude within the Boilermakers Society was that if 
merger was necessary it should be with "kindred Unions ". The craft sense of sectarian 
exclusiveness, through a competence to use certain tools or skills, wa.s clearly manifested and 
portrayed these narrow craft horizons. There was also countervailing memories of rivalry 
and the non-support of industrial action . 
With the appointment of Ken Baker, GI\1WU Senior National Industrial Officer , to have a 
complete oversight for amalgamation , the merger friendly style was developing . In 1981 
he was party to the discussions of forming a "Confederation of like-minded unions". Roy 
Grantham was initially in favour and 
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E.~1PU and APEX Each organisation would keep an ide111ity for recruitment, it 
would span skilled, unskilled and staff workers and secure economies in 
Research and other functions". (Grantham inten•iew 1993) 
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Baker made reference to this, what he termed "tripartite discussions, in his speech to that years 
GMWU Congress. A number of other unions had been approached including FTAT and 
UCATT, but no discussions had taken place. Howeverhe detailed discussions being pursued 
v-.ith APEX I EEPTU. regarding the Confederation suggestion arid those continuing with the 
Boilermakers Society, the National Union of Agricultural Workers (NUAAW), the National 
Union of Dyers and Bleachers and Textile Workers (NlJDBTW). 
The talks on a Confederation broke down , two reasons have been cited : the inability to reach 
agreement on the transference of white collar members from the partner unions (Grantham ) 
and the Isle of Grain dispute. (Smith.) Discussions between the Gi\1\VU and APEX were 
still part of the merger agenda. 
The APEX Conference of 1981 was advised of the progress to date , however the need for 
merger was underlined by the report submitted in support of increasing union contribution 
rates. Stating that "membership could fall as low as 130,000 before the bottom ofthe slump 
was reached ", reference was also made to difficulties in maintaining employment of full time 
officials and staff. Advocating non - replacement of those who retire or leave service of the 
union and possible redeployment , the General Treasure also proposed to change elements of 
fund allocation and the reserves. During the 1980s the decline projection to 130,000 
members was to prove to be an underestimation. 
1982 was certainly a year of mergers : 8 transfer of engagements and 4 amalgamations of trade 
unions. The Certification Office for Trade Unions Annual Report for the year noted that 
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"Almost a million and a hafftrade union members were affected by the mergers that 
took place during the year. l11is is more than five times the number involved in the 
whole period .from 1976 to 1981 ... " (Certification Office 1982) 
The NUAA W and the NUDBTW both transferred engagements to the TGWU early in the 
year, but by far the largest merger ( at that time) since 1945 , was the amalgamation of the 
GMWU and the Boilermakers Society in December 1982 creating the General Municipal 
Boilermakers & Allied Trades Union, the GMBATU. 
The amalgamation gave impetus to the union's new approach to expansiOn by further 
amalgamations, and broadened the structure of the union by establishing two sections -
GMW and BMS. (Fig 3) 
Although there was a clear acceptance to amalgamate and it was indeed a prestigious merger, 
it was only achieved 
"at the second or third time around, because the G.A1W got to the stage of getting out 
the tenns, having them agreed nationally and then they 11·ere overtumed by the 
Boilennakers Conference. It took some time, hut a basis o,{merger was eventually 
agreed". (Edmonds inte11'iew 1993). 
As a Scottish Boilem1aker, or as he made it plain a ship wright , recalled 
"enthusiasm was high amongst the national officials, but locally, even amongst 
some of our officials, we were less than happy. Although I voted for ; the alternatives 
were even less attractive ". 
Other activists and officials confirm these sentiments , but clearly recognised that the option of 
non- merger was not available due to the decline in membership. The AUEW, ISTC and the 
Blast furnacemen's union appeared to be in similar problems and to some were "too right 
wing". The latter comment most strongly put about EEPTU. The GMWU had" moved to the 
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centre". 
A member complaint was receiYed by the Certification Office ( this is not unusual in 
mergers), but was dismissed without holding a hearing. Reference is made to it here to show 
the importance of the norms and values, the culture, of a union to the membership. The 
written decision ,-.,•as summarised in the 1982 Report ... 
"Mr. T. Gormley (the Boilemzaker member supported by his branch committee) 
complained that the ASB did not follow the proper procedures which he said 1ms laid 
dawn in its mle 35(4). This providedthat the ASB could be dissolved by consent of 
four- fifths of its members in benefit at the time of taking the vote. 
The Certification Officer said that the complaint was based on a misunderstanding of 
the statutory provisions gowming amalgamation of trade unions under section 2(3) of . ·· 
the (Trade Union [Amalgamation etc.} 196-1) Act. A simple majority of the votes 
recorded is sufficient to pass a resolution, whatever the Union~<i mles might say 
(except in circumstances which did not apply in this case). Accordingly, the Union~<; 
rule 35(-1) was not applicable to the vote to approve the instrument of amalgamation" 
(Certification Qffice for Trade Unions 1982.) 
In APE~ the G11BATU dialogue had been disturbed by the Confederation idea . 
Furthermore, the AUEW (Engineering ) had made an approach on the possibility of an 
amalgamation. National Officers and Officials had met , but only the principles were discussed. 
This approach was significant , because Grantham 
"prior to the discussions ..... supported an amalgamation with the AUEW". 
(Gramham i111enie1v 1993) 
His reasons were to do with the potential for growth in those sectors of existing APEX 
density. The memberships , he contended, 
"largely overlapped in engineering, aerospace, shipbuilding, civil aviation and oil. 
Engineers were employed in most other industries such as food, but in such industries 
our (APEX) membership strength would give APEX the leadership role. There were 
clear advantages in recmitment single union agreements and economies in sen,icing 
on common issues like pensions, (company) reorganisations, merger and 
redundancies". (Grantham 1992) 
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Significantly there was also the political stance of APEX and the AUEW. Both uruons were 
categorised as right- wing led \\ithin the rue and Labour Party . Lewis Minkin, in his 
most important study of the complex relationship between trade union and the Labour Party , 
showed 
"there were strong personal/inks with some of the union leaders in APEX, the AUEW, 
ISTC and strongest of all in the EETPU. Political forums existed where ok! 
friendship and alliances endured .. " particularly" ... the St. Em1i11 's Group, (which) 
was named after the hotel 1rhere they met ... in the period 1979- 1981". (Minkin1992) 
Furthermore Grantham was an influential and directing figure in these right-wing trade union 
leaders caucuses . The senior officers ofthe union, Dennis Howell Iv1P, the President, Jean 
Travis , Vice President and Roy Grantham , viere acknowledged protagonists of labour 
movement right wing policies. However it must be acknowledged that these policies had the 
support of APEX Conference decisions. 
Travis , who also had a preference for the AUEW prior to the discussions \Vith the G!\ffi , 
whilst echoing Grantham's job territory I potential grmvth statement from her industrial 
background, acknowledged that "this political side (of the equation was ) also part of the 
argument". (Travis interview 1993) 
There were, therefore, industrial and political reasons for the national leadership predilection 
for the AUEW. 
APEX was facing financial difficulties, not only due to the loss in membership and therefore 
revenue, but also the cost of the Grunwick Dispute and the lengthy Cheall legal case caused 
by the acceptance of a rue ruling on this individuals membership. In November 1982, at a 
special meeting of Area Secretaries and the Executive Council, a report was produced which 
showed the continuing decline in membership, but , more particularly , drew attention to 
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future employment trends predicting further job losses. The meeting considered other 
recruitment potential , but it was becoming self evident, that for progress, a merger was 
necessary. By 1983 , careful management of the finances, a further contributions increase, and 
economies including early retirement of officers and staff, resulted in the union's reserves 
becoming very stable , however the future healthy state of finance depended upon growth of 
membersrup. 
The year 1983, was significant in many respects. Labour was defeated once again in a General 
Election. It had "lost more than a quarter of its 1979 vote ; its share of the vote was the 
lowest ever won by the principal opposition party". (Guardian 1992) 
The incoming Conservative Government , buoyed by trus result , outlined the succession of 
legislation to contain trade union action and union internal practices. At the same time 
further research by the unions recognised the effects of teclmology on employment in the 
offices. Although the unions were successful in reaching agreement with a number of 
employers , whereby there would be joint consultation and mutual agreement on the 
introduction of technology, the reports projected job loss scenarios . 
Meanwhile APEX members saw moves towards ham10nisation of conditions of employment 
by the manual workers , with specific reference to the shorter \Vorking week. The staff 
unions in the manufacturing industries argued for a convergence of conditions of employment 
Bravern1an's argument, that technology had reduced the division between the shop floor and 
. 
office worker, was plain to see, with staff unions seeking to evolve joint policies with their 
manual worker colleagues (CSEU 1983) . The divide between the manual and staff worker 
had been bridged by what Prandy et al. termed enterprise unionateness , which, as we have 
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seen, relates to the workplace union awareness and bonding . Previously what has been 
termed unionateness, later re termed society unionateness referred particularly to " the extent 
of political commitment of the union, the level of identification with the broader trade union 
movement to differentiate with "enterprise unionateness ". (Prandy et al 1982) 
There were new employment avenues, but they were in non traditional sectors which were 
particularly employer-negative tov.·ards trade unionism. Without the previous. legislation 
assisting recognition , the unions were faced with added difficulties. 
Living standards had undeniably risen ( trade unions argued this was due to the previous social 
partnership inherent in the past industrial relations of Britain) . Social Trends changed 
especially with regards manual workers ; the growth of home ownership , increase in 
disposable income, more consumer goods purchased, cars, telephone, coloured T.V., and 
holidays. The income differential between classes may not have changed, but the working 
class was now clearly a consumer target. The exceptions were the unemployed and those on 
fixed or means tested incomes. So the importance of change was not merely the significance 
of manual workers being able to have vestiges of new affluence, as this did not alter their 
social class. It merely portrayed changes in their use of income , which certainly did affects the 
traditional values, customary attitudes and behaviour. The major influence, however, was tllis 
developing mutual approach of the staff and manual worker in collective bargaining. Also 
redundancy, which affected shop floor and office , created a new way of perceiving their 
cominonality of employment 
The shift in the labour movement political complexion, highlighted by the defection of 
Labour politicians to form the Social Democrat Party ( including Shirley Williams 
M.P., an important figure in APEX politics) in 1981 also affected attitudes. By 1982, the 
composition of the APEX Executive Council had a weighting of "left " and "right" Area 
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Representatives, which was balanced by two or three who were "open to persuasion ". There 
was some difference in the nature of the left. At one time it was the communists that were 
instrumental in pressing the left politic (see previous Chapters on involvement), however the 
left was, what had become termed the" soft left", Labour Party activists, mostly "non aligned 
" to any group. The importance in the context of this study was that these decision-makers 
\Vere open minded about merger partners and decisions affected by this balance. 
Also at this time Howell , the President , decided to retire from the position. Howell who 
supported Gaitskell the right wing leader of the labour party ( 1955 - 1963 ), had been a 
minister in the Wilson Government and was recognised as a prime figure of the political right 
of the movement. The union elected the vice president Ken Smith in his place. 
Smith , a full time seruor APEX staff representative and branch secretary at Rowntree 
Mackintosh , York, categorised himself as 
"a grass-roots Yorkshire office workers representative" .... claiming he had "no 
commitment to either side of the political debate ". (Smith interl'iew 1993) 
Nevertheless, he was more often categorised by his contemporaries as right of centre . He 
had been part of the ongoing discussions on mergers , but referred to what he termed the 
''perpetual ongoing talks in private between General Secretaries although at the time 
1 knew little of these in real detail. Only what Roy (Grantham) chose to tel/the E. C." 
(Smith interview 1993) 
As President he , recognising the need for amalgamation and 
"kept an open mind. At the time there were too many people in the union at all/eve/.<; 
who had (in his opinion) made up their minds regardless of any factual 
considerations" (Smith i11ten•ie1v 1993) 
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Furthermore the campaign for the leadership of the Labour Party, after Michael Foot r-.1P 
resignation, was to change the 11 anti left 11 undercurrent. Most of the APEX senior national 
officers and officials supported Hattersley , the right candidate. However a ballot of the 
membership gave clear support to Kinnock for leader and Hattersley for Deputy. Factional 
political cohesion on the left and right had become weakened by the necessity to face up to the 
changes referred to above. The consideration of merger-mate was to be less and less effected 
by any past political culture ofthe union. 
That year was also significant in that Roy Grantham was returned to the General Council of 
the TUC by what came to be termed automaticity. He had lost his seat in the past , because 
the large union , with a left bias, and those smaller unions in the industrial groupings 
dependent on these large unions' votes themselves, combined to elect candidates suited to 
their political stance. In the past left candidates had suffered when there was the opposite 
political complexion . Therefore the proposition of automatic representation on the General 
Council had been under examination since 1976. At the TUC Congress 1978 , with Basnett in 
the Presidents chair, the GMWU tabled a motion requested the General Council to 
reconsider the question of its structure , for 
"automatic representation for all unions with owr 100, 000 members and a larger, 
though not a proportionate, representation for the larger unions". (rue 19 78) 
With a direct reference to APEX and the Grunwick Dispute , the delegate stated that "the 
General Council cannot be fully represented if unions of size and influence are excluded 11 • 
(TUC 1978) 
The motion was lost. 
The argument was reintroduced in 1981 by the POEU giving detailed structure to the G.l\1WU 
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motion of 1978. This did not call for a "reconsideration " , but the acceptance of the principle 
with the practical application of same to be put to the TUC in 1982. In seconding the motion 
Fred Baker, GMBATU, underlined the inequities of the system , affirming that his union" has 
no axe to grind. it is automatically on the present General Council" and can by its large 
vote .... " influence the choice of members from small unions". ( TUC 1982 ) 
Echoing sentiments expressed in his own union about their own internal polemic , he concluded 
that "we must have a body that automatically reflects changes in union structures and which 
is representative ofthe Movement". (TUC 1982) 
It took a further bitter debate in 1982 before it was recognised that the industrial I trade 
grouping had lost their purpose. In September 1983 , therefore, APEX was on the TUC 
General Council automatically. But this whole debate drew attention to the fact that to 
maintain influence trade union size was very important. 
Because the GMBATU had established , after the recent amalgamation, two sections, the 
GMW and BMS . This was a period of difficulty even hostility between activists and often 
officials. For the BMS section, their old system of districts conmlittees existed, full time 
Executive members were designated national officials , reflecting the regional power interface 
. This created difficulties in the Regions for the BMS section Regional Organiser whose 
direct line of authority was the Regional Secretary , yet the structure had a direct line for policy 
action to the BMS national officer . ( Fig 3) This dichotomous position of the officer led, 
often, to a mistrust of the individuals loyalty to the Region . Also the Regional Secretary 
could and in many regions , some BMS officers suggested , did frustrate activity. This was 
due to elements of the BMS Section rules, within the Rules of the Union, which appeared to 
create as one GMW officer suggested a union within a union . As the Congress Report 1988 
outlined ... 
The Decade of Decisions 
''All EMS officials are under the operational control of the BA.fS Section Executive 
Committee. Administrative support continues to be supplied by the Regions". 
(GMBATU Congress Report 1988) 
140 
In the culture of the GMWU , loyalty to the "union in the Region " is paramount, the 
national perspective is maintained by regional representative structures . It was claimed that 
membership figures on merger were not as expected and there was also ill feeling amongst 
G11W officials over the amalgamation terms related to contract of employment elements . ( 
See later this Chapter reference to Full Time Officials .) Although there was this general 
fiiction throughout the country, efforts were made in most Regions to accommodate the 
situation. Continuously , however , reference was made to the question of identifYing; this 
included the need to have Boilem1aker in the union title, retaining their officer and local 
structures and reference back to their rules. 
As Edmonds succinctly put it, "A most important amalgamation for the union's profile , a 
learning curve on how to handle major amalgamations". (Edmonds interview 1993) 
A Review of the Union Finances , Structures and Services, incorporating alteration to Rules, 
was produced and presented to the 1984 Congress ofGMBATU, and known as Decision '84. 
The document noted the immediate and medium term prospects of a decline in the job territory 
where " the G!\.fW Section and the BMS Section have historically recruited - semi-skilled and 
unskilled manual workers, both male and female, and the metal working craftsmen and 
ancillaries ". It further noted the continuing shift in employment patterns away from large , 
generally unionised , places of work to smaller locations with the difficulties of organising, 
part-time and casualisation of employment and the legislation factors referred to early in this 
Chapter. The strategy outlined covered ; inevitably finance and contributions , to contain 
expenditure, and have a viable income to meet cash flow and reserve . Most important it 
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outlined the need for integration between GMW and BMS Sections . The officers structure 
was changed creating the post of Regional Industrial Officer (RIO), 
"respollSible for a major group of members by broad sector" that "when welded to an 
appropriate Management Structure, will provide a sharper edged organisation able to 
adapt to new , maybe hostile, industrial and political environment" (GMBA TU 
Congress Report 1984) 
and a single grade of Regional Organiser. 
More particularly it also recognised the need for further amalgamations and to "be structured 
efficiently so as to be the most dominant partner in any future major amalgamation". 
(GMBATU Congress Report 1984) 
The actuality of the BMS Section , the existence of the RIO grade and this strong, but 
amalgamation fiiendly , style were to be fundamental in the APEX dialogue and eventual 
merger discussions. Although Sectionalisation of the Gl\.1B did not take place until after the 
APEX I GMB amalgamation , the foundation and causality was in this document. 
(GMBATU 1984: see Chapter 6) 
In the internal document "Recruit , Retain Consolidate " reference was made to "merger 
possibilities". Particular consolidatory approaches in the metal trades and textiles sectors . 
With regards the latter, specific discussions had taken place, on the possible transfer of 
engagements of a federation of ten separate unions in the Textile industry , mainly located in 
Lancashire and Yorkshire area. There were to be complex discussions during 1985, with 
transfer of engagements in 1986 of approximately 28,500 members. This strengthened the 
Textile industrial sector in the union , but did not augment the sectors where potential was 
perceived to be ; the staff or white collar and retail I distribution employees. 
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A further factor, in the cycle of amalgamation, was the ending of the federal structure of the 
AUEW , after much legal wrangling during the early 1980s, including an unsuccessful appeal to 
the Court of Appeal in 1982 . Eventually, after advice from the Certification Office, a rule 
change in the AUEW Engineering section and the submission of revised instruments of 
transfer , the three independent sections of the AUEW (Engineering, Foundry and 
Constructional sections ) joined into one AUEW with integrated sections . (Certification 
Office Reports 1981 , 1982 and 1984 ) 
The staff section , TASS , remained outside this integration for reasons explored in Chapter 2 . 
TASS, then by transfer of engagement, was to merge with two metal trade unions - the 
transferees APAC and the NSMM- both targeted by the GMBATU. TASS was at this time 
was left led and , as Grantham was to stress, communist dominated leadership . They were to 
seek and obtain merger with unions of conunon political culture , this included tobacco 
workers and sheet metal workers unions . They also took up an aggressive approach to 
membership recruitment in staff areas , particularly in the manufacturing sector. 
The miners strike , which began in 1984 ending March 1985 , the continuing Tory legislation, 
membership decline , redundancies and consequent financial problems , all signalled a 
message to the APEX conference that there should be an urgent "exploratory meetings vvith 
unions with whom the possibility of an an1algamation had to be seriously considered ". (APEX 
1985) 
During I 985 initial discussions took place with the unions on the list , but with little 
direction. Approached by the Metal Mechanics union (NS~1M ) discussions and proposals 
were to be put to their delegate conference ( along with those from other unions including the 
GMBATU ). Their decision was to transfer engagements to TASS, subsequently confinned 
by a ballot of their members. The EMA proffered what was essentially a federation, this too 
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was unsatisfactory. These discussions however created some media speculation and rumour on 
merger. To this extent the APEX Conference 1986 had a number of motions which specifically 
directed the union leadership : particularly regarding the question of autonomy. 
"Conference ... notes with concem the lack of any real progress on the question of 
amalgamation. .. re -establish meaningful discussions with trade unions sharing 
similar industrial coverage, whilst seeking to maintain autonomy ... this cannot 
be held sacrosanct if the future of the membership is to be protected " 
Motion26 · 
the union should 
... "enter into discussion1rirh. .. zmions ·with a similar industrial base ... prepare a report 
for Annual Conference 1987 ... recognise that this 1vil/ entail relaxing our present 
policy of insisting on maintaining our present autonomy" 
A1otion 27 
" ... in view of our declining membership and current financial problems, seek an 
urgent re1·iew of our position ...... " 
A1otion 28 
" ... commence immediate talks with TUC affiliated trade unions with a view 
to amalgmnation" ... as addended .. to make a specific recommendation as to which 
union we should amalgmnate with." 
A1otion29 
" ... concerned that rumours continue to arise linking the name of APEX 
with discussions about me1ger with other unions ... discussions I correspondence 
should be reported at the earliest possible opportunity." 
.Holian 30 
The decision - takers were pressing the decision -makers to produce an urgent response, 
outlined the general direction and requested leadership on this important issue. 
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The motions \\1ere composited into one motion calling on the Executive. to enter into 
discussions with other trade unions and prepare a report . This was agreed at the conference 
and as Grantham recalled 
11 The Executive received a report from me advocating discussions on amalgamation 
with ASIMS, AEU, VSDAW. TASS and TGWU. ll1e Executive looked at other 
unions in the report and added the GMBA TV to the list 11• (Grantham interview 
1993) 
Initially in the statement presented to the Executive he suggested that he "meet the General 
Secretaries of ASTMS and the Amalgamated Engineering Union infonnally ...... ". However in 
the following months all the unions on the list were approached. 
The GMBATU had also reviewed its progress on amalgamations and in his last year as 
General Secretary , Basnett had the Research Department carry out 
11 a major piece a,( work on employment trends This showed that the core membership 
of the GMBA TV would decline fast , irrespective of who was in govemment . 
171e centres of membership , heavy engineering, heavy chemicals , shipbui !ding and 
the manual workers in the public sen•ices were at best going to stay steady , but most 
of them were going to shrink ve1y rapidly indeed. Mainly the semi- skilled and 
traditional craft workers (job tenif01JV were going to shrink. lne union was heavily 
male based and full time, that also was going to shrink. So however the membership 
growth potential was analysed, we (the union) were in the wrong area for future 
expansion. There was one obvious area, a critical mass had to be reached amongst 
white collar employees. So strategically what was needed was a white collar 
amalgamation. Because the union had been regarded as a unskilled and semiskilled, 
the union needed a craft amalgamation : the boilennakers provided that. The 
research focused attention on the need for a white collar and retail sector 
amalgamation. ~xplicitly we (the union) needed the three and that is why it was 
essential to secure the amalgamation with APEX". (Edmonds inten•iew 1993) 
With a new General Secretary, John Edmonds, the union was to "pioneer a new approach to 
trade unionism which combines strategic thinking with a moral force long obscure in the labour 
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movement" (Financial Times 1987 a) 
Edmonds' recognised savoir faire was to heighten the media profile, developed when national 
industrial officer in the public sector. On achieving this senior post he was portrayed as 
"the ve1y model of a modem union leader: a university graduate, a professional, 
someone who had never done the job of the members on whose behalf he negotiated ". 
(Financial Times 1987 a) 
He was, nevertheless, seen to be a part of the contemporary Labour centrist thinking, 
"charting a new path for British trade unionism ". (Financial Times 1987a) 
To do this, he responded to the analysis that was the outcome of the aforementioned research. 
The union not only recognised the changes in employment trends , it also noted that it needed 
its path to be broad enough to encompass disparate influences . Added to changed 
employment factors, of low pay, part-time and casual work , was status - consciousness, 
portrayed in the quality of life themes . Furthem10re the promotion of women's involvement in 
the internal democracy of the union was achieved by the introduction of I 0 women seats on 
the CEC. There was also a shift of priority in negotiation to issues of training, health and 
safety . A structured recruitment approach was developed to suit new company human 
resource culture, often accepted by the employee. 
The union image was updated by the GMBATU, becoming simply the GMB, with a 
streamlined designer logo. Out went the old image of clasped hands with the slogan "Unity is 
Strength", replaced by stylised man and woman and the maxim "Working Together". That is 
not to say that the union had shifted in its advocacy and support of industrial action, within the 
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Jaw, to achieve better wages and conditions. An example is the support given to members in 
the Lancashire textile industry in the first year of the merger of the textile unions with the 
G.MB. 
APEX was by now approaching the issue of amalgamation in earnest. The list of unions was 
as established in 1986 and had become part of a general dialogue amongst the lay activists 
and membership , in no small part due to media speculation. At the activist level an attitude 
prevailed against the AEU being a possible merger partner. The reason for ·the AEU 
approach 
"was seen to be a means by which they (the AEU leadership) could progress their 
argument for a merger with rhe EETPU Most of the activists, even the right-
wing were against anything to do with them (E-ETPU) due to the Wapping affair". 
(A1oran interview 1989) 
The Wapping affair referred to the industrial dispute at News International and the allegation 
that the EETPU had secretly colluded to provide workers to work at Wapping after the 
company had dismissed print workers. The Financial Times , along with other newspapers , 
gave prominence to the possible merger with speculation on the effect noting that 
"Apex's choice of merger partner will have significant implications ... A link up with the 
AEU would enhance the prospects of an EEJPU- AEU amalgamation boosting the 
strength of the right in the TUC. The GMB's influence as a centrist force would be 
consolidated through taking in APEX while a merger of TASS, ASJMS and APEX 
would create a 600,000 strong left leaning group. Within APEX, the AEU and the 
GMB are considered the frontrunners". (Financial Times 1987 b) 
Other workplace representatives echoed Moran that the merger had to be in the interest of the 
members, however there was no longer an argument for a white collar merger only. 
Although the Executive was instructed to consider the unions involved and bring a 
recommendation to the next Annual Conference, 
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The Executive was, in the recall of an Executive member at the time, "quite happy to await 
the report, although speculation was rife". (Darke Apex Northern Region National Executive 
Member, Senior StaffRepresentative Swan Hunter interview 1989.) 
On this committee, however, Smith believed " there were clear and fixed views in most 
cases" . Although in the early stages he held no view, he did eventually come to an opinion, 
but "was careful not to express it since it was not in accord with the majority of officers at that 
time and (he) was not prepared to be sidelined in the negotiations". 
(Smith interview 1993) 
The Discussions with Possible Merger Partners 
Outline talks had been held, by APEX , with about eight unions. These talks , mainly initiated 
by the eight unions, consisted of proposals by them with submissions and letters . A report was 
produced to consider these details and the changing industrial and commercial environment. ( 
Document 1) 
After the report was given by this decision-making committee , the APEX Executive decided 
that further talks be held with five ofthe unions -the Grvffi, TASS/ASTMS (at this time now 
in open discussions themselves on merging) USDAW, the TGWU and AEU. These 
discussions to centre on suggestions and proposals from APEX. 
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USDAW 
TASS 
"J11e lack of membership cohesion with USDAW eliminated them" . 
(Grantham interview 1993) 
"l11e financial status, communist domination, and aggressive attitude 
soon eliminated them . l11ey had been approached by ASTMS for a merger." 
(Gramham inten•iew 1993) 
"They did not appear to want to discuss the issues properly. Probably the 
ASlMS approach was paramount to them" (Smith intenoiew 1993) 
ASTMS & TASS 
''ASJMSwas attractive even though Clive lenA-ins, General Secretary) over gilded the 
lily. A joint membership in engineering would have been powerfid to stand up to TASS. 
In recruitment , staff association mergers and seeking Single Union agreements 
it would have been a highly effective body. However, ASJMS pressed on with 
its discussions with TASS and when they had reached a basis for merger they jointly 
invited APEX to the talks. l11ese were not attended by either of their General 
Secretaries and the National Officers of TASS were so insulting it was clear they 
were afraid we could undermine their hopes oftahng control of the merged unions. 
So the talks came to an end". (Grantham inten•ievv 1993) 
" We met when they had virtually agreed their me1ger, it only needed the formal 
decision. We knew there was some feeling left in APEX for a white collar merger and 
the impending ASTMS I TASS merger was seen by some as a Threat to our organising 
in the offices and others as a way foni•ard Amongst the committee I do not believe 
they were a favourite. l11ey (ASTMS I TASS) made it very clear that we would be a 
junior partner. Contrary to what had been indicated previously, Jenhns told us it was 
too late for Roy (Grantham) to become a joint General Secret my" 
(Smith inten'iew 1993) 
[Note tins was the position agreed for the General Secretaries of the other unions. ] 
TGWU 
"ll1e talks with the TGWU were harmonious, but theirfinancial and organisational 
d(fftcultieS coupled with their in lema! political feuding meant that a merger would not 
solve our problems". 
(Grantham intenoiew 1993) 
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"The TGWU made it ve1y clear that we would be expected tofit into their trade group 
structure m1d this conflicted with the view that their needed to be some autonomy in 
the early stages for our members in a group of their ov.n Also they hadfinancial 
difficulties and, as I recall, were proposing a transfer of engagements". (Smith) 
The 11 Front-Runners 11 
AEU 
"The talks with the AEU were a.ffected by our common membership in eni;ineering 
and other industries, our l'iew of them as a Rule Book ridden body, the fact that they 
had only the previous year emerged from a d(fficult financial position, the fact that 
their o.fficials were paid less than ours, but had larger expense payments and their 
then prospective amalgamation with the EEPTU. The AEU could offer APEX 30,000 
sta_ff members , a strong recnliting base and the ability joimly to secure Single Union 
Agreements. D1e AEU offered a Sectional structure under which APEX would have its 
own EC and Officials, its own structure and Amma/Conference , subject to our 
contributions paying for these facilities and our share of the central costs of the union 
and accepting policies made by a Central Conference with limited numbersattending". 
(Grantham interview 1993) 
[ Note . January/ 1\.farch 1987 the AEU had proposed a wage freeze for all staff and full time 
officials ; redundancy plans " to reduce the number of officials by around a third" , were to be 
discussed ; merging of branches etc to meet their financial problems. Financial Times 1987alb] 
" The AEU were l'ery welcoming, but with all that was offered I could not see our 
women members faring well in that male oriented preserve . It would obviously be 
fine for the engineering indust1y men (!think the women would have been swamped) 
what about the other industries? Even their document presented to us was specific 
in mentioning engineering. Their membership was declining rapidly, finance 
problems, I had my mm political opinions (a Labour Party member) I supported what 
was sometimes seen as right arguments, sometimes the left. So the politics in the 
issue was not as relevant to me." (Smith) 
[Note. The Document referred to was probably the AEU amalgamation submission "The 
Process of Change" . It referred to "your industry" and "developing a common strength" in 
"engineering and manufacturing" also there was no mention of a structural position for 
women members.] 
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"The attraction of the GA1B started with their financial strength and their good 
administration which appealed to Officials who are always influential in 
amalgamation talks. John Edmonds with his capacity for leadership undoubtedly 
influenced the E. C. and appealed to Conference delegates. T11e wide rm1ge of 
industries covered and the existence of a staff section MA TSA ·were additional sources 
of encouragement to many delegates although its minority position in engineering 
formed a point of some contention. Tlm1 the general political stm1ce of the GA1BATU 
m1d its support for policies that were also supported by APEX at both the TUC 
and the Labour Party were further bonds. As John Edmonds said both uniO!lS could 
be comfortable with each other". (Grantham inten•iew 1993) 
"the GMB seemed to me, in the person partiLillarly of John Edmonds , to fly to meet 
our aspirations. lhey were sn·aight- they advised us of their experience in the 
boilennaker merger and the need to have some autonomy within one union. 771is gave 
us the possibility of a lm·ge 11hite collar section consisting of APEX, MA TSA m1d 
LCCSA m1d any other staff groups who came in subsequently. They made reference to 
their Equal Opportunities structure and agreed to holding to the Area structure and 
already had similar industrial advisories. They expressed the intention of holding a 
'high profile, well backed up, well publicised White Collar Section Annual 
Conference'. John Edmonds words. GA1B's attitude could not be better. T11ey 
promised security and better conditions of emplo;ment for the Officials and staff. 
'D1ey could provide first class legal educational m1d pension sen!ices along with 
research sen•ices that were up vdth the best. We would have unlimited help in 
extending white collar membership not only where we were relatively strong, but in 
m·eas which were new to us. Finally the finm7cial wo11'ies would diminish. By this time 
I was sold, since I had come to fl·ust John Edmond.'>, in fact I told this to our Annual 
Conference" (Smith inteniew 1993) 
[Note. The LCCSA , London County Council Staff Assoc., referred to above, had been 
retitled the Greater London Staff Assoc. and was merged by transfer of engagement to the 
Gl\1B on 14th Sept. 1988.] 
A document was produced by Grantham that analysed the eight unions and gave particular 
attention to the four. This was the basic information , the actual assessment was conditioned 
by further reports of attitudes to APEX opinions and more particularly the viewpoint of the 
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decision makers conunittee , but clso the Executive Council had now developed an opinion. 
The Executive Conunittee meeting held in February 1987 was fundamental and established a 
recommendation , to be submitted to the Annual Conference to be held in June, of one union 
for merger, the GMB. 
"By this time I was out in the open and had been for some weeks. D1e E. C. took its 
final decision to recommend the G.MB alone to the Conference . This GA1B. only 
decision was as a result of certain members 011 the E. C. committee (one in particular 
who had attended very few of the meetings) pressing hard for the AEU to be put on 
an equal recommendation I believe this pushed the Gk!B supporters to close the 
AEU option down there m1d then, once mtdfor all and to take the EC behind this" 
(Smith illferview 1993) 
"The opposition to the AEU came (also) from Qfftcials who regarded salaries and 
career opportunities in the GA1BATUwere much more attractive and a majority of 
one on the Executive who (the Executive) were influenced against, solely by a future 
merger with the EETPU in rhe light of Wapping and their leaving the TUC." 
(Grantham inten•iew 1993) 
[Note. Although at this time the EErPU had not been suspended from the rue for its refusal 
to accept General Council directives , which was to happen on 8th July 1988 with the eventual 
expulsion at the following rue Congress in October , the issues involved were well known 
and the 'leaving the rue ~expected. (rUC 1988c) ] 
"I was one of the rn·o lay officers who was not prepared to support theGMB as the 
"sole runner ", because at my first meeting (1985) with David Bassnet I saw it 
(then) to be a takeover ... rhe reason ('iupporting the AEU because) they had a non 
effective white collar group. I smi1 more of both the political side (of the 
equation) being also part of the argument and a great chance to increase 
membership". (1l"avis inteniew 1993). 
"On the information given to us, bearing in mind that most of the EC recognised that 
it was between the AEU and GMB, coming from the shipbuilding industry I could see 
the benefits of both. We already had single table bargaining in my company and the 
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idea of a white collar amale.amation was now a non nomer. Other EC members had 
'-
their own reasons -political andlor related to their industry or senice and the region 
they came from . The majority agreed that the best benefit for our membership was the 
GMB". (Darke inten,iew 1988) 
The Decision was to take to Conference the recommendation for open formal negotiations 
with the GMB. 
The issue had also been a major item for discussion at the APEX Area Officials' Fraternity 
meetings in August and November 1986 , where it became clear that there was a support for 
the GMB. This was not merely to refer to salaries and conditions of employment , but also the 
need to maintain a positive role in the labour movement (unionateness) , an 
acceptance of the changes in collective bargaining procedures and the decline in APEX usual 
job territory, sectors and membership. At the full -time officials' meeting in February 1987, 
having received a report from their "observer " on the Executive Council (E, C. ) , support 
was reconunended for the E. C. stance supporting the sole union merger proposal and was to 
be put to their Annual General Meeting in June 1987. 
The GMB Central Executive Council had been kept abreast of the discussions however as 
they were at this stage informal , they were merely a part of the overall analysis of the merger 
possibilities and talks taking place. Nevertheless this amalgamation was seen to have equal 
importance to the GMB as that finalised -v.~th the Boilermakers Society . 
Reference was made in the recollections of the main players in the APEX decision -making 
committee to the Officials being "influential in amalgamation talks" and the importance of the 
Officials and staff "security and conditions of employment". In both the GMB and APEX the 
full-time Officials had internal organisations which did have an influence and were not only 
The Decade of Decisions 
153 
interested in the terms and conditions of employment , but particularly the future security of 
employment. The latter item being linked to the question of future growth of the union , job 
territory for recruitment and servicing the membership. Although they differed structurally 
and in relation to the union , the APEX Area Officials Fraternity (AOF) and the GMB 
Officers Negotiating Committee (O~C) were to play a role in the merger process. 
The Officials 
In Chapter 2 amongst the factors considered , that effect the raison d'etre to merge , were 
the culture of the union and , amongst the decision - makers, the leadership by the full time 
bureaucracy. The main consideration, in that Chapter, being the national focus . Apart from a 
national bureaucracy there are also the local full time officials, professional trade unionists , in 
difference to the trade union professionals and staff. We considered in Chapter I , when 
inquiring into the socialisation effects of capital I labour changing the characteristics of trade 
unions, the altering scale of operation in the complexities of modem economic and industrial 
life as it developed. This essentially required trade unions to move away from what Sidney and 
Beatrice Webb in 1898, called the "ideal of primitive democracy". By primitive democracy 
they were referring to those early days of trade uniorusm when all the members of the union 
could meet regularly to make rules and policy decisions and apply these in their locality. 
Obviously there are still some very small unions that might be able to do this , but size, 
geographical spread , administration, the recondite knowledge of legislation and regulations 
that effect the union member , alongside the changing process of collective bargaining , has 
created the need for trade unions based upon representative democracy and the professional 
bureaucracy . 
In Chapter 2 a brief reference was made to Mchel's "iron law of oligarchy" and often the above 
basis of reasoning is used to suggest that this develops into an hegemonic hierarchy. A volte -
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face occurs on understanding the intricate democratic concord derived from the open challenge 
by members. Particularly their elected representatives and activists often can call in question 
the actions of the Officials and the politic of the union at a Conference I Congress which has 
representative rank and file delegations 
mandatory on the Official. 
The so - derived rules and policies are then 
Furthermore the career pattern of the Official , more often than not , begins with. the election 
to unpaid offices as a shop steward , a branch official and the regional I area structUre. This 
career pattern does not refer, therefore , the office administrative staff , who work for the 
union, just as they would work for any other employer. In no way does this imply a lack of 
loyalty by staff to the organisation , but it derives from a differing motivation. A further 
differing motivation applies to those with technical positions on the staff , the trade union 
professional , - legal , education , research , industrial engineer and political officers - oriented 
towards professional standards of their occupation . AJthough their career pattern commenced 
with an appointment , some direct from staff , others college - educated , their identification 
with the union is often an advancement of the ideology that drew them into or developed 
during their union work. For example, in the final stage of the GMB I APEX merger a motion 
was carried at the APEX Conference originating from the GMB staff who were members of 
APEX (the majority employed at the GMB national office) which clearly underlined this. It 
stated: 
" ... the right of all workers to belong to, and be represe111ed by, an independent trade 
union 
17wt, as the main union for trade union staffs, APAX must support the extension of 
this right to all those employed by trade unions . 
... the right of all APEX members employed by the GMB to transfer membership to an 
independent trade union of their choice, in the ewnt of an amalgamation between the 
two unions . 
... this right to be enshrined in the tem1s of the proposed GMB I APEX 
amalgamation". (APEX Annual Conference 1988) 
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The full time Officials of both unions , however, did not accord with this identification. 
Although their terms and conditions of employment are conditioned by the internal structural 
organisation, their identification with the union differed. 
Internal Full-time Officials' Organisation. 
The APEX Area Officials Fraternity (AOF) was composed of all the union's full time area 
Officials including the Area Secretaries , but excluded the National Officials .. ~ts right to 
represent was embodied in the Rules (APEX Rule 53 and 54 ) . In addition the AOF had its 
own written Constitution agreed by its membership and endorsed by the APEX (national) 
Executive Council . It held an Annual General Meeting at the Annual Conference which was 
attended ex - officio by all Area Officials . It also had corresponding representatives in each 
Area, who attended other meetings to discuss issues and represented the opinion of their 
colleagues. By custom and practice the AOF officers could speak at the Annual Conference 
on matters affecting the Officials or where the Officials' viewpoint (in their opinion ) was felt 
necessary or requested. 
With regards their terms and conditions of employment, the negotiating team consisted of the 
officers of the AOF ( 4) and , for the union , the national lay ofticers and the General Secretary. 
The AOF was entitled to a non - voting seat on the Executive Council. It was therefore aware 
of all decisions of the union's supreme body between Annual Conferences and the 
representative was often called upon to give the Officials' opinion. This was not only on Issues 
which directly affected or were appropriate for negotiation , but also issues of policy. The 
Area Corresponding member also was entitled to attend the Area Executive Conunittee for the 
same purpose locally. 
The Decade of Decisions 
!56 
The GMB Officers' Negotiating Committee (ONC) represented all the Regional Officials v.~th 
the exception of the Regional Secretary, but includes the Head Office based National 
Industrial Officers. Its rights of representation is not accorded under Rule, and at the time of 
the amalgamation, there was no reference to it at all in the Rules . However the ONC has a 
Constitution approved by "the General Secretary and appropriate Union Sub - committees 
and Council". Due to numbers, there were over 200 GMB Officials, there was no equivalent 
meeting to the APEX - AOF Annual General Meeting. The membership of the ONC meeting 
was composed of 25 representatives , ie. 2 from the regions , separate representation from 
BMS, RlOs and NIOs . (Note: this was increased for an interim period after the GMB I 
APEX an1algamation.) 
The negotiating team consisted of the officers (3) and two others from the ONC and, for the 
union , the President, General Secretary, 4 C.E.C. members (usually includes 2 Regional 
Secretaries) and personnel management (2). 
[ Note. The status of the Regional Secretary , as a national Executive member, treated under 
Rule as a member of the Regional Council creates the equivalent role in the Region to the 
General Secretary nationally ....... In later Rules reference is made to the ONC in new ( 1988) 
Rule 17 F3, Officials Disciplinary Procedure, this amended the old Rule after the Union agreed 
a disciplinary procedure ·with the ONC however there is still no embodiment of recognition in 
the Rules,] 
The two Officials organisations' officers met on an informal basis. immediately the decision was 
taken to seek amalgamation (June 1987 APEX Conference ) , both stating their support for 
the merger. After the November 1987 APEX Recall Conference discussions were on a more 
fonnal basis . The main topic was obviously to cross reference the tenns and conditions of 
employment , but also to discuss how the integration of the two unions could take place. It 
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was the expressed view of both organisations , as outlined in the AOF submission to the Joint 
Organisations' working party , that Officials should be regarded as 
"Officials of one union and not sections of a union .. except for an interim period, 
we do not believe that there should be separate white collar seats on the body 
representing officials or it's negotiating committee". (APEX ONC 1988) 
In the discussions it was recognised that APEX officials would be servicing the white collar 
section of the new union, however they set an objective of 11 the maximum. degree of 
integration of officials in the shortest possible time span 11 • It was understood from the outset 
that 
"cross- section sen•icing is not only a possibility but would be advantageous to the 
union by ensuring that officials gain experience in dealing with all members". (AOF 
1988) 
The discussions carried through 198 7 /88 with interim arrangements and mirroring the 
negotiating period of the two unions. The interim period was to last two years and entailed 
representation on the ONC by the four officers of the AOF and the two officers of the AOF 
recognised in the APEX Rule Book ( the Chair and Secretary ) joined the negotiating 
committee. In line with the ethos of integration, after the two years it was agreed that the 
ONC revert to the Regional and National representation. This not only meant ex-APEX 
officials having to participate in the elections in exactly the same way as other Gl\ffi officials , 
but tllis also applied to the BMS officials. Furthermore it set a pattern for future mergers. 
Ron Langston, the chair ofthe GMB/ ONC recalls the meetings as being on a harmonious 
basis; 
",•ery professional so that the integration of officials was smooth. We had some 
meetings with the Qfficials in my Region although little contact with the lay officers. 
(see later this Chapter- Approach to the Decision Takers.) The links with the AOF 
gave m1 added lift to making the amalgm11ation successful. Even when there was 
some argument about the establishment of the Regional Sta_ff q[ficer post , the 
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equivalent to an RIO, forth~ APEX Area Secretaries, it was not too d(fftcult to 
neutralise the problem. 'fl1ere was little suspicion of our colleagues from APEX. This 
was certainly different to problems during the Boilermaker merger". (Langston 
Inten~iew 1991 ONC Chair. He was also a Regional Organiser in the Birmingham 
and West lvfidland Region) 
During this period AOF/ ONC joint meetings were held with the joint General Secretaries 
regarding the details temlS and conditions. Again this was to cement relationships between 
Officials. 
The chair and secretary of the respective orgarusations attended the Unions' Conference 
(April 1988) I Congress ( June 1988 ) where the final decisions to merge were carried. 
The Final hurdles 
At the June 1987 Conference of APEX , although 
"there were some .fairly strong attempts to reopen the AEU option, the delegates 
ove1whelmingly supported the sole option of the GMB". (Smith inteniew 1993) 
At the Conference the motions submitted favouring ASTMS/TASS were heavily defeated ; 
there were successful motions clearly against even discussions with the EETPU , one also 
added to tllis the AEU due to its financial problems and particularly its prospective merger 
with the EETPU. The AOF chairman told, the Conference that the APEX Area Officials 
'il'elcomed the E~:ecutive Council decision to discuss amalgmnation terms with 
the GMB" ... going on to state that it was ... "in the interest of the Unionfor a sound 
industrial base , (that) this should be conducted as speedily as possible ... " 
(APEX AOFCHAJRNOTES) 
The Executive Recommendation was therefore a substantive motion and carried with only 
marginal dissent . 
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The GMB Central Executive Committee met later that month and tabled a Special Emergency 
Motion to its Congress which was carried unanimously. 
" ... warmly welcomes the decision of the APEX Conference to, seek early discussions, 
with a view to amalgamating vdth the G!v!B. 
Amalgamation betl1,.een our two organisations will be an important step fon1'ard for 
the trade union movement . It will provide staff employees in all industries and from 
all grades, with strong representative and expanding organisation, as well as a 
clearer voice inside the labour movement. · 
Cm!ference therefore calls on the CEC to enter into urgent discussions with APEX in 
order to draw up firm proposals concerning the details of amalgamation which can be 
recommended for acceptance by GMB and APE){ members ". (GMB Congress 1987) 
In a Joint Amalgamation Steering Committee was held and agreement reached to set up 
two Working Groups : (i) Finance, Contributions and Benefits and (ii) Government & 
Organisation. The Steering Committee composition was the four national Jay officers , the 
Deputy and General Secretary of APEX and the President , General Secretary, National 
Executive Officer, Regional Secretaries (3) , CEC members (7) and the BMS Section 
Secretary for the G!viD (only half the Gl\1B team attending at any time. ). The Working 
Groups were smaller , but both include the Presidents and the General Secretaries with four 
others ( GMB :-four from the steering committee and Apex :- three from the steering 
committee plus an Area Secretary (chair of the AOF) on the Government working party and a 
Regional Secretary on the Finance. These sub conm1ittees met on a very regular basis (often 
more than the once a month as agreed ) as the objective was to get the Heads of Agreement 
conclude by October for submission at the recall APEX Conference in November. 
This was achieved and set out the structure and financial arrangements that would be 
ultimately established and the transitional arrangements (mainly over two years ) as to how 
the new union moves to that structure , benefits contributions and other finance arrangements. 
Personnel issues would be discussed with the relevant bodies . There were key issues of 
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representation at the GMB Congress and the CEC on a better basis for an initial period, the 
APEX Section structure nationally and regionally and the branch structures. There were a few 
issues of Rule , however as this was an amalgamation it gave the opportunity for the GMB to 
update its rules. (G.MB 1988) 
The stage was set for the amalgamation , 
"the Special Conference (in November 1987) accepted most of the recommendations 
on the amalgamation talks. The negotiators were sent back to see if further 
consideration of some issues could result in change". (Gramham inten•iew 1993) 
The issues were not significant and \vere , as Grantham put it in his speech to the GMB 
Congress, "proposals of those who wanted to merge but wanted to stay as they 
were". ( GMB Congress 1988) 
The Apex Conference in April 1988 sealed the decision. The final hurdles on the amalgamation 
details had been cleared and the lead up to the ballot was underway 
Introducing the special debate at the GMB Congress in June 1988 by presenting the document 
"Shaping Up for Our Next Century " Edmonds stated that the amalgamation "would 
transform the nature of the GMB". Linking the other merger, the transfer of engagement of the 
GLSA which took place in October of that year, he underlined them as "part of a carefully 
thought out plan for the future of a new union". Although the transfer of engagement 
predated the amalgamation, the terms were based upon the G.MB I APEX model. The plan 
was a conglomerate trade union , without "the elitism that afflict some other white collar 
unions ", an identity within one union structure and therefore the debate was the vehicle for 
opening the debate on deleting the BMS section from the Rules and replacing it with an 
integrated section , based on the G.MB I APEX model ( the Technical Craft Section) which 
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was also outlined in this special Report. (GMB 1988) The debate was highly supportive and a 
unanimous decision for the amalgamation ballot to be arranged. 
Approach to the Decision - Takers 
The membership in both unions had been kept aware of developments in the Regional I Area 
meetings, correspondence -with Branches and the unions' house magazines. After June 1987 
the information resourcing was stepped up. Agreement on closer working ru:angements 
meant joint activities were undertaken in a number of Regions. Full reports were made on an 
ongoing basis to to the Areal Regional meetings and repot1s on relevant and major aspects to 
the branches. 
In some Regions joint approaches were made . Tllis \Vas to a degree due to officials' 
relationships, as in the London and the Southern Regions of the GMB (one Area in APEX) 
"a joint meeting was arranged in British Aerospace by the full time officials not 
for any other pwpose than to introduce each other to the ste1mrds. Obviously l-l'e J.new 
each other well as we were at that early stage preparing for the shorter working week 
issue. But it did show us that there was this close working relationship and the 
membership respected the officials' credibillity" (A1oran inten'ielv 1989) 
The nature of the industrial sectors created even further links , 
" fl1e GMB is a major union in my industry (shipbuilding) and the research material 
is excellent. This and the strength of the union in the (Northern) region, the largest 
union, meant we had regular contact with our ( GMB) colleagues in Labour 
Afovement meetings also. lhe APEX officials? Our Area Secretmy was committed to 
the amalgamation , so naturally ·we had all the documentation "(Dm·ke illfen'ielv 
1989) 
However, Travis could not recall being involved in any approaches in her Region , but 
"understood that in certain regions approaches ·were made, but in my (Binninghm11 
and West Midland Region) it was limited to Officials in the main I have often 
thought it may have been due to my anti- stance, which was well known". (Travis 
inten,iew 1993) 
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After the 1988 Conference I Congress all regions had this joint approach enhanced. All parts 
of the organisation were affected by the literature and open support given . Branches were 
visited , speakers were arranged for the respective Area I Regional meetings including the 
industrial advisories. In APEX special weekend and day schools for activists were held , to 
explain the merger details and recommendation of support. In fact at the special meeting of 
APEX Area Secretaries in September 1988, the reports showed that great progress had been 
made in developing the support for the recommendation to amalgamate . Special ·posters , 
leaflets and lapel stickers were produced. 
The decision takers had no qualms about amalgamating with a union with differing historic 
characteristic, they were aware of the need to amalgamate for reasons of growth and finance . 
They were ob,,iously effected by the attitude of the decision - makers. Particularly , they had 
seen the changing industrial relations scene , caused to no little degree by employment 
legislation, but also the changed nature of their relationship with their colleagues, staff or 
manual \Vorker . What was now significant , was the way the merger discussions were carried 
out . The amalgamation fiiendly style which created the correct environment for progress, was 
fundamental in achieving the final result . 
A timetable was established and action taken in accordance with statutory requirements. All 
ballot documentation had to be submitted to the Certification Officer ; 
The unions' instrument Of Amalgamation ( Document 2 ) 
The notice to members ( Document 3 ) 
The voting paper ; only YES or NO ( Document 4) 
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The new Rule Book which forms part of the Instrument of 
Amalgamation 
A joint letter from the two General Secretaries setting out the main terms and detailing 
benefits anticipated by the proposed amalgamation. ( Document 5 ) 
This was to be a full postal ballot. 
The timetable also has to meet statutory requirements . The ballot would commence in the 
September for announcement of results of ballot and formal application to the Certification 
Office to register by the end of December 1988 . After the ballot 
"the Certification Officer cmmot register the instrument of amalgamation earlier 
than six weeks after the application for registration ... Before or during the six v,•eeks a 
member of any of the organisations concemed may complain "on specified ground<;. 
(Certification Office 1989) 
The results were 
FOR AGAINST 
GMB 171,284 22,301 
APEX 16,879 4,850 
G.MB majority of 88.48 of nearly 25% votes cast. 
APEX majority of77.68 of about 29% votes cast. 
The amalgamation took effect from I st March 1989 
The significance of the amalgamation is as Edmonds stated three years later, the GMB had 
"secured mergers along the way, but the two strategic ones were the Boilennakers 
m1d APEX., probably more particularly APEX. 1l1ey changed the nature of the 
union". (.f.."'dmonds 199 2) 
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How this changed the nature of the G.MB, how this case study and other mergers relate to the 
conceptual maps . and what can be be related to future change will be considered in detail in 
the next chapter. 
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The Way Fonvard 
The consequences of the GMB/ APEX amalgamation, in 1989, can be measured against the 
expectations of the main players and the changed realities. They must also clearly follow the 
reasoning for the amalgamation as portrayed in the previous Chapter. APEX activists, whilst 
seeking to maintain a strong presence of staff employees in a trade union, recognised the 
disappearing gap between the socio- industrial status of blue and 'vhite collar workers. 
Hmvever, there was still an identification with some fonn of separatism for the white collar 
employee . The G:\·ffi leadership, in addition, saw it as a means of projecting a new 
organisational structure. The amalgamation with the Boilermakers' Society had given effect to 
a craft worker identity, broadening the general union concept, but it did not trigger· ·a · 
transfom1ation of the organisation, merely "bolting the two unions together. The result \Vas a 
confused structure of authority and decision-making". (GMB 1990) 
The move to a more synergistic model came out of the pre- merger discussions with APEX. 
From these discussions, post-merger , the Apex Partnership Section was established fanning 
the basis for future amalgamations. There had developed in the G1\1B a recognition that "every 
union discussing amalgamation \Vants to retain its own identity and its own autonomy". (GMB 
1990) 
By the means of sectionalisation, the question of identity and autonomy could be met on an 
industlial sectoral basis. 
This new Section, the Apex Pa11nership , consisted of the ex-APEX membership and those 
GMB staff members in the MA TSA group , which included the ex-Greater London Staff 
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Assoc. membership. The GLSA, the London Local Authorities' staff union, had transferred 
engagements earlier in 1989. Following this pattern , the Boilermakers Section became 
transformed, linking ex-Gl\1W section members in the industrial sectors of heavy 
manufacturing , for example engineering, shipbuilding , steel etc, into the Technical and Craft 
Section. The Boilermaker identity \Vas now subsumed into this new broader sectoral body. 
There was now 
"a protot;pe structure which (lms) still based upon the traditional GA1B Regional 
system ... extended to encompass other Sections to attract and accommodate other 
unions seeking shelter". (GJ!B 1993 i) 
The amalgamation, therefore, did trigger the transforn1ation to an organisational form, 
Sectionalisation. This was claimed to be the appropriate structure for the future , within the . 
tradition of the strong Regional culture. This union Regional culture, if it was to be maintained 
in the political and industrial climate of the 1990s, needed to integrate with the newly emerging 
Sectionalisation. Furthennore it was now believed that "by 1995 the industrial scene could be 
dominated by four super unions" each with ''well oYer a million members " . (GMB 1990) 
Taylor saw this as marking a "clear change of focus away trom the Gl\1B's traditional strength 
among the regional secretaries ". However the actiYists and representatives surveyed did not 
confirm this view. (Taylor 1994) Any attempt at changing the regional identity of the GMB 
would have been opposed by all. £yen APEX activists prior to the merger \vere regionalists. 
One thing was certain, bolting unions together to form one union through merger was destined 
to create problems and had been tried previously. (see Chapter 3 with regards to Unison and 
the AEEU) Therefore, the achievement of an amalgamation fiiendly style requires consistent 
organisational development , which can take a strategic view across whole sectors, and give a 
facility to an element of autonomy. These Sections in the GMB also had to align to the 
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Regional fonn. As Charles Handy has noted 
" ... many of the ills of organisations stem from imposing an inappropriate structure on 
a particular culture, or from expecting a particular culture to thrive in an 
inappropriate climate". (Handy 1985) 
At a special Conference held on 20th September 1990 , the National .Union of Tailors and 
Garment Workers agreed to seek a ballot for transfer of engagement to the GMB . By the 
agreement to merge in 1991 , a further section was established, the Clothing and Textile 
Section. The section was to consist of the ex-1\TUTGW membership and the Textile industry 
members of the GMB. A difference was to occur upon transfer of engagements with the 
NUTGW, the white collar members employed in the clothing industry remaining in the 
Clothing and Texiile Section.. This was at the request of the members who sought to maintain 
their industrial links and their voice on issues within the sector. 
The development of a more extensiYe sectional structure was now undenvay within the Gl\1B . 
After further analysis, it was demonstrated at the Gr-.m Congress in 1991, how the existing 
membership could participate on issues aftecting their particular company , industry or sector , 
by the establishment of a further four sections, creating a seven section structure : Apex 
Partnership, Technical and Craft ; Clothing and Textiles; Food and Leisure; Energy and 
Utilities; Process and Construction; Public Services. The Sections achieved organisational 
legitimacy by a Rule change at the 1992 GMB Congress. The arrangement was to consolidate 
GMB/ Apex Partnership members within sectors by allocation to the particular Section. 
(Note. With the transfer of engagement by FT AT to the GMB in 1994 the Construction 
sector was put into a new section , the Construction Furniture , Timber and Allied section -
making eight sections. ) 
Each Section has its ovm National Committee oflay members elected from within the sectors 
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of employment and its own annual conference. Each conference is the forum for debate on 
issues specific to the industries and can not consider issues of policy , which remain the 
responsibility of the Annual Congress. Nevertheless, this sectionalisation has given the union a 
distinct industrial focus. 
The consequence of the APEX/G\ffi amalgamation of 1989, therefore, had clearly assisted 
the ability to meet the challenge of the changing reality, but some of the main players in that 
merger began to view the situation differently. The last president of APEX , Ken Smith, 
summed up the feelings of some activists 
"l'm just sad that subsequent events have not mirrored the picture that was painted 
prior to amalgamation , most of all the new Sectionalisation proposals spell the 
death knell of any remnants of APEX, as 1re knew it.· · 
J.Ve 1rere told by GMB in the early negotiations that MA TSA was a part of the union 
lthich needed re1·italising and reshaping to cater for the needs of the growing 
lthite collar occupation . 
I fear now that our members hm·e been led- and I was one of those ltho led them 
- into a position Hhere they hm·e become only a part of a section, their identity lost 
in the manual1mrker strengrh in rhe sections. I look e1•en further into the future and 
see the GMB structure adjusted and adapted making a GA1B/TGWU merger 
much easier ... and not too far hence "(Smith intel1'iew Feb. 1993) 
These sentiments, as v•e will see later , \\'ere to surface at subsequent Apex Partnership 
Section Conferences. This was , to some degree, the expression of people who wanted no 
change and did not appreciate the changes going on around them. In fact , Smith, having 
reconsidered the situation, gave an insight into the appreciation of realities. 
"Hm•ing considered again my first reactions, maybe I'm a bit unfair to John 
Edmond'i by implication Obviously he may not hm·e intended to change from the 
original plan, as I see it, (regarding a white collar section) but has been forced 
by e1•ents to VCll)l and adjust what I believe was the understanding ... We HAD to 
merge with someone and I still feel -and not just to just((y myself- that the GMB 
was the right option. I suppose I yeam for the old APEX days, but if 1re were given 
an option of going back- we just could not, for all the reasons that weighed at the 
time. And of course since our merger, the situation has changed as far as indust1y 
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Smith's original opiruons were echoed by other APEX activists, with some, like Smith, then 
reconsidering after giving it more thought . Others still argued that there was need for a strong 
white collar section and that white collar members have common interests across all industries 
and services. They further contended that the white collar section could coexist with the trade 
sections, with such employees participating in both. These attitudes were primarily held by the 
APEX activists v • .-ho had played an active policy role in the past, as will be seen later in this 
Chapter, it also caught the spirit of feelings at the Apex Section Conferences. As one Northern 
Region activist put it 
'~41 the Conferences there 11·as thisfeeling of being left out-of the union's strategy 
discussions. I voted along 1rith the others for a retellfion of what we already had, a 
white collar section. But I realise, for progress, that it (sectionalisation, which will 
integrated 11hite and blue collar workers) has to come. 171e company I work in 
(engineering) has had a number of redundancies since the amalgamation ll1e 
number o.fApex members has been decimated ". (Ex- APEX activist still active in the 
Apex Section Interview 1993.) 
At the Apex Section Conferences strong advocacy for this retention of the separatist white 
collar section came from the trade union and political staff sector delegates . Nevertheless, it 
was a popular theme at the Conferences. It must be added that this conviction was also shared 
by some ex- l\1ATSA activists, 
"At the (Apex Section) Conference we haw looked at those issues that are of 
concern to white collar 1wrkers. We could still" participate in our trade 
section" ( Er- GMB MATS~-4. actil'ist still actil'e in the union. Industrial sector: Gas. 
lntelTiew 1993) 
At the first Apex Partnership Section (for brevity this will hereafter be called the Apex 
Section) Indust1ial Conference for the engineering, shipbuilding, aerospace and allied sectors, 
the delegates agreed unanimously a motion calling for the integration with the Techillcal and 
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Craft Section industrial conference. This \vas in 1990, the first year of the merger, and 
significantly was the position of the largest element of the old APEX. The rationale for the 
move was that 
11 In the longer term it had bem agreed that the problems facing the shipbuilding and 
engineering sectors were common to both the white collar and blue collar staffs ... " 
(Report 1991 GMB Apex Section National Industrial Col{(erei1cefor the 
Engineering, Shipbuilding m1d Aerospace Industries.) 
Yet after the 1991 G:t\1B Congress agreed to the establislunent of the seven Sections and , the 
follov-.•ing year the rule amendments to establish the structure and organisation, the Apex 
Section Conference in the November 1992 refused to accept the Section's National Conunittee 
Report on sectionalisation. The report referred to the changes in the Public Service Section 
11 the changing economic climate , changes in public services structures and 
bargaining arrangements led The Celllral Ewcutive Council (CEC) to establish a 
working party to consider how best to represent and promote our membership within 
the Sector. The CEC decided to include all public sen·ices workers (including white -
collar members) in the Section 
Jl1e ongoing harmonisation of terms and conditions of employment of blue and H'hite 
collar workers 1dThi11The Sector necessitated strong mganisaTion. 
1l1e creation of a new union by the pending me1ger of JlALGO , Nupe and Cohse will 
have implicationsfor all oTher public service unions . 
... a similar decision (11·as taken) i11 respect of the Energy and Utilities Section 
Changes in Goremmellf policies - including privatisation- and changes in 
bargaining arrangements placed pressure on members in the industries and this in 
tum created a growing desire from the membership to unite in order to have a strong 
industrial mice and high profile. 11 (Apex Partnership Cmiference 1992) 
The situation in the public sector and the newly privatised energy and utilities sectors had in 
fact moved the membership to seek integration in the Section. More patiicularly, it also 
indicated the direction for other Sections. The report \Vent on to say 
"THE FUTURE ... As the sectionalisation of the union continues, there are likely to be 
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other white - collar groups 11ho would wish to move into industrial sections ... the Apex 
Partnership Section wi!f remain a strong roice within the Professional and 
Commercial Sector. ll1e integration of GMB and Apex members into industrial 
sections will enhance the imolvement of Apex members within these sections whilst at 
the same time developing a specific profile in respect of professional, commercial and 
business sectors. (Apex Partnership Conference 1992) 
The delegates to the conference felt this was a negation of the pre -merger commitments, in 
that the white collar workers' issues would be lost or diluted , in fact an echo of Smith's earlier 
comments referred to previously in tllis Chapter. Yet at the same Conference the Special 
Reports covering -rvfanufacturing, Public Services and Utilities all outlined the need to 
nlinimise the division between blue and wllite collar workers. Further it was stated that the 
development of separate industrial sections within the union allowed tllis to happen. These 
reports were accepted. As one member from the publ!c services sector stated 
"We wanted the best of both worlds. I realised the need to integrate, but still felt 
the need to have a white collar identity protected". 
I-Ds colleague, a younger member and activist, disagreed he thought that with 
" ... all the changes we face, rhere is need for a common approach". 
At the 1993 Apex Section Conference , the issue was again approached in the Special Report, 
"The Way Fonvard". Once again the reasons for change were outlined by the national 
officers. Concern had been expressed, at the 1992 Conference, at the alleged lack of 
consultation in the public sen·ices and energy I utility sectors regarding integration. So it also 
outlined the wide consultation undertaken amongst Apex membership in the Food and Leisure, 
Process and Construction and Clothing and Textile Sections, regarding integration. The 
outcome \Vas a desire by the membership, as expressed through their \vorkplace representatives 
at regional level, to participate in the business of their industrial Section. The engineeting , 
sllipbuilding and aerospace industries were yet to be consulted on the possible integration into 
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a reconstituted Technical and Craft Section. However it was felt that this was merely a matter 
of time. 
The Report's recommendations '"'ere that the Apex Section would relate to the commercial , 
legal and professional staffs, Automobile Association (AA), civil air transport, security sector 
and the trade union and political staff. This took into account that 
"Despite the ongoing recession, employment trends indicate that the commercial and 
sen'ice sectors will be important sectors of the economy by the year 2000". ( GMB 
1993) 
To a degree, this also recognised the transfer of engagements of Staff Associations such as 
the AA Staff, Legal Aid Staff and the National Union ofLabour (Party) Organisers. 
(Note. The engineering, shipbuilding and aerospace staff stayed in Apex Section subject to 
consultations and possible integration, see above.) 
The activists who attended the Conference rejected all the reconunendations , keeping firm to 
the ideal of a separatist white collar entity, even though the National Committee promised 
"In addition, two sessions of the annual Apex Conference will be allocated to 
consider issues relating to The 1rhite collar membership of all Sections of the 
Union. Representation at these two sessions of the Conference to be determined 
following discussionli'ith 01ha Sections of the Union". ( GMB 1993) 
However, most workplace representatives and activists, even those who, as delegates, had 
been caught up in what one tenned "Conference fever", thought that sectionalisation was 
the way ahead. Some even, away fi·om the heat of debate, agreed with Smith's reconsidered 
sentiments as stated earlier, of change being forced by events, the recession and the 
transformed nature of industry and service sectors. There was a need for integration of white 
collar membership into the relevant industrial Section due to flexibility, single status, single 
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table bargaining and, in some instances, single union agreements. Activists appear to hold a 
contradictory dichotomy in opinion and attitude on tlus matter . 
When considering the attitudes that prevail, it is easy to believe that these are references to 
the "ordinary member", those who hold no office in the union and are not delegates to any 
part of the structure. The consequences of the amalgamation seemed more immediate to the 
activist, less so for the ordinary member. Obviously these changes did affect the whole 
membership, but the perception of the affect clearly differed. 
The "ordinary" (mainly ex-APEX) members interviewed were well aware of the 
amalgamation and the new union. This had been re-emphasised for most by the recent need to 
reaffirm their deduction of trade union contributions from ~alary: due to the Trade Uniori-& · 
Employment Rights Act 1993. Th€y were unaware, to a certain degree , of the Sectionalisation 
issue. Some did make reference to it being mentioned by their shop steward . There \vas 
certainly no hostility to the idea. A common thread from these discussions was the reliance on 
their colleagues, who were "more involved", giving greater consideration to these matters. 
Essentially the burden of facilitating the structural change rested upon the shoulders of these 
activists and the ofticials. 
These "ordinary" member more readily pointed out how the impact of the changes affected 
themselves, as individuals, and their own \Vorkplace; a different regional official, speed of 
access to legal assistance, information regarding their industry or sector and the affect on their 
salary and job status . It underlines the fact that they see their trade union as a service 
organisation, not an agency of social movement relating to a changing social class, from staff 
to some other class position. Far from identifYing with the attitudes of the activists, there was 
an indication that they more identified, as individuals, with 
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* the pursuit of a better economic position and job security, 
* a purposeful approach and need to know about training and development 
* effective and professional approaches to the changing jobs 
flexibility, single employment status , single table bargaining 
* the high profile of the union. 
environment, 
What they recognised was the union's ability to achieve these aspirations, by collective 
approaches or individually. The saYoir- faire of the general secretary, John Edmonds and 
regionally the media attention given to the Northern Regional Secretary Nick Anderson, were 
both major factors of satisfaction . The investigation was carried out in the Northern Region, 
w·here it is the largest union. It is also the largest region in the GMB. 
However, it is important to note that the origination of the motions to the Apex Section 
Conference, in deference to the National Committee position on Sectionalisation, was London 
and r....fidland Regions. This is hardly surptising given that the these were the areas of major 
membership in the old APEX, and held pivotal power in the pre amalgamation days. 
Furthermore the London area is the main centre for trade union staff membership. These are 
highly articulate, and, to a degree, more politically than industrially motivated members. 
Nevertheless, in brief discussions with "ordinary" members from these (and other ) regions, 
who were attending the union's college for industrial relations courses, they echoed the 
sentiments in the Northern Region. 
!'.·fore important in the competitive atmosphere of modern trade unionism, these "ordinary" 
members identified with the new concept trade unionism expressed by the leadership, regional 
and national. Interestingly they identified positively with the union's political stance, broadly 
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mainstream Labour Party, but this is probably due to other factors. It is, therefore, important 
to keep a balanced perspective on how the organisational changes are perceived in the union 
as a whole. 
Full time officials of the old APEX perceived few problems occurring due to the merger. At 
the time of the merger there were some who did not a fully understanding how the GMB 
worked. in practice. They understood the structure, the organisational elements, but some 
were unaware of the fundamental status of the Regional Secretary. One admitted in retrospect 
that 
"It should have been se{f e\·ident when you consider the size of the membership in the 
Regions: basically they are general secretaries in all but name. Edmonds is the 
national General Secretary but a lot of power lies in the Regions ... as a senior 
officer the direct line of authority was through the Regional Secretmy and not a 
national officer as it often m1s in APr:X ". (Rice Interview 1992) 
This regional, rather than central, authority , although something to which APEX officials had 
shown favour, was still a culture difference \vhich they had to take on board. Also considering 
the continuing erosion of the main membership sector of the old APEX, engineering, 
shipbuilding and aerospace, to maintain the aim of a strong presence of white collar workers 
in trade unions , the merger was essential and improved those elements listed above and the 
job security of officials and staff The assimilation into the GMB was obviously assisted by the 
position taken in 1988 in the lead up to merger, outlined in Chapter 5, that they were to be 
Officials of the Gl\1B, not a section of the union, and that cross-section servicing was essential. 
The general consensus at officer level is that the merger has worked well. Most ex-APEX 
oftlcials now work in Sections other than the Apex Section. 
The reality of change is symbolised by the development of what has been termed the Super 
Unions. Recorded in previous Chapters are the mergers creating the AEEU, with speculation 
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ofthe MSF returning to that amalgamation, U1\TJ:SON and TGWU. 
In the lead up to their merger with EETPU, which created the AEEU , the AEU established 
changes to its structure which recognised that "to remain dynamic and attractive to new 
members a union must maintain the identity for groups ... ". ( AEU 1986) 
U1\TJ:SON has declared it will 
"organise all those employed, directly or indirectly, within those areas of 
employment which provide sen·ices to the public whether in public, private or 
voluntmy sectors of the economy". (UNISON Rules) 
The current situation (1994) of three embryonic super unions is shown in Table 9.' 
Pr·ogress to the Super unions Table 9 
Membership 1993; Total TUC 7, 303, 419 :- 69 Unions 
U1\TJSON 1,486,984 
TGWU* 1,036,996 
AEEV** 884,463 
GMB* 799,101 
MSF** 552,000 
Merger prohahilitics * TGWU I GMB discussions continue 
**AEEU linked \\ith MSF, but no fon11al discussions 
OTJ-:!ERS: l'CATT 157,201 declared membership 
in fonnal discussions with TG\\'U 
USDAW 316,-491 no links as yet. 
They are all conglomerate in character with identifiable core sectors, with further prospective 
mergers and the probability of drawing in smaller unions . 
This produced this need to establish appropriate organisational structures. As has been 
established the relationship to cultural facets will be all important , so organisational change, 
such as the Sectionalisation of the GJ\1B, is part of the super union profiling whilst retaining 
the regional character . 
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The Sectionalisation, which has been established as a proactive organisational move to be more 
merger fiiendly, has also been seen to be a prelude to a GMB/TGWU merger. Smith's 
opinions recorded early in this Chapter was echoed by others . 
Outlining the feasibility and possibility of such a merger a document was presented to the GMB 
Congress 1993 as part of an "ambitious task of creating a new concept of trade union" (GMB 
Congress 1993) 
In outlining initiatives already taken between the two unions, it also underlined the political 
and organisational difterences. These differences, historic and cultural, which have been 
outlined previously in this study, were highlighted and unde~lined ·in motions and the debate" at 
the 1994 GMB Congress. Although the merger is still a strong possibility, the GMB decision 
makers, the Central Executive Council, have recommended that the unions, at this stage, only 
have "closer working relationship". (G\1B Congress 1994) 
.Measuring the consequences of the Gt\.1B/APEX merger against any success criteria 1s, 
therefore, fraught with difficulties. The reasons for the merger and the factors inherent in 
Tables 1 and 5 still apply. They have , however, been exacerbated by the ongoing recession and 
the laws affecting trade unions. It would be mere speculation to attempt any consideration of 
what would have occurred if APEX had remained an independent union, other than to 
recognise a large membership decline, or if it had amalgamated with the AEEU. It can be 
determined that, taking into account the reasons for the merger and the attitude and opinions 
of the ordinary member, the merger has fulfilled what could be realistically expected. The 
ryder, perhaps, relates to the sectionalisation, which as an organisational change is universally 
accepted, with some activists still hankering after the past, believing that a separatist white 
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collar section could exist outwith an industrial or sectoral identity. Given the caveat regarding 
measuring consequences, the merger has been positive in its affect on membership, officers 
and the GMB. 
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Conclusions 
The key dynamics that have appeared, as the analysis has proceeded in the preceding Chapters 
and explored here, are emphasised in the quadrants of change in Table 10, a composite of 
Tables 1 and 5. The coalition of the factors in this model is recognisable in the two relief 
maps of change; the actual traversing of the geography of these maps was clearly exposed in 
the case study. Interwoven threads of historic determinism developed the structural 
characteristics, whilst the effects of the capital labour nexus, changed the nature ofthe unions. 
These socialisation consequences also developed related change characteristic .. The decline 
in grov-.1h and density of trade union membership, in the past fifteen years or so, and the · 
widening occupational bands of the potential membership, created a need for economies of 
scale in organisation and services, but this was merely the start in understanding the new 
merger wave. The analysis (whilst paying attention on the way to past merger waves) led to 
the tendentious factors of change. 
This concluding Chapter is concerned with three issues. First to draw together the threads of 
the previous Chapters and relate these to the two maps in Table 10 . The change ethos will be 
considered by reference to the development and change, including the restructuring to 
sectionalisation and the embryonic super union, analysed in the case study, in the last three 
Chapters. Thirdly to focus on the implications of these issues on the unions' merger 
management and driving force. This set of hypotheses have given a direction to future merger 
probabilities, however their sum constitutes a larger agenda for further reflection. 
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It \\ill be useful here to restate the network of change factors : · 
INTRA- AND EXTRA-FACTORS WHICH AFFECT TRADE UNION 
AMALGAMATION TABLE 10 
INTRA-FACTORS EXTRA- FACTORS 
MAPl 
CHARACTERISTICS CHARACTERISTICS 
Trade Union Structural Potential Union Member 
Traditional to Conglomerate Social Stratification 
Manual-. Craft Actual______.. Assumed 
Non-Manual .,. Staff Imagery----... Perception 
Industria~ Sectoral Industrial-+ Sectoral 
General_. Conglomerate Demographic Change 
Open or Closed New Job Territory 
1\IAP 2 
TENDENTIOUS FACTORS TENDENTIOUS FACTORS 
:Merger Styles Impact ofLegislation 
Financial Status Collective Bargaining Changes 
Individual Union Culture Company Culture 
Decision Makers & Takers Industrial Organisation Changes 
The two maps of change, the characteristics and tendentious factors and particularly the 
elements within each, were refined during the course of the analysis for each Chapter. This was 
not a redefinition of the elements, but placed into tv.•o subdivisions in each map, the quadrants 
of change. Each quadrant began to define a positive dynamic, either at a given point of 
analysis or continuous throughout. It was important, however, to establish an initial linking of 
the intra and extra factors by reference to previous research. 
The literature, regarding historical determinants and the structural characteristics of change, 
showed the development from the social closure of the early craft unions, to the incentive for 
them to amalgamate \\ithin strict boundaries to meet the challenge of the New Unionism. 
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Consideration of the details showed the pressure on the large unions (always a driving force 
for change) led them to a general style with a more open organisation . Nevertheless the 
traditional classifications were difficult to set aside, for both the unions and the academic 
observer. This retention of these outdated classifications, even though they related more to 
beliefs and assumptions than to any reality of practice, effected the progress of change. 
Linking these socio- historic factors to the socio- industrial changes, in Chapter 1, exposed 
more clearly and reinforced the route the unions would be likely to take: an important 
indicator to the tendentious factors which were later analysed . 
Analysis of the four periods of change in Table 2 showed the effects of socialisation linking 
capital and labour change. The early literature however was engrossed in considering 
competing definitions of class status and awareness. (Lock·v .. ~od I9so : Goldthorpe et al 1968 · 
& 1969 : Roberts et al. 1977) Braverman's analysis of the evolving class structure in an 
advanced capitalist state was directly relevant . It gave emphasis to what was portrayed in 
Table 2 ; the changing structure of capital reflecting a change in the structure of the \\'orking 
class. Inevitably tllis would affect the nature of trade unionism although he did not relate llis 
analysis directly to, nor considered in any detail, organised labour . The changes in the labour 
process in the clerical and administrative sector resulting from the application of scientific 
management, which he exanlined, assists in giving balance to the dominant arguments on white 
collar workers status. Braverman, however, failed to give significance to the affects of the 
state incursion into the equation. (Braverman 197 4) 
In the last three decades in Britain the political institutions have played a significant role in the 
process of change as considered in all the previous Chapters . Nevertheless the old divisions of 
labour, inherent in trade union structures, were adjusting to reflect the actual and potential 
membership profiles. In the 1990s we began to discern the emerging shape of the new unions; 
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general in approach, Super unions; zt a time of declining membership. 
In the past one and a half decades, the dominating concern of all trade unions and those who 
were analysing the changing environment, was (and is) the decline of membership and as a 
consequence, the effect on density. There was an extent of quantitative data, which 
documented well, the changing pattern of social and economic indicators in this period of 
transformed Fordism. Having established within the two factor elements of Map I in Table 
1 0, the direction of trade union characteristics, the data relevant to the potential union 
membership in new job territories demonstrated one further driving force to merge. 
Alongside the grov-.~ng opaqueness with regards manual and non- manual work was the 
pressure to merge for growth reasons. 
However we noted in Chapter 2, decline in membership was not the only necessary causation 
of mergers; mergers had taken place during periods of grmv1h and decline. (Buchanan 1974 & 
1981: Waddington 1988) Within :t'v1ap 2 of Table 10 are other influential pressure components 
: the tendentious factors, comprising both internal and external agents. 
Amongst the intra-factors the merger approach was a vital force for change; what was termed 
merger styles. The study by Undy et al in 1981 which had as its empirical core the comparative 
study of twelve major unions considered organisation, union government, job territory and 
regulation. They developed, in the course of that analysis, the three merger styles: defensive, 
consolidatory and aggressive. In Chapter 2 those styles were considered against the changed 
socio - industrial and political environment in the 1980s and 1990s. There were still defensive 
and consolidatory mergers taking place, however the amalgamator union had transformed the 
style from aggressive to amalgamation - friendly . 
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An obvious factor in mergers was financial stability. The documents and data considered 
showed the vicissitudinous nature of the funds. Financial viability has certainly played an 
important part in the merger candidates motivation and appraisals. It is perceived as an 
indicator, not only of security, but also organisations' professionalism. 
As this study proceeded, it became more and more obvious that the data pointed to a most 
important factor for discerning reliable trends in mergers: the culture of the union. By this term 
is meant the whole identity of the union; its inheritance, the norms of rules, regulations, 
practices and the values of belonging and the paradigm. This latter point being the beliefs and 
assumptions of a particular urn on which are often taken for granted . Even though as outlined 
in Chapter 1 the old divisions of labour had become obsolete ·and ·there was also a converging · 
of status between manual and non- manual workers, the culture of the uruons in any merger 
was a determining aspect. As stated above, the old classifications of trade unions often 
remained when they were no longer relevant, this often became critical in how merger partners 
were perceived. Much evidence is here available to supp01t the notion that cultures can 
change; and there is no question that this is a subject future development in mergers will 
continue to address . 
The delivery mecharusm of the norms and values (and any subsequent changes) is the 
leadership, the decision makers, and the membership, the decision- takers. The study also 
reflected upon the power equation involved. The analysis of the affect of leadership was 
considered in brief in the early Chapters , but developed more fully in the case study. 
Apart from these internal motivators, there are external or extra tendentious factors which 
directly impact upon mergers. They were the overall social, political and human resource 
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management change directly affecting trade unions, but also augmenting the other merger 
factors. 
The positive steps in the Trade Union (Amalgamation etc.) Act 1964 created a better legal 
process of mergers. IntensifYing amalgamations, it more particularly aided the transfer of 
engagements . Furthermore all the analysis of the period 1 prior to this and up until 1979, 
showed not merely a participation in the corporate tendency of the the British State, but 
through the process of tripartite discussions (the government institutions, the employers and 
the trade unions) a positive and accepted role for the unions. The Labour Government of the 
1970s provided a means of direct approach . This not only assisted recruitment of members, 
but created the environment of merger for consolidatory reasons, political (culture) motives 
and, for non-TUC unions, particularly, to merge \Vith affiliated unions, so as to be influentialin · 
the corridors of power. 
In the previous Chapters \Ve noted the effects on particular unions and the direct change it gave 
to their structural and cultural makeup. Undemlined by economic problems and the "winter of 
discontent", the Labour Government was replaced by a Conservative Government in 1979. 
Since that date the continuing Conservative Governments effected radical changes to 
employment and trade union law v.ith subsidiary regulations and codes all to constrain trade 
unions. This ended the previous plurality and the accepted integral role of the trade unions in 
consultation and development of strategies. Tllis in itself created the new raison d'etre for 
mergers: the need for back up resources including research and professional services . 
Alongside the state intervention and the social changes referred to earlier in these conclusions, 
other extra- factors were reassessed. The changes in company organisation and the culture 
affecting and changing the nature of collective bargaining, the impact of technology, the 
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influence of market variables and individualism, all of these needed the ability to readjust, 
reinterpret and, to a greater degree, accommodate the changing environment. This again 
pushed the process of merger into a new wave. 
The analysis has not shown any particular cycles of change. In fact the use of the term 
waves, the notion used by Waddington in 1988, is most precise, as there is no merger 
automaticity in the historic detemlinants or tendentious factors. However the intensity of the 
wave, the propensity for merging, is given an additional push when one or more factors 
creates more drive. All factors are in some way an affecting driving force, but unions can be 
driven by the factors differently. When there are the stimuli to change, they could be driven in 
different directions at the same time or create barriers . 
In approaching the case study, using the methods outlined in Chapter 3, it was thought that, 
given personal involvement in the merger, attitude and bias could influence the selection of data 
and the interpretation of detail. However, conscious of this at all times, the grid like network 
of the interconnecting quadrants of the change model helped to avoid this impediment, as did 
the chosen interviewees. Using the the conclusion ofthe analysis, the model in Table 10 was 
the outcome. Having re-addressed each element during the research, there was not one key 
factor to the process of amalgamation. What was clearly exposed in the case study was this 
interplay of both the characteristics and tendentious factor paradigms . 
The development of trade union structures, conditioned by the characteristics of a changing 
socio-industrial environment and therefore the potential union membership in Chapter 4, 
showed amalgamation to be driven by the changing nature of work, the widening of industrial 
boundaries, and the convergence of approach in the bargaining arena. The impact of the 
tendentious factors was also perceived throughout, with an acceleration of the impact in the 
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last 15 years as evidenced in Chapter 5. It showed, categorically, the need for trade union 
organisation of a kind that could handle the dynamics of change against a back cloth of 
inimical conditions . 
There is some complementarity between both case study unions' historic development and 
pressures. Although starting from differing cultural positions their merger traits had significant 
similarity as explored in Chapter 4. The common denominator was the barriers militating 
against effective change. However the intensity of the factors in the last 15 years 1 as shown in 
Chapter 51 pushed back these barriers effecting the decision to merge and underlined the 
process of change . 
As the analysis proceeded and the maps placed as a matrix or'change1 it became evident that ·1t 
was unlikely to provide any p~ecise extrapolation into the future for all mergers. But there 
were discernible reliable trends: 
* there is no monocausal detemlinism : all the factors interplay in the process 
* the factors are interdependent 
* the wave of mergers is intensifYing 
*the Super Union 
* development of a conglomeratism 
We have seen in case study, Chapter 6, how the management of change has required 
structural changes to the organisation. Post amalgamation the development of Sections, 
reflecting sectors of industry and services, in the GMB was seen to cause some anguish to the 
APEX activist . The "ordinary" member, however, in tune with the official stance, felt that the 
changes were essential to meet the new circumstances. Union merger management is now a 
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major element of the forces for culture change in the trade unions, with structural development 
and organisational form critical to the successful merger programme. 
This new concept of trade unions has a significant importance for the unions internally, but 
also on the developing Super unions. Unison, the AEEU, TGWU and GMB had a combined 
total membership, in 1993, of4, 207,544 which was 57% ofthe rue affiliated membership. 
The stage is set for more mergers. In the contex1 of this study, the possible merger of the 
TGWU and GMB would again put the general union as the largest union in the rue. The 
TGWU has held this status since the 1930s, until ,in 1993 ,when the new union, Unison pushed 
it into second place. A merger of the TGWU/G.MB would produce a union which would 
account for about 25% of TUe membership. However, whether these discussions_ bear fruit or 
not, the super union syndrome \\ill continue have an importa.nt affect on British Trade 
Unionism and the character ofthe ICC. 
Throughout this study, the TUC has been one indicator of overall trade union attitude and one 
important aspect of unionateness. Although there was no specific analysis of its organisational 
structure, continuing referance has been made to its goal of maintaining harmony amongst a 
multiplicity of autonomous unions. The current development of the super union, which is 
conglomerate and multi- sector based, has required important structural, organisational and 
cultural change within the TUC. John Monks, TUC General Secretary appointed in 1993, has 
initiated such changes and started the development of a new role as the coordinating body . 
The effect of this will again intensifY the merger \Vaves . He believes that further mergers will 
reduce the number of affiliates to just over 40 unions ( 69 affiliates in 1993 ) in the next five 
years ... 
'~mme of the mergers in the past were made on political grounds, but these days they 
make industria/logic. But there will always be the need for a trade union centre". 
(A1onks 1993) 
Condusions 
188 
He also makes reference to the use of the trade union centre in European developments. 
Edmonds also believes that any new modem union "must operate successfully within a 
European context". (G:r..1B Congress 1993) 
To this end the G:r..1B has an office in Brussels and cooperation agreements with sister unions 
in the European Union. 
This study has focused on a range of merger driving forces, the reason for merges, the process 
and consequence of mergers, and how they act as stimuli to further merger waves. The case 
study has provided detail of one particular merger, GMB/ APEX amalgamation. This case 
study has demonstrated the importance of the factors contained in the model set out ··in · 
TablelO. As more more mergers are likely via the development of super unions , the 
importance of these factors in the model will continue. 
As a final point, this model cannot address every issue in every merger situation. However, the 
model does pocess a degree of predictability. As such it should serve to highlight the key 
factors to be considered and managed in any further mergers. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the model and case study demonstrate that Trade Unions, far 
from being outmoded institutions which are resistant to change, see the need to change, wish to 
change, and are able to change. 
Conclusions 
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ASSOC!ATlON OF PROFES5:c:·LI>.L, EXECUTlVE, CLERlCA.L A~D CO:'.l?UTER 
STAFr 
1. 
Paper on the ls:;.;.-:s to be considered on Amalgamation 
Meeting, Saturday, 21st February, 1987 
\i'hat are the ;:;aj_or issues 
(a)'' · \•.'e have· to a::;ess h;;'..: ir:d'..l:;try and services are 1i;.:,ely to 
develo? in the future. 
(b) \o.'e have to i::-.d a fit '.;i:h c::e cr rr.cre u:~ions that help 
sustai:1 our present ba:e and help us to :trengthen cur organisstio:) 
in the future, both in c:.:r present bc.se ir.dustries and in our target 
areas for r.:embet·ship Ce\·e1o?r:-,ent. 
2. Industrial a::d Service Developr:ent 1n the future 
I attach a ;:;;?er 'A' c:1 e::-,?lcy::-,ent trends fer the next 
f:=.·., yec.rs. Pu~ting ::5 co:~c1:..:sic~s ic;ether \,'it!& ctht=rs \·:e can be 
pretty sure· that 
(a) ba~ic inch . .ls:t:es like c.~ric:.J!t·l.lre ar:d minir~g ~·ill 'becc·::-.e 
r.:ore caj)ital int.::nsi\'e c.:-.d err.plc:y fe·.·er ;::·e.:-ple in the future as they 
hc.\'e d.:-:-~e fer the pa:t 5J yenr:.. 
(b) ;,:a::'clfactur::-.g indu~:ry -.ci:l :'ct ex;:>and jts :hare of t!-.e 
er:-,plcy::-.ent r.:ar:-:et, b'.1t ·~·ill change :15 share •dth 'hi-tech' fir::-,s 
grc· ... ·ing a:-1d 'lc-.,~-tech • firr.1s dimi:-dE-h~:--~g in all inCustries. 
(c) Health, Ec·-.1c?.iicn o.nd ct:--.er -y•J':Jlic !;ervices \dil g::-c,.... 
( d ) .t... rea s c f t r. ~ t rave 1 i :-d: :..: ~: r ...,, 1 :1 ~ ... · h: c h · .. ; e c per c. t e ~ 1..; c h c. s 
CAT , h cl ida y s , f <: n i e s :;. :-, d .~.A ·.,· i i1 i ~' c ~ e a "e rr, a. r g i:: a 1l y . 
(g) ?rci'ef~ion:.l ~crvices 
property v.·ill i:~creo.se. 
acccuntancy, actuarial, 
(i) ~e\,' product~.::-~ facilities ·~·ill 'ce sr:1a1ler tha:1 in the pa:t 
- typically betv.•cen 10.) and 500 er:1;:·lc:,.•.:.:s. 
(j) \1'ith single status 'being p•·cgressively introduced the sccpe 
fer r:1ore than one unic:~ in nev.·ly crga:-,i"ed companies taking account 
cf char.ges in size \dll diminish sig:-~ificantly. These \dll be a 
l<.nocl< en effect in cc:o.;:;anies that currently have a nur;.bcr cf unicns. 
·. . . . .:- ;:- .• ... -:: .... : ... -:: . ·. ~ ... · .. -.~-- ·. :' ........ ::··· .. 
.-_ .. _.: .... 
... _ . 
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3. Where is /-.?EX in employment terms?· 
Our critica 1 ::-.embership is in the follo'.dr.g areas : 
(a) Engineering, 
half ot:r r.Jembership. 
due to. the slt:rr.p. 
.!.ero!:'pace, l-~:tcrs and Shipbuilding represents 
It has fal~e:1 b:th absolutely and relatively 
' 
(b) CAT, A.A., Tc·· . .;t· Operators and Ferries repre:o.::nts 16% cf o•.Jr · 
membershij). There a:-e prospects fer grc· ... ·th • 
. (c) Ft:el-!,~inir.g, Electricity a::d Oil represent 
membership. Only oil .:::ffers signiiica;-.t grc·..;th prospects. 
Q<l 
Ji:J cf 
(d) Foc-d, Dri::~. Co-ops ar,d Tc'!::>acco rqrc!:'ent 8% cf 
membership. Exi!:'ting r.:er.1berships are being reduced, but there is 
still scope in other· cc;n?snies to off:.:t this. 
(e) Other ir.dustri<:s represe;;t L~L 
(f) .. S.:rvices, ir.cL;ding TL'rS, >:gc.l, :nsurance repr<:Serlt f.~. 
There are large gro'-";t~ c?;::;crtunities in la·_..., acccur•tancy, c.nd other 
professional service!:'. 
(g) 
].1 a :1 a,;~ r s 
Co:;-.p·.J;er ~tc.ff 
Legal 
Finai:ce 
Staff i\ss('cicticns 
:-:1-:ech sir1g1e cgrc~r.:ent 
ccrqnnies like .:..3 E1.:ctrc:1ics 
Travel 
Oc:r bas:c i;-,d;.:strial me;:-:':;~rs~:ip base has to be protected 
and must be stt·engther.ed by using t!:e resources cf an amalgamatio:1 
to develop \dder and ceeper r.;embers;-,i? i:1 groups, c;nd by securing 
single unic:1 c;gree:r:.e:-Jts in high-tech cr r.e\v iT.anufacturing ind•.Jstries. 
The .. ,ords -.dcened c.nd deepened are i:o:pc-rts.nt. They rnean that 
-...·hichever·· unio:1 ·~·e a;:;algamate ·A·j;:,, .. ,.e need to · .. :iden our 
~er.,benhip ar.;ong tecl-::1icians a:-:d ~uperviscrs, strengthen our 
membership ar.;ong mar.sgers and cc::-.put<:r staff, and cover all 
e;nployees in single unic:1 situatic:H. The t\,'O best exer..plars c-f 
this trend are the /lA Section ail employees from management 
dov.-n-...·ards covered; and the Welsh /-.rea .. ,hich ir~ its single union 
agreement at AB Electrcnics and its agreement -...·ith Chartered Trust 
covers all employees plus all e;;-.plcyees at the Ho .. ,•ells Garage 
subsidiary - these 1\,•o companies prcvide half the Area's r.1embership. 
Other t:nicns have to be Ciljlable of supporting us in these 
objectives if an ar.;algamr.tion is to be to our advantage. 
···-:· ·_ .. · -.·.' .. ·.· ·-.. :;.·· •. 
·:-:· ::·· ···.·:: ···:·.·· ·"":::-• ... _t;. • .. :. -·· ... :.;-:- .'.: •.; 
..... ·· 
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Analysis of G;!:c:r Unions 
Other unic:.s c=.:i be c.naly~ed u:-~der a number of headings; 
contribution rate, rr:e;::"::~rship by i:-:d'J:try, co:-.tribution income, 
structure in regard to :::xecutive Ccuncil and Ccnfere1;ce all being 
important. 
(a) Contribution ?.:;. te. 
1 ) EMA 0.55% cf incc;:;e - brcad1y 
2) USDA H 
ccrr:parab~e to ot:r c·w'i1 5~ 
61p a ·~·ee~ 
3) APEX 78? a ·ae~ 
4) TG\\U SOp a ·.·eek 
5) AEU 
6) TASS 
82J a .,.·eei{ 
SL~ a ·.·eek 
7) ASTJ.lS E(> a v:eel< 
S) G~·lBATU 90? a -..:eek 
t\~tes : 
(i) ASTMS Execu,i·:e pro?oo-ed a cc:-.tributio:1 i:-,crease to their 
1986 Co::[erence but fai:d to get ;J-.e t"-.·c-t~irds r..ajori~y to g~:t it 
approved • 
. (ii) Any ccntrib·~::cn ra~e hig~;er 
ASHJS/T.t..SS could te o-e-,·erely ce:rir.:.:~.:c.l 
cc:r! pet i tcr s. 
than 
~o our 
th,;t ~greed c1 by 
i:-.:t:rests if ·.·e v:et·e 
(b) Ccr.tributic:1 i:-.ccme 1935 c.r.::i ";;rplus cr cef:cit 
Surplus 
1 ;-,c .;:.::-.e (Deficit) 
Th-::··~:::.:-,ds Thouo-ar:ds 
1 ) TG'.~U n,6:,5 7,234 
2) GMB.h.TU 25,!!!. 330 
3) 1-.EU 15,Ef.2 (1,3SJ) 
L) AST:.lS 9,f23 164 
5) TASS 6, 2;·.4 35) 
6) USDA';".' 6, f.S.J L.17 
7) £!-lA 2,6~9 LC6 
8) A.?EX 2,&::.5 2~6 
~:ct€:5 : 
(i) Co:-~trib~.:tio:1 incorr.e diviced by i'innual contributio:1 rate 
gives a good indication of paying r..t;;;C.ership. 
(ii) The AEU ir:crea~ed its nu!7l'cer d Officials in 1979 and has 
not reduced them until the recent ur.r.ouncemcnt. Hence their 
deficits in 1955 and 1956. \·ihile the TG\\'U, GMEATU, ASTMS, TASS 
and APEX have made periodic cuts h the slur:-.p. 
.·.···.·.. ··.·:···.· ·.·· 
.· .... ·· .... 
. . 
···::·;: 
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(iii) TASS still ha\"c an excess 
mergers with small craft unions. 
properties to cover the p::,;-'.:>lem. 
nu~ber of Officials due to the 
Th:y are selling cff surplus 
(c) !\umber of Off:dals 
1 ) TG\I'U 523 
2) GMBATU 270 
.3) AEU 217 
L) f..SHiS 90 
5) TASS 55 
6) USDAH 130 
7) EMA JS 
Sl APEX 1.2. 
1\ote:. 
1-.ny a~algar::=•:on will increase the relative surplus of 
Officials and Staff as the Frese;:t areas cf duplicatic:1 are 
rationalised. 
(d) .Ye;-;:bership ty lndustry 
·A paper is a~:acr.ed sho'-'·j;-,_s a bread industrial a::alysis 
of membership in each i~~~strial grou?:ng. 
Executive Council and Cc:::ercnce 
1.. • TG\•1 U have ::9 rr.e ;-;;be rs 0:1 t :-:ei r 
Prc-:rata f..?EX/1-.CTSS cc·.::d jointly exj:ect to 
·already have 3. 
Executive Ccur:ci 1. 
get 5 cr 6. 1-.CTSS 
TG\~U hold a biennial C.:::~~erence. ?e;::rcsentation is based on the 
rr.embership in cn.ch Reg:c::al Trade Gro'J?; 1 per 1,000 up to 5,000 
mei7obers, 1 r-er 2,000 tl-.c::eafter. Cur representatiGn \''O;Jld be about 
60 . 
A separate Conference \,·c.:ld be provided fer APEX/ACTSS to deal \dth 
industrial iss-..:es. 1t is net co·Jered l:Jy their Ru1es and v;ould ha-.•e 
to be the sCJbject d r.egctia t ion. 
2. The C·lEATU r::s.ve 33 r.1CI7:Jers o;t their E):ecuti\·e Council, 
based en three per Regie;;. They \'C'Jld .:xpect A?EX/!,1.HSA to have 
about 5/6 r.i.::;;;bers on the Executi\'e Ccu;-:cil -..-hen it reaches 200,000 
r.:embers. J,~ATSA curre•.tly have 3 rr . .:r..bcrs elected frc;n Regicns. 
GMBliTU hold an .h.nnual Conference \::.:;.sed 0n delegate fer every 
2,000 rr:embers. So A?EX could expect to have L2 delegates. 
The Rules give the Exec;.;tive pc· ... ·er to create industrial bodies but the 
question of representation and authcority cf an APEX/J.~ATSA Industrial 
Conference v.-could have to be negotiated. 
.. 
· . . :·· .. :· :·· ·.·.I :.. .·:. :·.: ·.'>. ·. · .. :·.:~ ~ . . · ·:. • ... 
.:.·· •.. 
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3. The AEU has c.:1 Exe:cutive Ccuncil of 11. APEX could 
secure 2 seats like the F.:-·.:ndry Section Jut there is a strong case for 
3. 
The National Comr:1ittee !-!as 124 delegc.t.:s but in the present economy 
drive this may be reduced. Many nill ?refer. the old 52 perso:1 
C6mmittee. On the F-:esent formula ;.PEX could expect 30 to . .-:o 
delega·te·s in propoi"tio:1 t~ the Foundry Section, but c:1ly half that 
number if the Cc;r.mi.ttee is halved •. 
As the AEU has no ,.;f:i:e co11ar sect\.::::1 they v:ould agree to cur 
having. an Industrial Cc:-,:erence li~e cur present .t.nnual Ccnference 
and retaining our existing Executive Cc:.;:-:cil fer industrial r.:atters. 
!,. ASH-IS and T.;5S currently E:ce talking cf merging their 
Executive Councils 0:1 the ':-asis cf eqt:al \"Cling nt.:T:1bers, even t)")ough 
ASTMS has suJstantially ::-.ere meu.bers than TASS. l-k· ... ·ever, fer 
APEX they .have indicated ;:·ro-rata re?:·cse:-,tation as the basis fer a:a 
amalgamation. The Jci:-.t Executive ·,..·,-uld have LS rr.embers, 2L fror:1 
each union. Clearly ::-.is -...·ould be tc:> large and it ,,·culd decrease 
in size over a ;;eriod ci ~ir.,c- .t.?::X co·~ld expect btt\,·ce:a S c.nd 10 
Executive Council r.;.;:r.,bc:·s ..,;hich ,,·.:·•Jld stre01gthen the press•Jre to 
reduce it. 
A Ru1es Revisic:-~ Co:-~f'Erer.ce ba!.'ed 0:1 ::-D voti:1g delegates fror:1 each 
unk:-~ ... :c'.lld d.:terr..ir,e •:-.e Rules fer .:-.e r..erged ·unic:1 cc\'<:ri ng the 
str:Jcture cf tr.e wni~:1. f.i:~ and re~:-cEc:--:tatic:1 at .!..:--:nual Cc·:--,fcrence 
and the s-ize a:-.d elfcti0:1 cf the Execu:i·:e Co'.lncil. .t..ST!-~S \,·culd 
group Brar.ches to ·c:1s~:re delegate ;:u 1,000 r.,e;::'::.ers. T.A.SS 
'''0uld elect its Represe:-.t=.tives ·at its Divi~ional CccJ~:cils. J..PEX 
could expect 9J to 110 c.::egates at s•.:c'1 an \nitial Ccnicrer.ce. 
5. l: S D A \V have a :1 Executive C c •.: :-. c i 1 c f six tee :1 r ~. e r., be r s plus 
the President, '•'ho are e!ected every t·~·o years by ballc·t cf ;:;e;:-:ters. 
The only diiierer.ce \dth oursehes is ;:-,at Officials are entitled to 
contest the pcsitic:1s fer the t:x.;c'.:th·e Cou:-,cil b·Jt it :is 
oven,·helr:1ingly a lay E~:ccutive. 1.".'e discussed \-:ith thcr:1 the 
que~tion ci P.PEX repreH;-,tation on a Jc.:r.t Executive. They said 
they ,,·ould leek to a fair settler.:ent fer both sides en the questi-:>:1 cf 
APEX r.:presentat:io:'l at tr.at le\'el. Tl:ey • ... ·o'.lld -..;ant to ir,tegrate 
over a pericd cf ti"rr.e the ;::emberships · . .-here this · ... ·as appropriate and 
acce?tnble. to bc·th sides so that cc:r:::-:.::.:1 groups cf r.:err:b.:rs ulti:.:ately 
beca;::e resp.:>nsi!:ile for electi:'lg Reti!:E!:E:ntatives to the Ex~cuti\'e 
Council. 
They have a Branch based Annual Co:-,fer.:nce. Unlike ourf.elves 
they allocate 17!% cf the contribut:c:-os to Branches but they are 
responsible fer paying the expenses cf their delegates to P.nnual 
Conference. They have apprC'xir:;ately 1,000 Branches which 
dcterr:1ines the size cf their Annual Conference. 
. · .. · .. 
·; . .......... : . ·. :· ·:. ·:. ··.::~ .: ·. • .. ·~ ..... ~:; ·· . 
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6. The EMA wc>.1l·:i ·.•ant a Federatic-:1. 
larger unit ,,,e could ~:eep cur Executive 
Conference intact, bi..it :':".~y have a federal 
which representation ·,,•o•.J:;:: need to be agreed. 
Industrial Implications 
(a) 
As v.·e w::-uld be the 
Council ar.d Annual 
biennial Conference at 
·\l'ith the' v.·hite cellar \,·,:-~;:ers in Fu.:1, Lccal cJ~d Central Government 
and the NHS Yery s:ro:-.s:y crgan~sed :10 amalgamation that '.>e are 
considering v.·ould really i;:ve us a base fer major cxpansio;1 i;& these 
industries. 
(b) Engineering 
In the engi:ieering comp=.:-.ies ccvered by a saGple sen·ey by the EEF 
it was sh.:--...•n that abo...:t 55% cf r:;ar;t'al ·.;.:T"ers v.·ere organised, \o:ith 
a large majcrity in tr.: .;Ell. Cr;ly L6% of staff '''crkers v.·ere 
organised, · sho\dng a good prc~<:rt:c.:-~ cf the ccr:1pa:des cr 
establishments net crga;;::ed a;.d l.:ss tl-:s.n full orga:-tisat:o:J amc:1g 
·.•hitc col1ar v.•.:-rk.:rs • .. ·:-.~~e crganised. The:-e are t\>o via~!e 
strategies in e:-:ginceri::~ - :o jdn · .. ·it"l .!.~J!.\5 and T.;ss to crea~e a 
large · ... :hit!'! cellar b1oc .:f 300,00-J -..:!-.ere ct'r r.:e:~'bcnhi? a:-1d p.:-licies 
\o.'CUld form lL% d the t.:-:=.1. The ;:·:·c':::>!e::-~ is ;hat ;;ith the gro· ... ·;h 
of single stC'.tus and s::-.g1e targair,i:-:g t?-1is prcvides only a half 
solution. The ctr.er •;:a':::>~e alH:rr;aci-.·e is to rr:-::rge v.•ith the .!..EU, 
·and· acquire their,· say, 2),000 \<hite ccll:;r r:-.er::bers. lhlf cf t))ese 
\•:ould be forc;;:~n a;;d a ~..:-t cf craft~~e::1 "'!..)u1d :-ub:eq'..:cnt1v bec~rr.e 
techr,icians. S::> c·..:r >.<;ctiating fie~d ·"·.:-·..:1d have t-:> \dCe:1 ·to c;;\'er 
these. ·Tbe t-.EU· ·~·ill ':enefit frcr:~ t:-.e cerrer:t ta!;.:s c:1 a revised 
Proct:dure P.g::..:c-me:.t. 
(c) Transport 
The TG\1'U is by far a:·,.: C.\,·ay the Jiggeot union. 
GMBATU and AST:,~s ha-.•e ·..:;;eful me;r.'::le:r;;!-1:;::. 
(d) Fc0d, Drink .:;~d Tobacco 
'3ut the 1-.EU, 
USDA'.v is by far the r:;c.s! significar1t t;;:i:::l, but the TG\·iU ar,d ~ 
are very im?crtant als.:-. AST!,',S is bE:tter organised th.:;n \,·e are 
overall, and T/,SS have ;s.ken i:1 tl'1e Tc'bacco Workers. 
Finance 
ASTMS has the greatest r.err,bcrship i:1 this group - although the CBU 
and BlFU both have lar;.:r mer:~bers~Jips. It is intEresting as a 
pointer to ho'.v' minds are moving t::o..,.ards industrial bafed unions, 
that BlFU has ah·ays replied to o:;r approaches that it is an 
industrial union v.·hile \•e are a \\hi:e cellar unic:1. B.:-th USD.t..\-1 
and the TG\1'U hc.ve small memberships thc.t \,•ould fit in with cer m ... n. 
The 30,000 rr.crnbers in (~ are probably ns::-ociated "'·ith TV hire 
companies. 
. . ":· .: :· .• .. ,: ·:·· . : ·. ·. ~ ._.: ·. . . 
.. : 
... ; 
·.' .... ·· .... 
... ·.: 
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Other Industries 
In chemicals the Gt-lBATU, T~and AST\:5 arc importar.i. 
In textiles the G!•13ATU a::d ·TG\~U are bportant. 
--In construction the TG\\U, .!.EU and Ol3ATU are important. 
Professional Services 
The o:-~ly U!iions that· are i:1 th:s fleld 5eriously are ,;?EX and .;STMS. 
\~e should need an image ·~·hoever .,.,·e a::-:algamate \dth that enab}es us 
to build v.:ry ~u'Jstant::.i:y on the ste?S '1-'e have so far taken to 
develo? this area. 
In Summarx 
There are several industries that are i:::;:oonant to us, b~,;t fer future 
grc-wrh and viability \.'e :1eed to de> foc:r things maintain and 
cevelcp cur pcsitic:1 <cs an irr.pcrtc.~.t c.:1icn i:1 r:1anufactt.:ri:lg 
strengther\ ··vur de\•elcp::-.e;-.t in transpcn - ra-;·idly de-.·el.:-p o~,;r ?-:-sitic:-~ 
and visibi!ity i:1 services - and thrc;.;g'1 c:ma1gamatic:1 stre:1gtr:en cur 
capacity to carry O;.Jt sir-.gle unic:1 ag:-ee:::ents ccveri1:g manual and 
staff er..jJlcyees. - 1:-~ pe.rticu1ar ;..·e :-.eed to cater for all grades and 
types of f.taif- I:.anage:::.:~.t, diice, cc:;-.?•J:er, technical ,:,:-,d ctr.er. 
Ccnclusio:1 
This basic an:;.lysis is r.e.:essary befc:-e ·~·e can exa:-;.ir:e o;; tr.e 21st 
February hc·.-1 ">-'e develc? cur respc;;:e :::> tr.e various cp?rcacr.es that 
v:e have recei\·ed. n·.e Executive Cc"~:-.cil needs to a~~ess the points 
that are i;;-.;:oortant a~c-~t each unio:1. It then r.ccds to consider 
what pohts ·~·e .,,_.c·u1::l. :.;;.:d ans'.,·ered by each of thu:1 in relation to 
their apprcf.ch on ~truc<t.:re, policy c:rd t:-.e role d our J~err.'t:ers. 
0:1ly ;..•he;; >:e have clear ans· ... ·ers to ·,h-e~e questions '1-:ill tr.e Ex(cutive 
Council be ab!e to co::-.e to a judg;:-,.;;:-,t as to which >:ould te most 
favourable to c\;r me;:-,\::cr,;' interest~. 
Roy A Grantham 
General Secretary 
,../G/RAG/DAH 
9.2.87. 
I 
·' 
.: .. ·· •.. 
EXPLOYXENT TRENDS 
7his paper concentrates excl·~s:.vely on tl":e t·.<o r..ajor institutes that add:·ess 
themselves to err•ployment fcrtc<:sts: narr.ely the Institute of E;;-.ployieent Research 
~arwic~ University and the !~stitute of Ma~p~~er Studies. Their most recent 
forecasts cover the years 1S::5 to 1990 .. 
There are differences in ap;~cach of the t~o icstitutes: IER concerns itself 
with published statistics ar::i ;:-,aero forecasting; n:s forecasts are cerived · 
froi!l e:;.ployer s-..:rveys. 
APEX tieeds to be locking to lo~ge~ term cevelo~~ent than th~ next three 
~·ears but·, ~>'ith t?-.e present "state of the a:-t" the best that ca:1 be provided 
is an assur..ptio:1 of the co:-.ti:::.;atio!1 of tr:e sigrdfica!1t tre:1cs icentifiep. 
In global teri::s ~he fc.rec::s:s differ, :n t':"":at IE~ pE-:-ceives a total em:;>loy~e:-1t 
grcv;th of sor..e 145,000, v:he~~as rr.·,s vis-.Jalis.:s a decline of sc;;,e 125,000. 
'r:ithin those totals, ho· ... ·evcr, 0:1 en industrial sector basis, there are sir;,ilcr 
trends identified. The most significant cf these is the perceive1 growth 
in the fine.ncial services l::·.;:;i:-:esscs sector of bt:t·~·c.:n ~:63,000 and 381,000 
jobs. The other a~ea of g~c~t~ is in constr~ct{on. Both i~stitutes visualise 
si~1ifica~t eecline in ~an~fa:t~ring ind~stry. pa~ticularly in e~gi~eering 
a~d its rela~ed"industries ¥~ere· jo~ losses of bet¥een 274,000 and 314,000 
are projected. Attached at a;?endix A is the IER projection of ind~strial 
err,ployr.:ent, secto:- by sector fro:!"! 1984 to 1:;so. 
I~S pre~icts a i~c¥t~ in e~;:cyrnent in s~all cospanies ¥~ich are defined in 
t~o ~ays.7~e fi~st adopted e~finitic~ is u~ter 200 e~plc~·ees; the ~eco~d 
is turno~e~ cf u~~er £1m in ~a~ufacturi~g a~j !250,000 i~ ot~er sectors 
(1981 prices). The fo:-ecast increase i:1 e~?loyrnent is 700,000 jcbs across 
all·secto~s. excl~ding agri:~lt~re a~j ene~gy. 
Conve~tio:1al ~is~o~ st:ggest5 :hat ~ith a cc~ti~~e1 s~itc~ frc~ ~an~facturi~g 
to service-s, t:-:-e gc:p bet·,\:e;:: ~he scut:., ea~t at:d tf",e r~st of ti-.e ccu:--1try 
~il~ be -~ide~ej. Research s~~~ies, ~c~ever, p~i~t to a more co:~pltx pictl~re. 
for exa~ple, s~~ce 1979, ~~i!e u~e~~lcy~e~t ~as g~o~ing in all rcgio~s, 
~~ere ~ere sc~~ ~a~tic~la~ a:--eai of st~c~g g~o~th. These ~ere: ~e~ tc~~s, 
rural a~eas, h~s~cric to~~s. :he s~a tc~~s cf ~he so~thcrn regie~. This 
trend sce~s to ~~ st~o~gly li~~ed to tte grc~th of the service sector as 
a~ increase i~ service ern~lc~~ent l~as occ~~rcd i~1 all regicns except East 
~i~la~ds, N0~t~ ~est and Yc~~:shire a~d H~=~~rside. 
Size of t~e ~~r~?lace is ~e!~!d to be extre~!ly important by !E~ es there 
is a strc~g statistical li~~ ~et~een unic~~satio:1 and the size cf establish-
~ent (~ot th~ o~·2rall size cf the emplcyi~g crgani$ation). T~ere a;.~ca!·s 
tote u critical level Of :::-~·~::--Jd soo e~.,~lo::~es. ej') to this poir.t t.:r.ionisa-
tion gro~s quite rapiely; a~:ve this fig~:e the ~ensity rates do not change 
~uch ~ith n1~y increase in t~e size of t~~ esta~lisl11nent. 
:tear·ir:g in r.;ir.d t.i":e I!·~S pl·eCiction cf er::plc·:,·:r,r-nt gro· .. :th in srr.all cor:-~pe::1ies, 
the gro~ing p~o~ensity to ~ecentralise anj in~eed split existi~g compahics 
into separate ~~its, this is a factcr which ceeds tote borne in mind. 
Another i~portant isst~e for ccnsi~eratio~ is the grcwi11g i~clinatio~ of 
• e:r.ploj'ers for si::glc union ag;·eer..ents. i;'l -;.he context of ;.·orl,place sites 
employing less tl":an ~00 peo?le, this is a consideration not 1ichtly to be 
dismissed. · 
.· .. ::·· ... :.·. · ......... : ..... • .:.·· .. 
. · .. 
. : ; ~ .:' .. . . . : . ~: . 
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In organisational terGs fro~ a tra~~_Union point of view, it also makes 
sense. The key proble~s~c~ev!r, erethe a~o~nt of effort and ti~e needed 
to ~ecruit in ccmpanies that fall belo~ t~e 200 employ~e level 
ahd the identification of those corn;anies which are likely to experience 
cr..ploy;.;ent gro·d:h -<l_nd -\he nece::::a1·y consultatic-·n· 1d th other u;;iord. 
bccupatior.al infotmat:ion is r.:.:-e difficult t:> co.-::e by and r::ust be more carefully 
interpreted. Both IER and I~S ?redict gro~th in the following occupations: 
engineers and scientists. ~a.:-~ic~ foresees a 9% growth in security occupations 
ahd a.24% gro~th in supervfs:.:-s of ~hite collar ~orkerS together with a 
_12%· increase. i11 r..anagers a:1d i:.:dnistrators. ES, en the other hand, sees 
~est of these occupations as .:-e~aining fairly static, with r::ain growth concentra-
ting mainly on part ti;::e staff, egainst a ~ackgrc~nd cf ai.ticipated jc~ 
loSses in operative a~d cler!c~l occ~patio~s. 
.·.· .. ::· ··.· ·= • · ..... · .•.. ·~: ·: ...... ·• ·, 
.... 
I I t.:c:·; ISTf 
To Delegates to Annual Conference 
and Members l\'ovember 1987 
Dear Fellow l··ler.:ber, 
Background to the ~~e_sctiations on Amalga.mation •.-ith the GMB 
Supplementary Re?ort !\o. 2 en Amalgamation sets out in 
structural ar:d financial is~:.1es that ha\'e been the subject 
negctiatior.s >dth the G:.l3 "''hich are reco:n:r:ended by the 
Council to the t:ovember C:::-:ference. 
detail tl:e 
of detailed 
Executive 
This st.ater.:ent deals 
y,•hich y,•ere referred 
amp 1i cat i en . 
y,·i~h other 
to .;,t the 
issues i:1 relation to 
June Conference but 
Amalgamation 
need further 
The Changing rUure 
Majer changes .,.:ill take ;::la.ce in ti':e r.ext ten years broadly as 
follows: 
1) Basic ir:dt:stries L~:e /.linir:g, S:eel and Shipbuilding •.dll 
emplcy fe· ... ·er pevj:>!e. 
2) J.!anufccturi:lg i•:dt.:s::-ics like Engineering, Chemicals and Feed 
'Will COntinUe to CeCrca!Oe but 'hi-:ech' CC'ri•pan!es \o:ou]d grew 
and 'lo .... ·-tech' ccm;:.c.:-:ies ·.vould dir;oinish: 
3) Health, Educatic-:1 a:-.d o;her !:'crvices ·~·i!l gro"''· 
.(;) Banking, Fhance and Distributk."l ·,.:ill gro·,..•. 
5) Areas d t~.e Travel Trade ~uc.h as CAT, Holidays, Ferries· and 
the AA \,•ill increase r::argina1ly. 
Prcfes~io:~al Services such as L.:gal, f..ccountancy and Actuarial 
will ir.crcas~. 
6) ;>:ew prod~.:ctic:1 fF.ciLties will be s:.1aller than in the past 
typically bet\,·ccn lC:·J and 500 err,?lcyees. 
7) h'ith the gre\>'th cf single status in industry the scope fer mere 
than cne union in nc\dy organised companies will diminish 
significantly. APEX needs to be part of an organisation that 
can cor.1prehensivcly represent a 1l employees. 
An amalgar.~ation "''it:-t the G:,·!B .,.·ith their majer membership in 
Manufacturing and Services - i:1 the Private and the Public 
Sectors greatly enhar.ccs our ability to tackle the~.e changes in 
the interests of cur mcr.:bcrs. 
· .. ,. :·.·. . :- .· ... .. :.-:·· . :::- ·~.: .·.":·~ .. -~··.:. •. ·:: ·.~. · .. ·..... .. : •. 
: ... . · ... 
::· 
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INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION 
How will an amalgamation ::.:iect our r.:embcrs in each industry: 
1 ) 
2} 
Engineeri;;g, Shipb•.;::ding and S<cel. 
The GJ.·:3 are creati:-._; a Craft and Engineering Section to )Cln 
. together the Bc-iler::-.::.~:ers ar.d their cv;n Engineering members. 
The GM3 is strong in electronics <he gro·.dng part of the 
industry. T0_;e:her the t""'o unions have ever 160,000 
mer!'lbers. 
Transpcrt 
APEX is strong in (.!.T, the AA and in sorr:e other parts of the 
industry. The C.\3 has fe>;cr r.:embers since they do net 
count their large S£.:•.:rity r.:em:,crshi? as transpcrt. The· t""'o 
unions have over 1.J,OOO members - as many as the National. 
Union d Seamen. 
The G~·~3 is 
me:T:bershi p. 
ver">• strong, .,_.hi'!e APEX has a:1 importa:1t 
n:~ joint r::embershi? is nearby 60,000. 
L) Er . .:n;y, C:l and !·~:~.::-,.g 
Tr.e G~·!3 is very strc.ng in Gas, Electricity, Hater a:1d 
Quarryi;;g. To;e::~er • ... ·c \•ould hu'.'e over 100,00-::J r::er.,bers. 
Sl Che;:-.ica1s 
The G!.~3 is a r.1ajcr force ".dth C\'er 25,000 me:m'bers. 
6) Textiles 
Tr:e Gl•\3 is strong i:1 Cotto:a a:~d \'.'oc-1. 
have c v e r 15, 000 r. e ;-:-, t: e r 5 • 
Joi:~tly the unions 
7) Co:1structicn, Buildi:-.~ a:~d Furniture 
The G:·l3 hos a ~·~'Jstantial r..err:b~:rship of over LO,OOO 
sccpe fer growth. Constructio:~ is poorly organi~ed 0:1 
5taff sice nnd ·.·:-.ich \dll ;:novice a great potential 
recruit;r.e;-.t. 
S) Business Services a:-.d Comrr.erce 
with 
the 
for 
The G~l3 has large memberships in Hire Purchase Finance and 
Security Staff. APEX has a •:ide r..embership. Together the 
unions have over 20,000 member5. 
·.· .. • .• • ... ·: • ·~.: ·: :: •. • • •. :. · ... ·.r,: ' .. (· ··• ... ·: ......... . 
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9) Distribution 
10) 
11) 
In the Retail and ;;:.clesale Trades the tv.'o unions have ever 
30,000 me:nbers. 
Local Authorities a:-.i NHS 
The GMB has 250,0-:·J members. 
New Technology and Computer Ccmpanies and Greenfield Sites· 
APEX has an imp~~:::-~t agrecme:-.t ·~·ith A.B. Electrcnics where 
we ha\'e 1,000 ·r.,~;:-.':ers plus r::aj.:-r n:embershi? at o.ther High 
Techno1cgy and Cc::-.~·.lter Compa:-oies. The G~l3 has several 
similar agrec;::ents. The \ihite Collar Section "''ill be 
res;:-onsible fer all :::.:ch staffs in an amalgamation and will be 
re.s;:>o:-~si'ble fer de·.-~1oping our r..e::-,bership in Computer, l\ew 
Tech:1olc-gy and Gr.:~:-.field Site Ccm;:Janies. 
12) Other Services 
APEX has · gre· • .:ing ::;e:-r.bership a::;c:1g Legal St~.ffs, 
Trade U:1ions Stafis, Insurance, S?crts and Leisure. 
lea~t fo·..:r cf the~e sectcrs tr.e G~.:3 has r.,embe;-ship 
reinfcrc~ grcv.'th. 
13) Unicn Services 
Printing, 
In at 
a:>d can 
\1'i:h a large r..e::-,":~rs:.ip it beccr::es easier to provide better 
services for r..er.:'::e~s. ln ell their ten Regions the Gl·13 
currer,t:y has full ;:::-.e staff de\'Oted to servicing their mer:1bers 
c:1 the fc11o·~·ing s·..:·:~ects:-
a) Legal Represe:-::=.tion - isst:es are dealt with closer to the 
r..ci;;bers.. 
b) Health and Sa:~:y - an area ···here ,,·e need to imprc\'e our 
~·ervice. 
c) Edt:ce.tion - th:y have one cf tl-,e finest Education Colleges 
i:1 the cc·untry ?1us en Educati.:-:1 Officer full tirr.e in each 
Regio-n. 
d) P.e~earch .:... they have a Research Officer to assist Officials 
and Pepreser.tatives in each Region. At national level 
the Gl·l3 Resea:-ch team is highly respected. Joined with 
c-'Jrs they v.·iil te a formidable team. Already y,·e are 
both regarded =.s the leaders on Pension issues. 
Negotiations 
Our staffs wi1l continue to be served by their existing Officials in 
negotiations. An amalgamated union y,·ould strengthen support in 
Research fe-r negotiations, in Publicity fer recruitment, in Education 
and Training, and in the groy,·ing area of Legal suppcrt on Company 
mergers, rights to infcrr.;ation, Equal Value cases and Pension 
prevision. 
·- 4 -
\'ihere there are P.PEX r:.:-:d C:!'l3 staff and ;;:anual members in. the sarr,~ 
Company or industry it \c::-·Jld be the intention to develc-j) systems cf 
co-operation to the mutual advantaf_e cf b.:th. 
ANNUAL COKFERENCE 
Only one ctf:er union the .!.:i:U offered t:s a \1'hite Coller Conference in 
addition to the ,!.nnual C.:->::erence cf the L'nic:1 - and their Conference 
only has one de~egate pc:r 6,000 ;;:embers. ASTMS is abandoning a 
Conference cf Branch ce:=;ates. \·."it~ TASS they are likely' to 
decide on a Conference t:a:;-=d 0:1 one celegE.te fer ab.:-t:t 1,500 to 2,000 
members. 1 ne TG\iU i":as a bie>,:·,ial Conference at v.·hich our 
representatio:1 .. ,ould be c.':;:·_;t 60. 
The three cay ,,·r..ite C.:c~"-r Cc.:~ferer,ce cf an amc.lagarr.ated union 
v.•ould ccst 60% cf tr.e. ccst cf tl;.e G!-\3 Cc:~ference. 
\1'e bargained very_ hard :;, get a fair c.rrangei7ient 
democratic traditiens ci ':.ranch partic1?atic:1 in 
APEX. 
tf:at continues the 
p.clicy making in 
1:1 lo~·ki::g at rep!"esentc.ti..:-~ c:1 the Ex-eci..!tivc Co~r:ci1s cf unio:1s \~,'e 
calcula:ed that \dth :he TC:h'U the ,;FEX c.:-.d ACTSS ;;.e::-:':·ers · .. :culd get 
5 to 6 r..e:-r."::ers e:1 :he E:o:.:ci.Hive Cc-u::cil, v.·ith ,!.CTSS c.~reacy havir.g 
three cf the ::cc.ts. 
l·.'ith .t,~.T:-.:~/T.!.SS ·v.·e ca lc"J:a:ed \-:e .,,·c:..::d get betv.·een S c.:-,d 1•) r..e ... bers 
i:-:itially, bt:t that tl-.e c.-e~all size cf ;;-.e Executive c.r,d cur seats on 
it \\·ou ~ d t·e ::·!".::'~res=- i v e l:·l re: cl :.:c~ d. 
Our r:egc.ti.,ti.:-:is \dt:'l tl":e G:-~3 have r.:s·J!ted i:1 an agr.:.:r;;eM for APEX 
to have 7 SEidS initiallv. P.fter icur years the \\"bite Cellar ~ectic:1 
(APEX-i·.!AT~.!,) \,·c··.Jld hi':\"e 1.::1 f.c;.ts :::-.d in additi0;1 c:.:t cf the te:1 
\\'c~cn' s ~ects c:1 11'".-= Ex-2..:t.:tive Ccunc~l c.b01Jt thr~e ;...·c-..:1d be -. .. ·~:1 b:; 
~\-hi te Ce1la r ;;-_e.-;-, ::e r s. 
1n c.ddition t!":ere v.·ou!d ::e a \\'hite Cc1lar Executive Co;-:-.;.,ittce cf 
a~o'..lt fiftee:-J r::e;-:,"ber;; c\·crsighting ail h"hi:e Cellar deve1c;:•r:-.er:ts. 
The res~li71ed .!.n:~ual Cc-::fereJ;ce at tJ-.e end of :\cverr.ber · . .:ill have t:1e 
vital task cf deciding \oihethcr to apprcve the prcj)c:als '"'e have 
jcintly agreed ,,·ith the C-\3 0:1 the Gcvern:r.ent and the Finances of an 
P.malgarr.ated L':-Jic:~. C.'l Finance tr,e G}.~3 l-:as lcan-:ed a· great deal 
from us. \{hite Cellar r.:ei7ibers in the amalgamated union .,,•euld pay 
10% less tha:1 the G!·IB rate, since our rr:embers do r.ot need Friendly 
Society Benefits. That means v.·e shall need only a Yery small 
increase in cur contributien rate next year to reach the agree:d 
figure. This represents the first bonus from the advantages \oo'e shall 
secure fror.1 bdng a large union. 
.. . · .. ·. 
.· .. :· . • •. ~·. ' .· ·: .•. ·.·:: .• :; ·• . • • • • • 0. • ·~ ••.• ; 
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!{ext year ''e have ir;;pcr:~.:-!t iss\:es to clear - a com:7lon rule book, 
the management struct1.::·~ of the n~· .. • union, the \·:hite Cellar 
strucn:re, the 1<:-cn tic-:1 of ~ifices a!!d co:::r::cn conditic;;s of employment. 
Thereafter ;he final dcc·~':'.ent •:ould be submitted to the Annual 
Conferences of both u:1io:-.~. and finally to a ballot of rr.embers. 
November is the real te:::t. ~!cr.bers a!"',d delegates have to \o:eigh 
the changes i:1 o~;r so::.:o:y <hat "'ill affect us a1l oYer the next 
t .... ·enty years, co::1e \:.~0::1 '' slu;:-•?· Tl":e old trade unio:1 moverr:er.t 
has not g~t the a:-ls·~·ers :~ c1:a:lge, bc.:au~-e it is too divided and 
:pends t00 rr.uch ti:r.e cc::-.7=ting {ns:ead d co-operating. !\o \-!hite 
Collar union cnn dfecth·;;:y ans· . .-er the changes in skill, in status 
and in the deve1.:·pr. . .::i"!t .:: co.-:-.mo:-1 b::.rgaini:lg for all employees. 
f.malgamatio;, ·~·i•h the G:.:::., and the c•l-.er ar.,algamaticns 1ha.t \oo'lll 
follov as others jcin us, ,:,::r.s to tackle 1!-.e:::e fundar..ental issues. 
\•,'hen our tear:1 star:ed ::-.~:::e negotiatk:-.s • .. ·e ..,·ere net all \.lnitc:d 0:1 
<'.;-r:algamating .. ,ith the (;:.!3. Toc:-.y after fcur months cf 
l!egotiatico:-.s ''e are t::-,:;.:-,i~::cus tl-:c.t ''c have chc~e:1 intelligent, 
corr.petent c!"'.d fcn,·a!"d 1.:-.:-~ing partr,ers. \1'e have cho~en people 
"·ho honestly \,'f.nt to b·.:::d a better ~.:::i;.-:1 · .. •ith \.lS c.r:d ha\'e been 
~repc.red to r..c.ke r..aj..:-r c~:-:.::essic:--as t.:' :...;s :D achi.cYe t~c..t cT"ld. 
Tl-.e prcpcsed a.-:-.alga:r:atic::-~ can ~;;nef!t .::Yery group of o\.:r r. . .::;:;':.lers. 
I ~tro;'lgly recc:-:-:::-.end it t;, ::-• .:::-.bers. 
>oy~,q;~~ 
General Secretary 
. :· 
.·'.•. 
._ ..... · 
~---------··-------- ------·--·----··-·--··--·----·------·------------·l 
1 {(j7Jf~f\~i"§ 
H.:orh-ing together 
\VE HOPE yo:1 wi!l YO:e ··::es'' in this b:::!loc- "yes" for the 
2!11?.l_san1~r!on, 2nd for:::.:: exciting nt\\' ft~a~:-e for o·.:r t'\\·o tini\.1~5. 
The ~,m,,lgr.rn~,cion -;vil! c;;.;:e a new union for rhe 199Js wd be-yond. 
It will gi"e rl-:e G:\13 ?.r..:J.!,PEX a mo~e po-.;erft:l Yoice co rc-rruenc 
pc·ople wo~~ing i:1 ~!I 1-;i:-:,~s of inJdstries u:d 2!lrypes d i('l:s. 
lt ,,·ill f:"e \:5 a srr.:-.::g c.r:i respected '':hi:e cc-:!,·,r seCliOEl. This will 
ncr r-.s 11 ~priP-gbo~~d for :::-(ru!rn~Jc-!it- ::l1c~-:-·::::g t:s ro cJ:e tr2 ... ~e li:1Io:1 
icer.ls znd <'.Clion to peo_?:e "·or~ing in new in-:c:stries, exrendir.g the 
f:.-.n:ie:rs of tr:<cc 1::-:!or<s::1. ,-\nd ic will gi,·e c:s?. cle~rer Yuicc i:1 
wi::n!!'.S a btt:cr Je:-.1 f.:.~ >·.hi:e coilJr st~,[f in c.:! in..:l1.1strics ;:nJ 
~~·i"\";CtS. 
\\'e ,,·j!J ;:lso t:se o~:r ((1:-:·.'::-::-:ed snen_£rh to p;c"i~Je new and b::·t:c-r 
sen·ices for \:nion :r.tn'~~rs- fin::nci:d sen·ices, r.e~lth <.:ld ~ .... :cy 
?.c,·ice, ltt;~l ser\'ice>, ec;::.:l rights ::nJ b::rg::ir.:::g skills co win ben(·r 
p;:)' ::d CO:JJi;)c,r.s for f::<:;Je r.t work. 
\'\'e u:-t;e y\.Y.l to Y0:e '"yes .. :o the ::n1:1!g:~!l"J~~:!:.:~:1- ~~.J :1 nC\V u;i;'---::1 [h:1t 
wiil k'e the ~rrcn~•h ~:,J ~!-;ill w prore(t ycr:r rights ~:t work ;o bui!J 
a be:t~cr L.~1~.;re. 
---d~"- 0""'-~ .. 
J .:)>:>~ ·:~);~.:.~:>'-:;;j 
'::-: ;· .. : ·: .~: .. -\ L 5: :~ ::: ·:: t.\ _:-: "/ - :_; .. ' '. J 
j 
·- -···-····---· .... ' 
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INSTRUlVtENT OF AN1ALGl:\.MATION 
Between 
GENERAl, MUNICIPAl, BOilERMAKERS AND AlliED 
TRADES UNION 
And 
ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAl, EXECUTIVE, 
ClERICAl ft.ND COMPUTER STAFF {APEX) 
This Instn:n;em of Ar;l::lgs:;,_:rion m,:de krw(·tn GE~ERAL, }.1UNICIPAL, 
BOILERM:\KERS Ai'D J.;LUED TRADES U~IO~ ~:nd ASSOCIATJO:N 
OF PROFESSlO)JAL, EXECUTIVE, CLERICAL AND C0)1PUTER 
STAFF (APEX) (herein~h·r called "the ::m~:dg:H112.ting unions") sh?.IJ, if 
duly ?.pproYed by a resoh:ric:-~ of the members d e:1ch of the amalg;;m::_ring 
unions, take effect on lsc J::-.:1::.ry 1989 or on the d:He of rhe regisrr;;rion of 
this ir.sa~~:er:r, ''hicheYt:r is rhe brer. 
Upon rhe co:nir.g inro oper~:io:1 of rhis instn.::i":enr the memt>ers of e::ch of 
the ?.malgar;·,::ring t~nions ,,-:;) become me:l!~trs of the r:m:ilg;:m::red union, 
robe cr:lJed "G:\m··, r:r:.:l be s:..:b;ecr tO th;:.t ~:n!on's ruks. 
The rules of rhe c;ms)g;:ill;::ed union sh:::ll be ?.S ser our in the n1lebook 
\vhich is ~,;r;::ched ro and fu~::·.s p:::rr of this ir.srrumenr. 
Signed: 
John Edmonds 
Genc:ral Secretary 
Olga M Mean 
Jim Morrell 
Derek Gladwin 
Signed: 
Roy Grantham 
Ge-neral Secretary 
Ken Smith 
Rose Degiorgio 
Jean Travis 
TO ALL fv\E/\ftBERS Of- APEX 
T },KE ::\OTICE rbr rhe iSS3 Conference :\:-.3 rh Exec12tiYe Council of rhe 
;\ssoci:nion of Profe>sic:1~1. L::-.:uriYe, Cleriul ~,;;d Compner Srsff (;\PEX) h3Ye 
reso!Yed rh<.c a b;,Jloc cf i:s ::·.embers be held :o .:Jeci,4e w)xrhcr ,-\PEX sh::ll 
2:11alg~mJ re wir !1 ri":e Ge::er ?.], ~,~~:nicipal, Ik·i 1er:1::o.'.:ers :: nd All id Tr:des U nior1. 
A b!loc CJf d·.e Ge-r.er;J, ~'~':;-::c:p.:l, l),,iJc-:-;:·,.:'.;c·•s ::nd AllieJ Tr2dc-s l'n:cn 
n:e;-r!btrs :s i:~u :.ei:\g hti3. 
1·he tern~s ?.::d co:-:l~;r:.:~~s cr :;:e pro?os-:-3 .~:::.:~g::nl~t!on :;re ~c·r o~:c in d-:e 
Jnsrrumer.r c,f ;\n~~~_g.::~·,;,r:cn, -;-. hich acco:r:p.;:O:ts :.:-,d forms pr.rr of this -:.:or ice. 
The Jr.srr:.rr.tr.r (i:'c::c.:i::g rl·.e :-c::es c·f the r:e-:' ·~:<:>:1) <::lclthis Notice h;,\e be(:n 
::pp:-o,-ed by t~.c Ce:-\iric(-.lic~:i (1:·~-ictr. 
Then rbce the \'o:ing P;;t:;:-r i:l the pC·_t'.":i:l U.Yelope 2nd pc5r ir. DO 1'\0T 
AfFJX A SL\\li?. 
Voting sh;o.lj CCllr.:::e:;:ce C:1 )fl~:!·.!.1y, 28th :\'olc":<~c-r. l9SS. Yot:r \\Iring r~1p(;r 
n;usr 3rri\·e ~t /•.!-'EX, 22 \\'crp!e l~o.:J, Lc•:10.:c:1 S\'Vi9 cJBR by ?-.lorhi::y J9rh 
December i9SS . 
.. D0 )WI ~:pp;o1·e :l~e Jr.str!:ctnt of ,-\m~li;.::L:ric·:1 of :\PEX with 1he Ctner::l, 
}.h!>'ici;:d, Boi:en:;:,~:crs c.nJ ,!,:~ieJ Trc.f.fs Unic/' 
ROY GRANTHAl\~ 
GENERAL SECRETARY 
VOTING PAPER 
Do you approve the Instrument of Amalgamation of the 
Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer 
Staff (APEX) with the General, Municipal, Boilermakers and 
Allied Trades Union? 
PLACE AN "X:' AGAINST YOUR CHOICE 
'-----y ES----'-----'1 IL.___N 0 -----"---------' 
Voting Papers containing more than one cross or containing 
marks other than a cross will not be counted . 
. . . · .. 
